Narrative:

I had planned to make a VFR flight with my fiance. I left work a half hour early to give us plenty of time to complete the flight before dark. I called 1800-WX-brief to obtain a standard weather briefing. I was told by the briefer that the entire route of flight was showing unrestricted visibility.we departed that evening with full fuel. We had about 20 miles of visibility. I set my navigation 2 radio to the VOR; selected navigation 2 on the audio panel to confirm the identification of the VOR but could not make it out over the ATC chatter on communication 1. I deselected communication 1 so that I could just hear the VOR and only heard an identifier every 30 seconds. I deselected navigation 2 and reselected communication 1. I heard a transmission from the ATC to another aircraft which cut out mid-sentence. My radio reception capability had just failed. Approaching my destination; about 15 miles out; I contacted approach to see if I could get cleared through their class C airspace instead of going around. I did not hear a response. I set my DME equipment to the airport VOR and kept an arc distance of 12 DME from the airport VOR which would keep me out of their airspace by two miles and bring me right to my destination. We were approximately 2 miles from our destination when the visibility dropped to about 6 miles. I was over the large channel of water leading into the mouth of the bay and had already started a descent. I could see the power plant situated in the bay about 1.5 miles from the field and could see the lights along the beach of our destination and set myself up for a right base to the runway. Approximately 1/2 mile away from our destination; (the miniature airplane on my GPS's nose was touching the airport icon); at 600 ft AGL - (we were over water with an elevation of 0 AGL); the lights of our destination became hazy and about 5 seconds later the airplane entered a dense bank of fog sweeping in from the ocean. I could see the beam of my landing light able to penetrate about 5 ft into the fog. I entered the fog because my line of sight and visibility on the approach looking down from 600 ft was steeper than my actual line of descent; and I could not see the fog against the background of the ocean.going right to the instruments and calling upon my recent instrument experience; I stopped my descent and climbed 200 ft to 800 ft (a power plant at 500 AGL was on my left) before starting a left 180 degree; standard-rate turn. We returned to visual conditions about 15 seconds after reversing course. After coming out of the fog bank the visibility was deteriorating rapidly down to 5 miles and at that time I told my fiancé that we were not going to make it to the beach tonight. As I climbed above 1;000 ft; I set a course back home. At about 1;100 ft I noticed that dense fog was quickly consuming the ground below me at an unimaginable rate. Within 10 minutes we were going to be trapped on top. Then; right on cue; my GPS quit.at this time I attempted to contact approach again to see if they could provide me with the weather information at my home airport; and at the nearby class C because if conditions were deteriorating as rapidly as they were at my home airport as they were here; it would be socked in IFR before we could get home. I did not hear the transmissions coming from approach and at that time; so with a marginal safety window getting smaller and smaller; I told myself that I had to assume that my home airport was fogging up just as fast as it was where I am; and that a diversion to the class C airport was the best option. It was the closest airport; had the longest runway around and had a VOR with DME. My DME was reading 11.0 miles from the class C airport and I tuned my navigation 2 VOR to take me directly to the airport which was on a heading of 050 from my present location. Other than the occasional hole big enough to see a baseball field or parking lot through in the intensifying clouds below me; I had no ground reference to navigate by. Thankfully the conditions above 1;500 ft were VMC. I attempted to contact approach one more time stating just my north number and waiting for a response. At 10 miles I started to just give them advisory position reports in case they had other operations going on at the time hoping they could hear me. 'Approach; this is north***** we are 9.2 DME at 2;000 ft heading 050 directly to the field; conditions are deteriorating and we are heading your way and will attempt to land.my next position report was at 7.2 miles to which I also did not hear the response (I later learned they were responding). At this time; I thought that the error might be on my end and getting into such close proximity to a large airport with commercial service; I decided the best course of action was to try them again on 121.50 because I knew if anybody would hear me; it would be on that frequency. I stated my position and heading again this time 5 miles from the field. I informed them that my intentions were to over fly the field; and see if I could locate the runway through one of the last remaining holes in the solidifying layer while I circled. I also could not hear the controller's attempts to communicate with me on that frequency. In a final attempt to communicate with the approach controllers and advise them of the urgency of the situation; I selected 7700 on my transponder; because I was told as a student pilot that doing this makes your radar return on their screen 'jump out' and that they would see me coming if they had previously not. At about 1.0 mile DME I asked them to 'turn the lights up as high as they would go; so I would have a better chance of seeing them through the cloud deck'. As I watched the DME come within .2 miles and my VOR indicator switch from to to from; I knew I was right over the field. I told my fiancé to look out the windows on her side and look for runway lights. Within 15 seconds; she had spotted the first 1;000 ft of the runway (I could see the green REIL) and pointed them out to me. I made a turn to the left and locked my eyes on the runway. My next transmission was 'ATC; we have a runway in sight directly parallel to our present heading; were currently on a downwind and will make a 180 and attempt to land. As I slowed down to vfe and began to lower the flaps; I noticed my altimeter was reading 2;000 ft. To make a normal landing; I would have to fly a longer downwind; but the longer downwind I flew the view of the runway through the opening began to get fuzzier. I knew if I didn't turn now; I could possibly lose my chance to land VFR. I entered a left base and knew I would be high. I set the power to idle; applied full right rudder; threw in left aileron and put the airplane into a slip at 85 KTS. Lining up on final; we were coming in at about 85 KTS indicated. As I descended through 1;000 ft; my angle to the lights was changing and my once crystal clear view of the runway lights began to disappear right in front of me. 600 ft was getting marginal again and at 400 ft AGL there was nothing more than a dim glow surrounding each light. Finally; passing through 300 ft; I broke out; everything came into view; extremely clear; I had about 3;000 ft of runway remaining and we had an uneventful landing. I taxied clear of the runway; pulled out my airport facility directory and opened the back of the book to the airport's diagram to see where I would need to taxi once I received a light gun signal. About a minute later I saw flashing lights of an airport vehicle approaching the aircraft. I shut the engine down and the driver told me he would get in touch with the tower and I could follow him to the FBO. We taxied to the FBO; shut the aircraft down and parked for the night. We got out of the plane; looked up and saw that all the holes in the sky were gone. I was told by an employee at the FBO that they had been shut down for the past 4 nights due to dense fog and that the airport didn't have any operations going on at that time. A controller inthe TRACON told me that recently they have been going from great visibility to solid IFR in a small window of 20-30 minutes for the past few nights. He had asked me why I didn't head back home; since they were still reporting 10 miles of visibility and clear skies. I had told the controller that I was calling them to see if they could provide me with the weather at my home airport; but since I could not communicate; I erred on the side of caution and decided the best thing to do was to get the airplane on the ground considering rapidly deteriorating conditions. The only thing going through my mind was I've been to quite a few aviation safety faast seminars and have heard of so many fatal accidents in which pilots had multiple opportunities to get the airplane on the ground and chose to continue on or try the same approach that didn't work the last 3 times because they didn't want to cause a commotion or get in trouble. The speaker in the presentation had a wonderful take on that mindset. 'I'd rather be tried by 12 than carried by 6.' so I told the controller I tried everything I could to communicate with him; position reports; 121.5; 7700….really anything to make my intentions known. I decided right then and there that at the first safe opportunity; I was going to land. In short; I saw a runway through the clouds at the class C airport and I had a 100% opportunity to get on the ground; albeit with the possibility of having a few questions to answer when I landed. I chose that guaranteed lifeline over 'hoping' that I would be able to get in when I got back home.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Trapped by IMC conditions as he approached his destination the pilot of a PA28; who had previously lost radio reception capability; elected to divert to another airport where he was able to maintain ground contact long enough to make a safe landing.

Narrative: I had planned to make a VFR flight with my fiance. I left work a half hour early to give us plenty of time to complete the flight before dark. I called 1800-WX-Brief to obtain a standard weather briefing. I was told by the Briefer that the entire route of flight was showing unrestricted visibility.We departed that evening with full fuel. We had about 20 miles of visibility. I set my NAV 2 radio to the VOR; selected NAV 2 on the audio panel to confirm the ID of the VOR but could not make it out over the ATC chatter on COM 1. I deselected COM 1 so that I could just hear the VOR and only heard an identifier every 30 seconds. I deselected NAV 2 and reselected COM 1. I heard a transmission from the ATC to another aircraft which cut out mid-sentence. My radio reception capability had just failed. Approaching my destination; about 15 miles out; I contacted Approach to see if I could get cleared through their Class C airspace instead of going around. I did not hear a response. I set my DME equipment to the airport VOR and kept an arc distance of 12 DME from the airport VOR which would keep me out of their airspace by two miles and bring me right to my destination. We were approximately 2 miles from our destination when the visibility dropped to about 6 miles. I was over the large channel of water leading into the mouth of the bay and had already started a descent. I could see the power plant situated in the bay about 1.5 miles from the field and could see the lights along the beach of our destination and set myself up for a right base to the runway. Approximately 1/2 mile away from our destination; (the miniature airplane on my GPS's nose was touching the airport icon); at 600 FT AGL - (we were over water with an elevation of 0 AGL); The lights of our destination became hazy and about 5 seconds later the airplane entered a dense bank of fog sweeping in from the ocean. I could see the beam of my landing light able to penetrate about 5 FT into the fog. I entered the fog because my line of sight and visibility on the approach looking down from 600 FT was steeper than my actual line of descent; and I could not see the fog against the background of the ocean.Going right to the instruments and calling upon my recent instrument experience; I stopped my descent and climbed 200 FT to 800 FT (a power plant at 500 AGL was on my left) before starting a left 180 degree; standard-rate turn. We returned to visual conditions about 15 seconds after reversing course. After coming out of the fog bank the visibility was deteriorating rapidly down to 5 miles and at that time I told my fiancé that we were not going to make it to the beach tonight. As I climbed above 1;000 FT; I set a course back home. At about 1;100 FT I noticed that dense fog was quickly consuming the ground below me at an unimaginable rate. Within 10 minutes we were going to be trapped on top. Then; right on cue; my GPS quit.At this time I attempted to contact Approach again to see if they could provide me with the weather information at my home airport; and at the nearby Class C because if conditions were deteriorating as rapidly as they were at my home airport as they were here; it would be socked in IFR before we could get home. I did not hear the transmissions coming from Approach and at that time; so with a marginal safety window getting smaller and smaller; I told myself that I had to assume that my home airport was fogging up just as fast as it was where I am; and that a diversion to the Class C airport was the best option. It was the closest airport; had the longest runway around and had a VOR with DME. My DME was reading 11.0 miles from the Class C airport and I tuned my NAV 2 VOR to take me directly to the airport which was on a heading of 050 from my present location. Other than the occasional hole big enough to see a baseball field or parking lot through in the intensifying clouds below me; I had no ground reference to navigate by. Thankfully the conditions above 1;500 FT were VMC. I attempted to contact Approach one more time stating just my N number and waiting for a response. At 10 miles I started to just give them advisory position reports in case they had other operations going on at the time hoping they could hear me. 'Approach; this is N***** we are 9.2 DME at 2;000 FT heading 050 directly to the field; conditions are deteriorating and we are heading your way and will attempt to land.My next position report was at 7.2 miles to which I also did not hear the response (I later learned they were responding). At this time; I thought that the error might be on my end and getting into such close proximity to a large airport with commercial service; I decided the best course of action was to try them again on 121.50 because I knew if anybody would hear me; it would be on that frequency. I stated my position and heading again this time 5 miles from the field. I informed them that my intentions were to over fly the field; and see if I could locate the runway through one of the last remaining holes in the solidifying layer while I circled. I also could not hear the Controller's attempts to communicate with me on that frequency. In a final attempt to communicate with the Approach Controllers and advise them of the urgency of the situation; I selected 7700 on my transponder; because I was told as a student pilot that doing this makes your radar return on their screen 'jump out' and that they would see me coming if they had previously not. At about 1.0 mile DME I asked them to 'turn the lights up as high as they would go; so I would have a better chance of seeing them through the cloud deck'. As I watched the DME come within .2 miles and my VOR indicator switch from TO to FROM; I knew I was right over the field. I told my fiancé to look out the windows on her side and look for runway lights. Within 15 seconds; she had spotted the first 1;000 FT of the runway (I could see the Green REIL) and pointed them out to me. I made a turn to the left and locked my eyes on the runway. My next transmission was 'ATC; we have a runway in sight directly parallel to our present heading; were currently on a downwind and will make a 180 and attempt to land. As I slowed down to VFE and began to lower the flaps; I noticed my altimeter was reading 2;000 FT. To make a normal landing; I would have to fly a longer downwind; but the longer downwind I flew the view of the runway through the opening began to get fuzzier. I knew if I didn't turn now; I could possibly lose my chance to land VFR. I entered a left base and knew I would be high. I set the power to idle; applied full right rudder; threw in left aileron and put the airplane into a slip at 85 KTS. Lining up on final; we were coming in at about 85 KTS indicated. As I descended through 1;000 FT; my angle to the lights was changing and my once crystal clear view of the runway lights began to disappear right in front of me. 600 FT was getting marginal again and at 400 FT AGL there was nothing more than a dim glow surrounding each light. Finally; passing through 300 FT; I broke out; everything came into view; extremely clear; I had about 3;000 FT of runway remaining and we had an uneventful landing. I taxied clear of the runway; pulled out my Airport Facility Directory and opened the back of the book to the airport's diagram to see where I would need to taxi once I received a light gun signal. About a minute later I saw flashing lights of an airport vehicle approaching the aircraft. I shut the engine down and the driver told me he would get in touch with the Tower and I could follow him to the FBO. We taxied to the FBO; shut the aircraft down and parked for the night. We got out of the plane; looked up and saw that all the holes in the sky were gone. I was told by an employee at the FBO that they had been shut down for the past 4 nights due to dense fog and that the airport didn't have any operations going on at that time. A controller inthe TRACON told me that recently they have been going from great visibility to solid IFR in a small window of 20-30 minutes for the past few nights. He had asked me why I didn't head back home; since they were still reporting 10 miles of visibility and clear skies. I had told the Controller that I was calling them to see if they could provide me with the weather at my home airport; but since I could not communicate; I erred on the side of caution and decided the best thing to do was to get the airplane on the ground considering rapidly deteriorating conditions. The only thing going through my mind was I've been to quite a few aviation safety FAAST seminars and have heard of so many fatal accidents in which pilots had multiple opportunities to get the airplane on the ground and chose to continue on or try the same approach that didn't work the last 3 times because they didn't want to cause a commotion or get in trouble. The speaker in the presentation had a wonderful take on that mindset. 'I'd rather be tried by 12 than carried by 6.' So I told the Controller I tried everything I could to communicate with him; position reports; 121.5; 7700….really anything to make my intentions known. I decided right then and there that at the first safe opportunity; I was going to land. In short; I saw a runway through the clouds at the Class C airport and I had a 100% opportunity to get on the ground; albeit with the possibility of having a few questions to answer when I landed. I chose that guaranteed lifeline over 'hoping' that I would be able to get in when I got back home.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.