Narrative:

This event began with a short notice call from scheduling. The captain arrived first to the airplane; readying it completely for the already delayed flight. The first officer then arrived to the already boarded and ready-to-go aircraft. The cockpit crew had flown previously and was familiar with each other. The captain said everything was done preflight wise. The first officer said okay; they ran the checklist; and pushed back. Climbing through around FL310; the cabin altitude warning horn sounded. The crew performed the memory items; descended to 10;000 ft; and then ran the QRH checklist. The first officer was pilot not flying; therefore; running the checklist. It was discovered during this process that the landing altitude was set to 11;000 ft. The mistake was evident; corrected; and the flight continued on with no further event.I believe this occurred for a number of reasons. First; [there was] complacency on the first officer's side in trusting the captain to do the first officer's job. Second; the captain had a bad vantage point with the analog pressurization panel; so the mistake was an easy one to make. Third; the pressure of getting a delayed flight out as soon as possible resulted in skipping steps that would've prevented this. What could be done differently is to not succumb to the pressure of on time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 reserve flight crew reports operating a delayed flight with the Captain arriving first and doing the cockpit set up and the First Officer arriving with the passengers already boarded and the flight ready to depart. Passing FL310 the cabin altitude warning horn sounds and an emergency descent is initiated. It is discovered that the landing elevation is incorrectly set to 11;000 FT instead of 1;000 FT.

Narrative: This event began with a short notice call from Scheduling. The Captain arrived first to the airplane; readying it completely for the already delayed flight. The First Officer then arrived to the already boarded and ready-to-go aircraft. The cockpit crew had flown previously and was familiar with each other. The Captain said everything was done preflight wise. The First Officer said okay; they ran the checklist; and pushed back. Climbing through around FL310; the Cabin Altitude Warning Horn sounded. The crew performed the memory items; descended to 10;000 FT; and then ran the QRH Checklist. The First Officer was pilot not flying; therefore; running the checklist. It was discovered during this process that the landing altitude was set to 11;000 FT. The mistake was evident; corrected; and the flight continued on with no further event.I believe this occurred for a number of reasons. First; [there was] complacency on the First Officer's side in trusting the Captain to do the First Officer's job. Second; the Captain had a bad vantage point with the analog pressurization panel; so the mistake was an easy one to make. Third; the pressure of getting a delayed flight out as soon as possible resulted in skipping steps that would've prevented this. What could be done differently is to not succumb to the pressure of on time.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.