Narrative:

I was functioning as pilot not flying. Once in the terminal area we encountered moderate mixed ice from about 13;000 ft and below. We were established on final to the runway. ATC asked us to slow to 170 KTS. We were already at flaps 9 and we didn't want to add any more flaps; as there was significant ice on the unheated parts of the windscreen. I would estimate 1/2 to 3/4 of an inch; as well as ice accumulation covering about 2/3 of the direct view window. We opted to drop the landing gear instead of lowering flaps to slow. About a minute or two later at 1;800 ft AGL or so we heard and felt a strange vibration that lasted about one second. The captain and I both said 'what was that' and out of the corner of my eye I saw the engine 2 lp vibration indicator about 2/3 up the gauge and dropping rapidly. I am assuming it was in the amber or red before I saw it. A few seconds later we smelled something odd. A few seconds after that smoke started pouring into the cockpit. We donned our oxygen masks and smoke goggles. We were talking with tower and I said something to the extent of '[call sign]; emergency; smoke; roll trucks.' the flight attendant called us; but we were too busy to answer. By this point the smoke was getting incredibly thick; to the point where we couldn't see the pfd or mfd from a normal seated position. From a normal approach to having smoke so thick we couldn't see anything took about 30 seconds. The captain and I both realized that we needed to get the plane on the ground immediately and that a go-around was not an option. The captain flew the aircraft and finished configuring it for landing. The smoke was so thick he had to have his chin over the yoke just to see the pfd. During this time I manually dropped the passenger oxygen masks and tried to press the cabin dump button. I pressed this and the man button next to it; because I couldn't remember which was which and due to the smoke I couldn't see the buttons. I looked at the EICAS and saw E2 oil low pressure. I then heard the egpws say 'glide slope' and we focused on getting the plane on the ground. Neither of us remembers when the autopilot was disconnected or whether or not it was disconnected intentionally. I divided my time between leaning in to monitor airspeed; glide slope; and localizer deviations and putting my face to the windscreen to look for approach lights; as we were in IMC. The weather was about 3/4 mile visibility with clouds at 300 ft and light snow with freezing fog. I made callouts to the captain such as '500;' 'airspeed;' and so on. I saw the approach lights at about 200 AGL and yelled 'approach lights' several times. The captain did not look up; which was a good idea because there was no way of seeing outside and monitoring airspeed at the same time. I kept yelling AGL altitudes; and then yelled 'flare' and assisted with pulling back on the yoke. We touched down firmly; bounced; and the captain brought the aircraft to a stop. We immediately opened the direct view windows to ventilate the cabin and assessed what was really going on with the aircraft. The three EICAS annunciations I remember are bagg smoke; lav smoke; and E2 oil press lo. We agreed that there was no engine fire; so we began to run the evacuation checklist. The captain made a PA 'evacuate main cabin door' and the flight attendant conducted the evacuation. I made a call to ATC saying that we were evacuating on the runway. When we got off the plane all the passengers were already outside. The captain followed me and was the last off. By this time a few airport operations suvs were already there and the passengers were on the side of the runway. We asked if anybody was hurt; and everybody seemed ok initially. The fire department came and secured the aircraft and also popped the overwing emergency exits. We were then transported to the airport operation's facility where we debriefed. We had smoke in cabin/cockpit; ice; low visibility; possibility of engine 2 failing; lack of timeto coordinate a desirable response. This is the type of scenario that no simulator event could have ever prepared us for. I had no idea that it was possible for smoke to be that thick. To be honest; we were lucky to make the runway. Monday morning quarterbacking tells me we could have done things differently; but in a situation this extreme I don't think what you do matters as long as you keep everybody alive.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Following an apparent engine malfunction on final; an EMB145 filled with smoke so thick the flight crew could not see the instruments. Even with ice encrusted windscreens; they were able to land then successfully evacuate the aircraft.

Narrative: I was functioning as pilot not flying. Once in the terminal area we encountered moderate mixed ice from about 13;000 FT and below. We were established on final to the runway. ATC asked us to slow to 170 KTS. We were already at flaps 9 and we didn't want to add any more flaps; as there was significant ice on the unheated parts of the windscreen. I would estimate 1/2 to 3/4 of an inch; as well as ice accumulation covering about 2/3 of the direct view window. We opted to drop the landing gear instead of lowering flaps to slow. About a minute or two later at 1;800 FT AGL or so we heard and felt a strange vibration that lasted about one second. The Captain and I both said 'what was that' and out of the corner of my eye I saw the Engine 2 LP vibration indicator about 2/3 up the gauge and dropping rapidly. I am assuming it was in the amber or red before I saw it. A few seconds later we smelled something odd. A few seconds after that smoke started pouring into the cockpit. We donned our oxygen masks and smoke goggles. We were talking with Tower and I said something to the extent of '[Call sign]; emergency; smoke; roll trucks.' The Flight Attendant called us; but we were too busy to answer. By this point the smoke was getting incredibly thick; to the point where we couldn't see the PFD or MFD from a normal seated position. From a normal approach to having smoke so thick we couldn't see anything took about 30 seconds. The Captain and I both realized that we needed to get the plane on the ground immediately and that a go-around was not an option. The Captain flew the aircraft and finished configuring it for landing. The smoke was so thick he had to have his chin over the yoke just to see the PFD. During this time I manually dropped the passenger oxygen masks and tried to press the cabin DUMP button. I pressed this and the MAN button next to it; because I couldn't remember which was which and due to the smoke I couldn't see the buttons. I looked at the EICAS and saw E2 Oil Low pressure. I then heard the EGPWS say 'glide slope' and we focused on getting the plane on the ground. Neither of us remembers when the autopilot was disconnected or whether or not it was disconnected intentionally. I divided my time between leaning in to monitor airspeed; glide slope; and localizer deviations and putting my face to the windscreen to look for approach lights; as we were in IMC. The weather was about 3/4 mile visibility with clouds at 300 FT and light snow with freezing fog. I made callouts to the Captain such as '500;' 'airspeed;' and so on. I saw the approach lights at about 200 AGL and yelled 'approach lights' several times. The Captain did not look up; which was a good idea because there was no way of seeing outside and monitoring airspeed at the same time. I kept yelling AGL altitudes; and then yelled 'flare' and assisted with pulling back on the yoke. We touched down firmly; bounced; and the Captain brought the aircraft to a stop. We immediately opened the direct view windows to ventilate the cabin and assessed what was really going on with the aircraft. The three EICAS annunciations I remember are BAGG SMOKE; LAV SMOKE; and E2 OIL PRESS LO. We agreed that there was no engine fire; so we began to run the evacuation checklist. The Captain made a PA 'evacuate main cabin door' and the Flight Attendant conducted the evacuation. I made a call to ATC saying that we were evacuating on the runway. When we got off the plane all the passengers were already outside. The Captain followed me and was the last off. By this time a few Airport Operations SUVs were already there and the passengers were on the side of the runway. We asked if anybody was hurt; and everybody seemed OK initially. The Fire Department came and secured the aircraft and also popped the overwing emergency exits. We were then transported to the Airport Operation's facility where we debriefed. We had smoke in cabin/cockpit; ice; low visibility; possibility of engine 2 failing; lack of timeto coordinate a desirable response. This is the type of scenario that no simulator event could have ever prepared us for. I had no idea that it was possible for smoke to be that thick. To be honest; we were lucky to make the runway. Monday morning quarterbacking tells me we could have done things differently; but in a situation this extreme I don't think what you do matters as long as you keep everybody alive.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.