Narrative:

We were on a regularly scheduled part 121 flight to durango; co. We were on with den center. We asked him what the minimum vectoring altitude was that we could expect near durango. This information was to supplement our descent planning. He told us 11;000 ft within 10 miles of the airport. About 20 miles from the airport we called dro in sight and he had us switch to dro advisory frequency. The captain was flying and we each had terrain pulled up on our mfd's. We referenced the terrain on the mfd it appeared safe to descend. The captain initiated a descent and we heard the GPWS say 'terrain; terrain; pull-up'. The captain then initiated a climb using full power and a vertical rate to match the vsi. Shortly thereafter the warning went away. We re-assessed our descent planning and felt it appropriate to resume the descent shortly thereafter. The rest of the flight proceeded uneventfully. Our error was to start the descent a little too early in mountainous terrain. The threat was potential ground contact; which was avoided with the combined efforts of automation and immediate pilot input. The undesired aircraft state was dealt with immediately and decisively. Pilot action minimized the length of time of the undesired aircraft state. In retrospect; I think we should have planned on flying to the VOR; then descending; and doing a circle to land on 21. There is a VOR on the field; with an ILS; VOR; and RNAV to runway 3. No instrument approaches to 21. We were landing on runway 21 due to a tailwind component of 14 if we landed on runway 3. The approach to runway 21 was visual. Though it was VMC; it was night; and no moon (we were under a broken layer). Note: our commercial charts say runway 21 is the preferred runway though there are no instrument approaches to that runway. I'm sure this has to do with the mountains to the northeast of the field.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An Air Carrier First Officer reported taking evasive action to a TERRAIN; PULL UP warning during a night descent into DRO after they started the approach descent too early with an 11;000 FT MVA within ten miles of the airport.

Narrative: We were on a regularly scheduled Part 121 flight to Durango; CO. We were on with DEN center. We asked him what the minimum vectoring altitude was that we could expect near Durango. This information was to supplement our descent planning. He told us 11;000 FT within 10 miles of the airport. About 20 miles from the airport we called DRO in sight and he had us switch to DRO advisory frequency. The Captain was flying and we each had terrain pulled up on our MFD's. We referenced the terrain on the MFD it appeared safe to descend. The Captain initiated a descent and we heard the GPWS say 'terrain; terrain; pull-up'. The Captain then initiated a climb using full power and a vertical rate to match the VSI. Shortly thereafter the warning went away. We re-assessed our descent planning and felt it appropriate to resume the descent shortly thereafter. The rest of the flight proceeded uneventfully. Our error was to start the descent a little too early in mountainous terrain. The threat was potential ground contact; which was avoided with the combined efforts of automation and immediate pilot input. The undesired aircraft state was dealt with immediately and decisively. Pilot action minimized the length of time of the undesired aircraft state. In retrospect; I think we should have planned on flying to the VOR; then descending; and doing a circle to land on 21. There is a VOR on the field; with an ILS; VOR; and RNAV to Runway 3. No instrument approaches to 21. We were landing on Runway 21 due to a tailwind component of 14 if we landed on Runway 3. The approach to Runway 21 was visual. Though it was VMC; it was night; and no moon (we were under a broken layer). Note: our Commercial charts say Runway 21 is the preferred runway though there are no instrument approaches to that runway. I'm sure this has to do with the mountains to the northeast of the field.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.