37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1008476 |
Time | |
Date | 201205 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | JAX.TRACON |
State Reference | FL |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Fighting Falcon F16 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Initial Climb |
Route In Use | Direct |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Instrument |
Experience | Flight Crew Total 5500 Flight Crew Type 5500 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Altitude Overshoot Deviation - Procedural Clearance |
Narrative:
This event occurred on the 'first flight' of a modified/new series military aircraft; the qf-16; a drone version of the venerable F-16. The flight went very well and the aircraft flew great; however; either a misunderstanding or miscommunication caused a problem and potential violation with ATC.the flight was a functional check flight (fcf) requiring an unrestricted quick climb to 15;000 ft MSL. The pilot has a number of parameters to carefully monitor during fcf flights. In accordance with boeing procedures and military material command directives; a chase aircraft was required for this test. Our chase aircraft was a qf-4; an aircraft with significantly inferior performance compared with the qf-16. Techniques to best utilize the qf-4 as a safety chase were discussed during both ground training as well as during the mission briefing. Due to the tremendous performance differences; I decided to utilize an 'airborne pickup.'this procedure requires the chase aircraft to takeoff first; fly an overhead pattern and order brake release for the test aircraft. By doing this the disadvantaged qf-4 already has some airspeed and the pilot can remain focused on the chase task. One of my major concerns is that neither the qf-16 nor the qf-4 have radar; TCAS; or data link systems of any kind installed. 'See and avoid' along with ATC flight following; IFR clearances; etc.; are our best and safest means of avoiding other aircraft. During the fcf the pilot must spend considerable time looking both inside the cockpit at various instruments as well as outside looking at various flight control surfaces. This means very little time and attention is available for clearing the flight path; therefore; ATC provides an invaluable service to our program. In fact in my opinion; this program could not be safely accomplished without ATC services.the instructions that I 'heard' from the tower were 'cleared for takeoff; cleared for unrestricted climb on runway heading to 15;000 ft.' I also thought I was to maintain runway heading until reaching 15;000 ft and then proceed on the flight plan route. During the takeoff roll the qf-16 performance was outstanding and perhaps a little better than I am used to given the sea level elevation and a clean aircraft. I typically fly the F-16 at 2;300 ft pressure altitude and with a centerline fuel tank or wing tanks giving the aircraft much more drag; weight; and thus; less performance than today. In any event; I did not initiate the pull down from near vertical early enough to stop at 15;000 MSL and went above 15;000 ft momentarily to almost 16;000 ft and then immediately corrected. Given the tremendous climb rate I actually only considered this a minor deviation. In this instance there were no other aircraft in the vicinity; but there could have been. For that reason we need to ensure that ATC fully understands what the unrestricted climb is and that they do not clear us for the climb if there are any potential traffic conflicts.the flight was very successful and uneventful; however I received a radio call from base directing me to call approach on landing. I asked one of our pilot controllers/duty pilots to call ATC for me and inform them that I did get their message and that I would call at the first opportunity. He informed me that the controller he spoke with was very upset about the potential deviation as well as with our [LOA-letter of agreement] for operating the qf-16. I called after mission debrief and a new controller was on duty. He suggested that I contact the supervisor another day. The bottom line is that when a human is dealing with multiple tasks or concerns at the same time; it is easier to make a mistake. The lesson learned for me is slow down and ensure you understand your clearance exactly. I know it's an old lesson but again it seems that communication is one of the most difficult things that we do.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: The pilot of a 'manned mission' of the first QF-16 UAV was unable to pitch over from a maximum performance takeoff in a timely fashion to avoid exceeding his cleared altitude of 15;000 FT MSL by nearly 1;000 FT.
Narrative: This event occurred on the 'First Flight' of a modified/new series military aircraft; the QF-16; a drone version of the venerable F-16. The flight went very well and the aircraft flew great; however; either a misunderstanding or miscommunication caused a problem and potential violation with ATC.The flight was a Functional Check Flight (FCF) requiring an unrestricted quick climb to 15;000 FT MSL. The pilot has a number of parameters to carefully monitor during FCF flights. In accordance with Boeing procedures and Military Material Command directives; a chase aircraft was required for this test. Our chase aircraft was a QF-4; an aircraft with significantly inferior performance compared with the QF-16. Techniques to best utilize the QF-4 as a safety chase were discussed during both ground training as well as during the mission briefing. Due to the tremendous performance differences; I decided to utilize an 'Airborne Pickup.'This procedure requires the chase aircraft to takeoff first; fly an overhead pattern and order brake release for the test aircraft. By doing this the disadvantaged QF-4 already has some airspeed and the pilot can remain focused on the chase task. One of my major concerns is that neither the QF-16 nor the QF-4 have radar; TCAS; or data link systems of any kind installed. 'See and Avoid' along with ATC flight following; IFR clearances; etc.; are our best and safest means of avoiding other aircraft. During the FCF the pilot must spend considerable time looking both inside the cockpit at various instruments as well as outside looking at various flight control surfaces. This means very little time and attention is available for clearing the flight path; therefore; ATC provides an invaluable service to our program. In fact in my opinion; this program could not be safely accomplished without ATC services.The instructions that I 'heard' from the Tower were 'Cleared for takeoff; cleared for unrestricted climb on runway heading to 15;000 FT.' I also thought I was to maintain runway heading until reaching 15;000 FT and then proceed on the flight plan route. During the takeoff roll the QF-16 performance was outstanding and perhaps a little better than I am used to given the sea level elevation and a clean aircraft. I typically fly the F-16 at 2;300 FT pressure altitude and with a centerline fuel tank or wing tanks giving the aircraft much more drag; weight; and thus; less performance than today. In any event; I did not initiate the pull down from near vertical early enough to stop at 15;000 MSL and went above 15;000 FT momentarily to almost 16;000 FT and then immediately corrected. Given the tremendous climb rate I actually only considered this a minor deviation. In this instance there were no other aircraft in the vicinity; but there could have been. For that reason we need to ensure that ATC fully understands what the unrestricted climb is and that they do not clear us for the climb if there are any potential traffic conflicts.The flight was very successful and uneventful; however I received a radio call from base directing me to call Approach on landing. I asked one of our pilot controllers/duty pilots to call ATC for me and inform them that I did get their message and that I would call at the first opportunity. He informed me that the Controller he spoke with was very upset about the potential deviation as well as with our [LOA-Letter of Agreement] for operating the QF-16. I called after mission debrief and a new Controller was on duty. He suggested that I contact the supervisor another day. The bottom line is that when a human is dealing with multiple tasks or concerns at the same time; it is easier to make a mistake. The lesson learned for me is slow down and ensure you understand your clearance exactly. I know it's an old lesson but again it seems that communication is one of the most difficult things that we do.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.