Narrative:

On approach into mia runway 9 with windshear advisories in affect and heavy thunderstorms about 2 miles from the field; the captain flying found himself too fast to extend final landing flaps by 1;000 ft so he pitched up the aircraft which placed us high on the glideslope. After extending final flaps he attempted to dive for the path by idling power and pulling the speed brakes. At this point I stated that he should consider a go-around because I did not see how he could stabilize this approach. At 400 ft I observed the following un-stabilized approach characteristics: airspeed ref+20; sink rate aural warning; PAPI indicating 4 red; speed brakes starting to retract; throttles near idle. At this point; I commanded a go around twice; but the captain under his flight manual authority; 'captain's responsibility for operational control;' overrode my command. After the captain made it clear that he was overriding my command for a go around; I stated one more time that the approach was unstable and that he should execute a missed approach. On the ground I advised the captain of the parameters that I observed and why he should have aborted the approach; he stated that there was plenty of runway available to recover the approach and land. I also stated that we should file a report and we could expect to get a call. This situation created a clear conflict between the flight manual that the captain's 'order stands; it is to be followed'; and the operations manual section 'go-around requirements. The directed go-around will be executed unless an emergency situation overrides.' as the first officer; once the captain overrides my advice; I am relegated to survival mode. In other words until I feel that my life is in danger and hope that it is not too late; I am along for the ride. That is not a comfortable position to be in.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An Air Carrier First Officer reported that his Captain; the flying pilot; refused to execute a go around during an unstabilized approach.

Narrative: On approach into MIA Runway 9 with windshear advisories in affect and heavy thunderstorms about 2 miles from the field; the Captain flying found himself too fast to extend final landing flaps by 1;000 FT so he pitched up the aircraft which placed us high on the glideslope. After extending final flaps he attempted to dive for the path by idling power and pulling the speed brakes. At this point I stated that he should consider a go-around because I did not see how he could stabilize this approach. At 400 FT I observed the following un-stabilized approach characteristics: Airspeed Ref+20; Sink rate Aural Warning; PAPI indicating 4 red; speed brakes starting to retract; throttles near idle. At this point; I commanded a Go Around twice; but the Captain under his Flight Manual authority; 'Captain's Responsibility for operational control;' overrode my command. After the Captain made it clear that he was overriding my command for a Go Around; I stated one more time that the approach was unstable and that he should execute a missed approach. On the ground I advised the Captain of the parameters that I observed and why he should have aborted the approach; he stated that there was plenty of runway available to recover the approach and land. I also stated that we should file a report and we could expect to get a call. This situation created a clear conflict between the Flight Manual that the Captain's 'order stands; it is to be followed'; and the Operations Manual Section 'Go-Around requirements. The directed go-around will be executed unless an emergency situation overrides.' As the First officer; once the Captain overrides my advice; I am relegated to survival mode. In other words until I feel that my life is in danger and hope that it is not too late; I am along for the ride. That is not a comfortable position to be in.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.