Narrative:

Airport was operating in south flow; runway 15; with excellent VFR weather. Maintenance was being performed on the runway 33 glide slope with a BE20 performing flight check operations in opposite direction flow for runway 33. I had been briefed that the BE20 was running race track patterns on the localizer for runway 33 and breaking off to the east at 2 miles from the runway. I was working ground control/FD/clearance delivery (ground control/flight data/clearance delivery). I heard the local controller cpc in training clear a stearman for take off from runway 15 at intersection J. A few seconds later I heard the local controller cpc/it say 'oh' and I looked over to see the local controller cpc/it looking out the window to the southeast. I turned to the southeast and saw a BE20 on descending approach for runway 33 at a very high rate of speed. Immediately I heard the local controller cpc/it cancel take off for the stearman and instruct the aircraft to exit the runway. Next I heard the local controller cpc/it attempt radio contact with the BE20. As I looked back and forth between the two aircraft; I saw the following sequence of events occurring simultaneously: (1) the stearman turned around from the runway back toward taxiway J as the BE20 crossed the runway 33 threshold at approximately 20 ft AGL. (2) the stearman crossed the runway edge onto taxiway J as the BE20 passed taxiway F at approximately 20 ft AGL. (3) the stearman crossed the hold lines from taxiway J onto taxiway a as the BE20 passed taxiway H and started a steep climbing right turn. Having observed the stearman depart hundreds of times over the years; I know the aircraft's usual and customary departure roll time; climb rate and departure attitude. Had the local controller cpc/it not taken corrective action; and had the stearman become airborne; I have no doubt that there would have been a collision above the runway with the BE20. After the event; I was told by the local controller trainer that no approach to the runway had been coordinated by the D10 controller and the BE20 was not on local frequency until after the BE20 had turned away from the runway. The above event was only one of many possible dangers which could have occurred with any flight check aircraft. Tower personnel expected the flight check aircraft to be flying a race track pattern and not completing approach to the runway. Nothing otherwise had been coordinated. There could have been a runway crossing in progress; a vehicle performing runway inspection; a runway taxi operation; an aircraft with line up and wait instructions; etc. The point being that it is very dangerous to have a flight check aircraft making an approach to a runway; opposite direction to runway flow or not; and the aircraft to not be on the tower frequency. The tower controller needs to have communication with the flight check aircraft in order to be able to send the aircraft around; issue traffic or any other necessary instruction. It is understood that flight check pilots have abundant workload for the purpose of their flight. Nevertheless; regardless of any coordination that may or may not have been agreed between tower controller and approach controller; it is paramount that the pilots and tower controller be in direct communication when the aircraft is approaching the runway. I recommend policy be set forth that at least one of the flight check pilots must be in direct communication with the tower controller when completing approach to any runway. If there is a need for the aircraft to be in communication with approach control all the way to the runway; there is still the absolute need to also be in communication with the tower. To prevent catastrophe; this should be the flight crew policy at all times; regardless of any coordination between controllers.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Tower Controller described a potential collision between a departure and a Flight Check aircraft conducting opposite direction operations; the reporter offering a number of preventive recommendations.

Narrative: Airport was operating in south flow; Runway 15; with excellent VFR weather. Maintenance was being performed on the Runway 33 glide slope with a BE20 performing flight check operations in opposite direction flow for Runway 33. I had been briefed that the BE20 was running race track patterns on the localizer for Runway 33 and breaking off to the east at 2 miles from the runway. I was working GC/FD/CD (Ground Control/Flight Data/Clearance Delivery). I heard the Local Controller CPC in training clear a Stearman for take off from Runway 15 at Intersection J. A few seconds later I heard the Local Controller CPC/IT say 'oh' and I looked over to see the Local Controller CPC/IT looking out the window to the southeast. I turned to the southeast and saw a BE20 on descending approach for Runway 33 at a very high rate of speed. Immediately I heard the Local Controller CPC/IT cancel take off for the Stearman and instruct the aircraft to exit the runway. Next I heard the Local Controller CPC/IT attempt radio contact with the BE20. As I looked back and forth between the two aircraft; I saw the following sequence of events occurring simultaneously: (1) The Stearman turned around from the runway back toward Taxiway J as the BE20 crossed the Runway 33 threshold at approximately 20 FT AGL. (2) The Stearman crossed the runway edge onto Taxiway J as the BE20 passed Taxiway F at approximately 20 FT AGL. (3) The Stearman crossed the hold lines from Taxiway J onto Taxiway A as the BE20 passed Taxiway H and started a steep climbing right turn. Having observed the Stearman depart hundreds of times over the years; I know the aircraft's usual and customary departure roll time; climb rate and departure attitude. Had the Local Controller CPC/IT not taken corrective action; and had the Stearman become airborne; I have no doubt that there would have been a collision above the runway with the BE20. After the event; I was told by the Local Controller trainer that no approach to the runway had been coordinated by the D10 Controller and the BE20 was not on Local frequency until after the BE20 had turned away from the runway. The above event was only one of many possible dangers which could have occurred with any Flight Check aircraft. Tower personnel expected the Flight Check aircraft to be flying a race track pattern and not completing approach to the runway. Nothing otherwise had been coordinated. There could have been a runway crossing in progress; a vehicle performing runway inspection; a runway taxi operation; an aircraft with line up and wait instructions; etc. The point being that it is very dangerous to have a Flight Check aircraft making an approach to a runway; opposite direction to runway flow or not; and the aircraft to not be on the Tower frequency. The Tower Controller needs to have communication with the Flight Check aircraft in order to be able to send the aircraft around; issue traffic or any other necessary instruction. It is understood that Flight Check pilots have abundant workload for the purpose of their flight. Nevertheless; regardless of any coordination that may or may not have been agreed between Tower Controller and Approach Controller; it is paramount that the pilots and Tower Controller be in direct communication when the aircraft is approaching the runway. I recommend policy be set forth that at least one of the Flight Check pilots must be in direct communication with the Tower Controller when completing approach to any runway. If there is a need for the aircraft to be in communication with Approach Control all the way to the runway; there is still the absolute need to also be in communication with the Tower. To prevent catastrophe; this should be the flight crew policy at all times; regardless of any coordination between controllers.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.