Narrative:

We were running late due to weather and ATC delays. We were given a clearance to taxi for runway 18L; ground control changed our runway to 18C; so we were on our way to spot 2; when our runway changed again to 36R due to thunderstorms and other ATC factors. We shut down one engine. We were watching the weather move in and observing other aircraft taking off and maneuvering around thunderstorms. We were recalculating takeoff data and V speeds (etc) with all of the changing conditions. When we were approaching the front of the line for takeoff we restarted the engine and I was about to call for the 'flaps 8 before takeoff checklist' when we began discussing a white 6 indication on our inboard left btms [brake temperature monitoring system]. We communicated with tower that we were going to need some time; and they were going to taxi us down the runway and back in line. Then it cooled to green; we announced that we were no longer going to need the delay. We immediately got a 'line up and wait' clearance; followed by a 'cleared for takeoff' clearance; as we lined up we were watching the radar map and the TCAS of other aircraft to see their departure route. We transferred controls to the first officer; and he was then the flying pilot. He added power and we immediately received a 'to config flaps' warning. We communicated with ATC; rolled down the runway to a clear taxiway and we notified the flight attendant. We contacted dispatch for a revalidation and maintenance for reassurance. We reconfigured the aircraft for takeoff and left when it was our turn without further incident.the conditions were changing rapidly and as we adapted; we allowed ourselves to be distracted by the btms indication. When it cleared we failed to get back into the regular flow of doing the checklist. I never called for the before takeoff or the takeoff checklist. Once we were in the front of the takeoff line and something wasn't 'perfect' or set up as normal; we did the right thing by asking to be re-sequenced so we could have time to work it out. We should have stuck to our plan instead of trying to jump back into normal operations as soon as the messaged improved. When my normal flow was interrupted I failed to get back to normal procedures. This was poor multi-tasking. I guess I got too focused on getting out of clt before the thunderstorm stopped all departures and felt rushed into asking for a takeoff clearance. It would have been infinitely safer to get re-sequenced for departure and taken extra time to depart. In the future; I will be sure to take a moment to double check that we didn't overlook such huge procedures. In rushed situations; with changing runways; weather; and aircraft configurations it is even more crucial to double check and cross check that we didn't skip over something while dealing with irregular ops. Non standard operations require even more vigilance than routine ones do.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ200 flight crew describe the factors leading up to an attempted takeoff with the flaps not set and the before takeoff checklist not accomplished. The Configuration warning sounds when the thrust is advanced for takeoff and the takeoff is rejected.

Narrative: We were running late due to weather and ATC delays. We were given a clearance to taxi for Runway 18L; Ground Control changed our runway to 18C; so we were on our way to spot 2; when our runway changed again to 36R due to thunderstorms and other ATC factors. We shut down one engine. We were watching the weather move in and observing other aircraft taking off and maneuvering around thunderstorms. We were recalculating takeoff data and V speeds (etc) with all of the changing conditions. When we were approaching the front of the line for takeoff we restarted the engine and I was about to call for the 'flaps 8 before takeoff checklist' when we began discussing a white 6 indication on our inboard left BTMS [Brake Temperature Monitoring System]. We communicated with Tower that we were going to need some time; and they were going to taxi us down the runway and back in line. Then it cooled to green; we announced that we were no longer going to need the delay. We immediately got a 'line up and wait' clearance; followed by a 'cleared for takeoff' clearance; as we lined up we were watching the radar map and the TCAS of other aircraft to see their departure route. We transferred controls to the First Officer; and he was then the flying pilot. He added power and we immediately received a 'TO Config flaps' warning. We communicated with ATC; rolled down the runway to a clear taxiway and we notified the Flight Attendant. We contacted Dispatch for a revalidation and Maintenance for reassurance. We reconfigured the aircraft for takeoff and left when it was our turn without further incident.The conditions were changing rapidly and as we adapted; we allowed ourselves to be distracted by the BTMS indication. When it cleared we failed to get back into the regular flow of doing the checklist. I never called for the before takeoff or the takeoff checklist. Once we were in the front of the takeoff line and something wasn't 'perfect' or set up as normal; we did the right thing by asking to be re-sequenced so we could have time to work it out. We should have stuck to our plan instead of trying to jump back into normal operations as soon as the messaged improved. When my normal flow was interrupted I failed to get back to normal procedures. This was poor multi-tasking. I guess I got too focused on getting out of CLT before the thunderstorm stopped all departures and felt rushed into asking for a takeoff clearance. It would have been infinitely safer to get re-sequenced for departure and taken extra time to depart. In the future; I will be sure to take a moment to double check that we didn't overlook such huge procedures. In rushed situations; with changing runways; weather; and aircraft configurations it is even more crucial to double check and cross check that we didn't skip over something while dealing with irregular ops. Non standard operations require even more vigilance than routine ones do.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.