Narrative:

I was working the east radar position. The os was sitting next to me at the south radar position monitoring training that was in progress at the west radar position. I observed a pilatus ARTS data tag approximately 35-40 nm northeast of the gsp airport (vicinity of the eho airport) at FL260. I had an IFR flight progress strip on the pilatus indicating that the aircraft was inbound to land at gsp. Normally; high performance IFR aircraft inbound to gsp from the northeast; are handed off from charlotte approach control descending to 10;000 ft considering the height and position of the pilatus relative to gsp; it caused some concern. The os noticed the same thing and mentioned it to me and asked if I knew anything about it to which I replied negative. Atlanta center sector 31 called with an apreq stating that the pilatus was at FL240 and heading 180 asking how we wanted the aircraft handed off to us. The os took the call and coordinated a 230 heading and control for right turns to which sector 31 approved. Gsp was landing runway 22 in VFR conditions and advertising visual approaches; so weather was not a factor. The pilatus checked in out of FL180 descending to 11;000 ft requesting a turn towards gsp. I issued the altimeter and verified that the pilatus had the current ATIS; gave the aircraft a turn direct lymen (the outer marker on the ILS runway 22 approach) and descended them to 5;000 ft. The pilatus read back all instructions correctly. During this time; the os and I were discussing the descent rate of the pilatus as the aircraft descended from FL240 to 11;000 in approximately 10-15 miles; which made me concerned that something was not quite right considering the descent rate and the request at FL180 to turn to the airport. Although the pilot(s) did not indicate anything was wrong or amiss; I still felt there was a sense of urgency for them to get to the airport as soon as possible. I issued a descent clearance to maintain 4;000 ft to the pilatus. The read back was correct along with reporting 'the field is in sight'. I told the pilatus that I would have an approach clearance for them in a minute; as the aircraft was approximately 18 NM east southeast of gsp and approximately 6 NM east southeast of spa. During this time; the radar flight data position was coordinating with me for an IFR release on a citation off of spa airport runway 23; which is located approximately 12 NM east of gsp. I issued maintain 3;000 and runway heading and released the citation for departure off of spa. Discussion ensued with os that perhaps the pilatus had spa in sight instead of gsp due to the aircraft's position to both airports and again the descent rate of the aircraft. I pointed out both airports to the pilatus to which the reply was 'both in sight'. I informed the pilatus of the citation departure at spa off runway 23 and that they could expect their approach clearance to runway 22 at gsp once they were past spa. The pilatus responded with 'looking' and then 'I think I got him in sight now'. I asked the pilatus if they could maintain visual separation from the citation; to which the reply was 'yes sir' and 'uh huh'. Due to the sense of urgency I felt from the pilatus; I then cleared them for 'visual approach left base runway 22 proceed direct lymen). The pilatus read back the clearance correctly. I then told the pilatus to maintain visual separation from the citation departing spa airport and restated the direction of the citation's departure off runway 23. The pilatus responded with 'we'll be keeping him in sight'. As the pilatus was number one to gsp in a sequence of four aircraft; I instructed him to keep his speed up as much as practical for succeeding traffic to gsp. The response was that they would keep their speed up and restated again that they had the traffic in sight rolling at spa. I observed the pilatus heading westbound towards the departure path of the citation instead of maintaining a more northwesterly course that direct lymen would put them on. I instructed the pilatus to turn due north and to pass north of the spa airport for the traffic to which they read back the instructions correctly and again stated 'traffic in sight'. I issued a traffic alert to the pilatus in reference to the departing citation climbing to 3;000. The pilatus responded 'we got him in sight; he's going over the top of us sir'. I responded with 'roger'. I issued radar contact to the citation to see if they were on frequency yet. The citation checked on frequency level at 3;000 with the pilatus in sight. I issued radar contact to the citation and informed them that the pilatus had them in sight and was maintaining visual separation. I then issued a climb to 10;000 ft and to maintain runway heading. I then instructed the pilatus to keep speed up again and to contact gsp ATCT. I then got the citation on course and over to atlanta center. Do not allow the pilot to talk you into a clearance when you are not prepared to issue it or are not comfortable with it; i.e. Possible conflict of departure aircraft off satellite airport. Second; upon review of the recordings; I discovered that the pilatus used their call sign less than 20% of the time when responding to my instructions. Aside from the fact that there were no bleed over or stepped on transmissions indicating confusion and no voice recognition software available; there is no way to positively prove that the pilatus was the aircraft providing visual separation. Of course; during the 'the heat of the battle' as it were; we don't always pick up on clipped or dropped call signs from pilot's especially during moderate or greater workloads. Exercising due vigilance when communicating with pilot's is paramount to safety as we continue to have hear back/read back forums all the time. Third; pilot's lack of acknowledging instructions with their call sign as well as not following headings issued and the instructions to go north of spa airport when they instead flew to the south and west right into the runway 23 departure path. Pilot's need to comply with instructions (they are being issued for a reason; safety) and acknowledge with their call sign and not be so complacent. Basically; had I not allowed myself to be lured into the perceived urgency of the pilatus getting to gsp right away; I would have kept them at 4;000 until past spa airport and then cleared them for the visual approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GSP Controller described a conflict event between an IFR aircraft cleared for a Visual Approach to GSP and an IFR departure from a satellite airport; the reporter acknowledging a lack of positive separation during the event.

Narrative: I was working the East RADAR position. The OS was sitting next to me at the South RADAR position monitoring training that was in progress at the West RADAR position. I observed a Pilatus ARTS data tag approximately 35-40 nm northeast of the GSP airport (vicinity of the EHO airport) at FL260. I had an IFR flight progress strip on the Pilatus indicating that the aircraft was inbound to land at GSP. Normally; high performance IFR aircraft inbound to GSP from the northeast; are handed off from Charlotte Approach Control descending to 10;000 FT considering the height and position of the Pilatus relative to GSP; it caused some concern. The OS noticed the same thing and mentioned it to me and asked if I knew anything about it to which I replied negative. Atlanta Center Sector 31 called with an APREQ stating that the Pilatus was at FL240 and heading 180 asking how we wanted the aircraft handed off to us. The OS took the call and coordinated a 230 heading and control for right turns to which Sector 31 approved. GSP was landing Runway 22 in VFR conditions and advertising visual approaches; so weather was not a factor. The Pilatus checked in out of FL180 descending to 11;000 FT requesting a turn towards GSP. I issued the altimeter and verified that the Pilatus had the current ATIS; gave the aircraft a turn direct LYMEN (the outer marker on the ILS Runway 22 approach) and descended them to 5;000 FT. The Pilatus read back all instructions correctly. During this time; the OS and I were discussing the descent rate of the Pilatus as the aircraft descended from FL240 to 11;000 in approximately 10-15 miles; which made me concerned that something was not quite right considering the descent rate and the request at FL180 to turn to the airport. Although the pilot(s) did not indicate anything was wrong or amiss; I still felt there was a sense of urgency for them to get to the airport ASAP. I issued a descent clearance to maintain 4;000 FT to the Pilatus. The read back was correct along with reporting 'the field is in sight'. I told the Pilatus that I would have an approach clearance for them in a minute; as the aircraft was approximately 18 NM east southeast of GSP and approximately 6 NM east southeast of SPA. During this time; the RADAR Flight Data position was coordinating with me for an IFR release on a Citation off of SPA airport Runway 23; which is located approximately 12 NM east of GSP. I issued maintain 3;000 and runway heading and released the Citation for departure off of SPA. Discussion ensued with OS that perhaps the Pilatus had SPA in sight instead of GSP due to the aircraft's position to both airports and again the descent rate of the aircraft. I pointed out both airports to the Pilatus to which the reply was 'both in sight'. I informed the Pilatus of the Citation departure at SPA off Runway 23 and that they could expect their approach clearance to Runway 22 at GSP once they were past SPA. The Pilatus responded with 'looking' and then 'I think I got him in sight now'. I asked the Pilatus if they could maintain visual separation from the Citation; to which the reply was 'yes sir' and 'uh huh'. Due to the sense of urgency I felt from the Pilatus; I then cleared them for 'Visual Approach left base Runway 22 proceed direct LYMEN). The Pilatus read back the clearance correctly. I then told the Pilatus to maintain visual separation from the Citation departing SPA Airport and restated the direction of the Citation's departure off Runway 23. The Pilatus responded with 'we'll be keeping him in sight'. As the Pilatus was number one to GSP in a sequence of four aircraft; I instructed him to keep his speed up as much as practical for succeeding traffic to GSP. The response was that they would keep their speed up and restated again that they had the traffic in sight rolling at SPA. I observed the Pilatus heading westbound towards the departure path of the Citation instead of maintaining a more northwesterly course that direct LYMEN would put them on. I instructed the Pilatus to turn due north and to pass north of the SPA airport for the traffic to which they read back the instructions correctly and again stated 'traffic in sight'. I issued a Traffic Alert to the Pilatus in reference to the departing Citation climbing to 3;000. The Pilatus responded 'we got him in sight; he's going over the top of us sir'. I responded with 'roger'. I issued RADAR contact to the Citation to see if they were on frequency yet. The Citation checked on frequency level at 3;000 with the Pilatus in sight. I issued RADAR contact to the Citation and informed them that the Pilatus had them in sight and was maintaining visual separation. I then issued a climb to 10;000 FT and to maintain runway heading. I then instructed the Pilatus to keep speed up again and to contact GSP ATCT. I then got the Citation on course and over to Atlanta Center. DO NOT allow the pilot to talk you into a clearance when you are not prepared to issue it or are not comfortable with it; i.e. possible conflict of departure aircraft off satellite airport. Second; upon review of the recordings; I discovered that the Pilatus used their call sign less than 20% of the time when responding to my instructions. Aside from the fact that there were no bleed over or stepped on transmissions indicating confusion and no voice recognition software available; there is no way to positively prove that the Pilatus was the aircraft providing visual separation. Of course; during the 'the heat of the battle' as it were; we don't always pick up on clipped or dropped call signs from pilot's especially during moderate or greater workloads. Exercising due vigilance when communicating with pilot's is paramount to safety as we continue to have hear back/read back forums all the time. Third; pilot's lack of acknowledging instructions with their call sign as well as not following headings issued and the instructions to go NORTH of SPA airport when they instead flew to the south and west right into the Runway 23 departure path. Pilot's need to comply with instructions (they are being issued for a reason; SAFETY) and acknowledge with their call sign and not be so complacent. Basically; had I not allowed myself to be lured into the perceived urgency of the Pilatus getting to GSP right away; I would have kept them at 4;000 until past SPA airport and then cleared them for the visual approach.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.