Narrative:

ECAM item arose and there was no way to positively identify the appropriate procedure to follow because of ECAM wording (anti ice stby right stat) with anti ice underlined cannot be found in fom vol 2 and maintenance control would not provide specific support as to what the exact problem was and specific page number(s) to follow in the fom. Eventually maintenance control deferred the conversation to dispatch via commercial radio and discontinued communication with the flight crew. The sole reason the crew made the decision to divert was maintenance control's continued insistence that the problem being experienced was a combination of the procedure(s) in fom vol 2; but would not provide guidance as to the nature of the combination or where to begin the procedure. This being the case even after the captain specifically and word for word spelled out and stated the ECAM failure and inoperative systems and asked why nothing matched the fom. The crew never received an answer to this question and therefore could only act as if they were dealing with an extensive captain's; first officer's; pitot static; standby pitot static failure with pending unreliable airspeed indications. The flight would encounter weather in the form of thunderstorms south and east of present position extending to the upper peninsula of lake michigan with tops exceeding FL400 and potential icing conditions in clouds. The procedures to follow in fom vol 2 clearly stated to avoid these types of conditions. The crew chose the best action and landed at the nearest suitable airport in consideration of the safety of passengers; crew; and aircraft once they knew the nature and potential nature of the problem as insisted upon by maintenance control. More specific action should be allowed maintenance control in providing crew exact direction to deal with the failed system per fom. I believe the FAA's continued and confusing interaction and directives have made everyone paranoid and no one wants to accept responsibility for a problem or make a decision even though it is ultimately the captain who takes the fall.communicated with dispatch and maintenance control via ACARS for approximately 1 hour and 15 minutes. First officer flew; and performed pilot flying and ATC communication duties; flawlessly throughout the flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 pilot describes a diversion when the Flight Manual and Maintenance Control cannot provide information as to the nature of and specific actions required for an ECAM message stating 'ANTI ICE Stby R Stat.' Crew elects to divert to a suitable airport.

Narrative: ECAM item arose and there was no way to positively identify the appropriate procedure to follow because of ECAM wording (ANTI ICE Stby R Stat) with ANTI ICE underlined cannot be found in FOM VOL 2 and Maintenance Control would not provide specific support as to what the exact problem was and specific page number(s) to follow in the FOM. Eventually maintenance control deferred the conversation to dispatch via Commercial Radio and discontinued communication with the flight crew. The sole reason the crew made the decision to divert was Maintenance Control's continued insistence that the problem being experienced was a combination of the procedure(s) in FOM VOL 2; but would not provide guidance as to the nature of the combination or where to begin the procedure. This being the case even after the Captain specifically and word for word spelled out and stated the ECAM failure and inoperative systems and asked why nothing matched the FOM. The crew never received an answer to this question and therefore could only act as if they were dealing with an extensive Captain's; F/O's; pitot static; standby pitot static failure with pending unreliable airspeed indications. The flight would encounter weather in the form of thunderstorms south and east of present position extending to the upper peninsula of Lake Michigan with tops exceeding FL400 and potential icing conditions in clouds. The procedures to follow in FOM VOL 2 clearly stated to avoid these types of conditions. The crew chose the best action and landed at the nearest suitable airport in consideration of the safety of passengers; crew; and aircraft once they knew the nature and potential nature of the problem as insisted upon by maintenance control. More specific action should be allowed Maintenance Control in providing crew exact direction to deal with the failed system per FOM. I believe the FAA's continued and confusing interaction and directives have made everyone paranoid and no one wants to accept responsibility for a problem or make a decision even though it is ultimately the Captain who takes the fall.Communicated with Dispatch and Maintenance Control via ACARS for approximately 1 hour and 15 minutes. F/O flew; and performed pilot flying and ATC communication duties; flawlessly throughout the flight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.