Narrative:

After calling fwa clearance while on the ground at asw, we were cleared to 3000', expect 3700' in 10 mins. I read back the clearance and the controller said to call him airborne. I acknowledged and the copilot began the takeoff. Distracted by a problem with the heating system in the aircraft. We inadvertently climbed through 3000 to 5000' where I called fwa approach and reported leaving 5000'. The controller acknowledged saying, 'I thought I gave you 3000', climb to 7000'.' I replied, 'roger, climbing to 7000.' the nature of the heating problem is as follows. The aircraft is an light transport. It uses engine bleed air for heating and pressurization and has a dual zone heating system, ie, it has separate controls for regulating the temperature in the cockpit and in the cabin. The temperature in the captain can be controled from the cockpit or the cabin, depending on which controller has priority as indicated by a white light next to the controller. Control can be transferred from the cockpit to the cabin and vice versa by pressing the white lighted button. In this situation, the passenger (first time in this aircraft) had control over their temperature and had the controller turned to full hot. The passenger had turned the heat up full hot while taxiing out, since the cabin was cold and heats up very slowly with the engines at idle thrust. Upon pwring up to takeoff thrust however, extremely hot bleed from the engines is pumped into the cabin attendant, hot enough to cause a noticeable odor and visible smoke around the floor ducts where the hot air enters the cabin. Immediately after rotation the passenger began yelling at me that the carpet was smoking. Due to the distance from the cockpit to the cabin and the noise level in the aircraft with the engines at takeoff thrust, I had to ask him to repeat himself twice. When I finally understood what he was saying I immediately took control of the temperature in the cabin and turned it to full cold. By the time I had the problem resolved we were at 5000' (approximately 1 min after liftoff) and I called fwa approach. After bringing the situation to the attention of the copilot, he stated that he never heard the controller give us an initial altitude. What could have been done to prevent the incident: 1) I should have discussed and verified the initial altitude with the copilot. 2) I should have monitored his performance more closely. 3) although the passenger were briefed before the flight on use of the temperature controller, they were not warned against selecting full hot for takeoff and should have been, or, 4) I could have taken control of the temperature for takeoff. 5) the temperature controller should not be able to select air hotter than the melting point of the materials comprising and surrounding the floor outlets.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INITIAL ALT AFTER TKOF OVERSHOT.

Narrative: AFTER CALLING FWA CLRNC WHILE ON THE GND AT ASW, WE WERE CLRED TO 3000', EXPECT 3700' IN 10 MINS. I READ BACK THE CLRNC AND THE CTLR SAID TO CALL HIM AIRBORNE. I ACKNOWLEDGED AND THE COPLT BEGAN THE TKOF. DISTRACTED BY A PROB WITH THE HEATING SYS IN THE ACFT. WE INADVERTENTLY CLBED THROUGH 3000 TO 5000' WHERE I CALLED FWA APCH AND RPTED LEAVING 5000'. THE CTLR ACKNOWLEDGED SAYING, 'I THOUGHT I GAVE YOU 3000', CLB TO 7000'.' I REPLIED, 'ROGER, CLBING TO 7000.' THE NATURE OF THE HEATING PROB IS AS FOLLOWS. THE ACFT IS AN LTT. IT USES ENG BLEED AIR FOR HEATING AND PRESSURIZATION AND HAS A DUAL ZONE HEATING SYS, IE, IT HAS SEPARATE CONTROLS FOR REGULATING THE TEMP IN THE COCKPIT AND IN THE CABIN. THE TEMP IN THE CAPT CAN BE CTLED FROM THE COCKPIT OR THE CABIN, DEPENDING ON WHICH CTLR HAS PRIORITY AS INDICATED BY A WHITE LIGHT NEXT TO THE CTLR. CONTROL CAN BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE COCKPIT TO THE CABIN AND VICE VERSA BY PRESSING THE WHITE LIGHTED BUTTON. IN THIS SITUATION, THE PAX (FIRST TIME IN THIS ACFT) HAD CONTROL OVER THEIR TEMP AND HAD THE CTLR TURNED TO FULL HOT. THE PAX HAD TURNED THE HEAT UP FULL HOT WHILE TAXIING OUT, SINCE THE CABIN WAS COLD AND HEATS UP VERY SLOWLY WITH THE ENGS AT IDLE THRUST. UPON PWRING UP TO TKOF THRUST HOWEVER, EXTREMELY HOT BLEED FROM THE ENGS IS PUMPED INTO THE CAB, HOT ENOUGH TO CAUSE A NOTICEABLE ODOR AND VISIBLE SMOKE AROUND THE FLOOR DUCTS WHERE THE HOT AIR ENTERS THE CABIN. IMMEDIATELY AFTER ROTATION THE PAX BEGAN YELLING AT ME THAT THE CARPET WAS SMOKING. DUE TO THE DISTANCE FROM THE COCKPIT TO THE CABIN AND THE NOISE LEVEL IN THE ACFT WITH THE ENGS AT TKOF THRUST, I HAD TO ASK HIM TO REPEAT HIMSELF TWICE. WHEN I FINALLY UNDERSTOOD WHAT HE WAS SAYING I IMMEDIATELY TOOK CONTROL OF THE TEMP IN THE CABIN AND TURNED IT TO FULL COLD. BY THE TIME I HAD THE PROB RESOLVED WE WERE AT 5000' (APPROX 1 MIN AFTER LIFTOFF) AND I CALLED FWA APCH. AFTER BRINGING THE SITUATION TO THE ATTN OF THE COPLT, HE STATED THAT HE NEVER HEARD THE CTLR GIVE US AN INITIAL ALT. WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE TO PREVENT THE INCIDENT: 1) I SHOULD HAVE DISCUSSED AND VERIFIED THE INITIAL ALT WITH THE COPLT. 2) I SHOULD HAVE MONITORED HIS PERFORMANCE MORE CLOSELY. 3) ALTHOUGH THE PAX WERE BRIEFED BEFORE THE FLT ON USE OF THE TEMP CTLR, THEY WERE NOT WARNED AGAINST SELECTING FULL HOT FOR TKOF AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN, OR, 4) I COULD HAVE TAKEN CONTROL OF THE TEMP FOR TKOF. 5) THE TEMP CTLR SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SELECT AIR HOTTER THAN THE MELTING POINT OF THE MATERIALS COMPRISING AND SURROUNDING THE FLOOR OUTLETS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.