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Approach controller loss of radio contact with air carrier on vector heading for localizer intercept.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 103376 |
| Time | |
| Date | 198901 |
| Day | Sun |
| Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | airport : ord |
| State Reference | IL |
| Altitude | msl bound lower : 5000 msl bound upper : 5000 |
| Environment | |
| Flight Conditions | VMC |
| Light | Dusk |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Controlling Facilities | tracon : ord |
| Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
| Make Model Name | Widebody, Low Wing, 3 Turbojet Eng |
| Navigation In Use | Other |
| Flight Phase | cruise other |
| Route In Use | enroute : on vectors |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Person 1 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | flight crew : first officer |
| Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : cfi pilot : flight engineer |
| Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 5000 flight time type : 800 |
| ASRS Report | 103376 |
| Person 2 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
| Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : commercial |
| Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 14000 flight time type : 360 |
| ASRS Report | 103267 |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | other anomaly other other spatial deviation |
| Independent Detector | other controllera |
| Resolutory Action | other |
| Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
| Supplementary | |
| Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
| Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
We were being vectored for an ILS approach to runway 27 left at ord. Everything was normal until our turn to base leg. We were told to turn left to 360 degrees, slow to 170 KTS, then descend from 7000 to 5000'. As we approached the localizer we realized that the controller was no longer talking to us. The captain made a radio call to advise that we were going to fly through the localizer. At this time we were told that we were cross channeling. We then realized that at some point during the speed reduction, flap confign and gear horn cutout one of us had inadvertently switched our #2 VHF radio toggle switch from approach control back to the previous frequency. Both the landing gear horn cut out button and the flap handle are in fairly close proximity to the radio control panel. Had this been a military flight, we would have been told by the controller on guard frequency, 243.0, to turn before we had flown through the final approach course. I recommend that the FAA require airliners to monitor 121.5 on their secondary radios. This would give controllers a backup way to communicate with aircraft. Also, widebody transport crew members should be aware of the potential for inadvertent switching of the radio frequency when silencing the gear horn or lowering flaps. Chicago approach control did an excellent job, as usual, in handling our loss of communication during a critical phase of flight.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: APCH CTLR LOSS OF RADIO CONTACT WITH ACR ON VECTOR HEADING FOR LOCALIZER INTERCEPT.
Narrative: WE WERE BEING VECTORED FOR AN ILS APCH TO RWY 27 LEFT AT ORD. EVERYTHING WAS NORMAL UNTIL OUR TURN TO BASE LEG. WE WERE TOLD TO TURN LEFT TO 360 DEGS, SLOW TO 170 KTS, THEN DSND FROM 7000 TO 5000'. AS WE APCHED THE LOC WE REALIZED THAT THE CTLR WAS NO LONGER TALKING TO US. THE CAPT MADE A RADIO CALL TO ADVISE THAT WE WERE GOING TO FLY THROUGH THE LOC. AT THIS TIME WE WERE TOLD THAT WE WERE CROSS CHANNELING. WE THEN REALIZED THAT AT SOME POINT DURING THE SPD REDUCTION, FLAP CONFIGN AND GEAR HORN CUTOUT ONE OF US HAD INADVERTENTLY SWITCHED OUR #2 VHF RADIO TOGGLE SWITCH FROM APCH CTL BACK TO THE PREVIOUS FREQ. BOTH THE LNDG GEAR HORN CUT OUT BUTTON AND THE FLAP HANDLE ARE IN FAIRLY CLOSE PROX TO THE RADIO CONTROL PANEL. HAD THIS BEEN A MIL FLT, WE WOULD HAVE BEEN TOLD BY THE CTLR ON GUARD FREQ, 243.0, TO TURN BEFORE WE HAD FLOWN THROUGH THE FINAL APCH COURSE. I RECOMMEND THAT THE FAA REQUIRE AIRLINERS TO MONITOR 121.5 ON THEIR SECONDARY RADIOS. THIS WOULD GIVE CTLRS A BACKUP WAY TO COMMUNICATE WITH ACFT. ALSO, WDB CREW MEMBERS SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE POTENTIAL FOR INADVERTENT SWITCHING OF THE RADIO FREQ WHEN SILENCING THE GEAR HORN OR LOWERING FLAPS. CHICAGO APCH CTL DID AN EXCELLENT JOB, AS USUAL, IN HANDLING OUR LOSS OF COM DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.