Narrative:

I went to the local airport to take my cousin flying. We planned on flying in a cessna 150; but found the tire flat upon arrival and decided to fly in a baron B-55. The purpose of the flight was to sightsee and give a short introduction to flying. The pre-flight inspection of the aircraft revealed nothing abnormal. Everything was in good condition and the airplane had been flown the day before. The auxiliary fuel tanks were empty and the main tanks indicated about half on the left tank and three-quarters on the right on the factory gauges. The trustworthy shadin digital flow indicator confirmed adequate fuel and reserves for the flight; but does not differentiate between tanks. After preparing the plane; we took off and flew for about twenty to thirty minutes around the local area. It was about five minutes after takeoff when I switched the left engine to crossfeed off of the right tank. I made this decision because I noticed the indication of fuel imbalance between the left and right tanks. We were flying about three miles north of the airport at 2;000 ft when both engines died. Both engines were feeding off of the right main tank (left engine on crossfeed); which indicated a half tank of fuel. I switched the left engine to the left main tank and the engine restarted. I began to prepare to land at the airport; while trying to get the right engine restarted. I decided to focus on landing the airplane on a single engine after about a minute and continued a final approach. The right engine was left windmilling at this point as I had not finished the checklist. I touched down near the threshold and on the right side of the runway. I was unable to keep the aircraft from running off of the runway and eventually hitting a wingtip on a fencepost. I have had the chance now to analyze my decision making and have thought of several ways I could have changed the outcome. The decision to have both engines feeding from the right main tank was; in hindsight; not a good one. I had made this decision because the left tank was getting low; while the right tank indicated about half a tank. Also; after restarting the left engine; I should have switched to crossfeed off of the left tank as well. Had I done that; both engines would have restarted; but in the moment that thought did not cross my mind. Since I was only three miles away; I made the decision to land rather than to focus on restarting the second engine. Instead; I could have stayed in the air a little longer to finish running through the entire emergency checklist resulting in either getting the right engine restarted or securing it. After the incident I noticed blue fuel stains streaming back from the right main fuel cap; meaning that I had been losing more fuel from the right tank in addition to the amount I was burning. This may have been caused by replacement of the fuel cap after preflight; or it may have been due to old; cracked o-rings on the fuel cap. This incident as taught me valuable lessons for future flights. I now have a greater understanding of the importance of fuel management. It is always important to know how much fuel you have and in what tank; but also to be wise about how it is used. The B55 poh includes crossfeed as an emergency procedure. Using crossfeed to correct a fuel imbalance is not the correct procedure. As fuel systems become more complex in bigger airplanes; it is still my responsibility to fully understand how to use that system. I have also learned that is it especially essential to use the checklist in situations like this so as not to forget anything. Prior to this incident; I had already been training and preparing for the mei rating and had signed up for an upcoming 'beechracft pilot proficiency program'. I feel that both of those training opportunities will reinforce the lessons I have learned from this incident and prepare me to deal with future situations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BE-55 pilot reported dual engine failures because of fuel starvation after a right tank fuel cap was either left unsecured during preflight or a cap seal deterioration leak. A single engine was restarted before landing where a runway excursion and wingtip damage occurred.

Narrative: I went to the local airport to take my cousin flying. We planned on flying in a Cessna 150; but found the tire flat upon arrival and decided to fly in a Baron B-55. The purpose of the flight was to sightsee and give a short introduction to flying. The pre-flight inspection of the aircraft revealed nothing abnormal. Everything was in good condition and the airplane had been flown the day before. The auxiliary fuel tanks were empty and the main tanks indicated about half on the left tank and three-quarters on the right on the factory gauges. The trustworthy Shadin digital flow indicator confirmed adequate fuel and reserves for the flight; but does not differentiate between tanks. After preparing the plane; we took off and flew for about twenty to thirty minutes around the local area. It was about five minutes after takeoff when I switched the left engine to crossfeed off of the right tank. I made this decision because I noticed the indication of fuel imbalance between the left and right tanks. We were flying about three miles north of the airport at 2;000 FT when both engines died. Both engines were feeding off of the right main tank (left engine on crossfeed); which indicated a half tank of fuel. I switched the left engine to the left main tank and the engine restarted. I began to prepare to land at the airport; while trying to get the right engine restarted. I decided to focus on landing the airplane on a single engine after about a minute and continued a final approach. The right engine was left windmilling at this point as I had not finished the checklist. I touched down near the threshold and on the right side of the runway. I was unable to keep the aircraft from running off of the runway and eventually hitting a wingtip on a fencepost. I have had the chance now to analyze my decision making and have thought of several ways I could have changed the outcome. The decision to have both engines feeding from the right main tank was; in hindsight; not a good one. I had made this decision because the left tank was getting low; while the right tank indicated about half a tank. Also; after restarting the left engine; I should have switched to crossfeed off of the left tank as well. Had I done that; both engines would have restarted; but in the moment that thought did not cross my mind. Since I was only three miles away; I made the decision to land rather than to focus on restarting the second engine. Instead; I could have stayed in the air a little longer to finish running through the entire emergency checklist resulting in either getting the right engine restarted or securing it. After the incident I noticed blue fuel stains streaming back from the right main fuel cap; meaning that I had been losing more fuel from the right tank in addition to the amount I was burning. This may have been caused by replacement of the fuel cap after preflight; or it may have been due to old; cracked O-rings on the fuel cap. This incident as taught me valuable lessons for future flights. I now have a greater understanding of the importance of fuel management. It is always important to know how much fuel you have and in what tank; but also to be wise about how it is used. The B55 POH includes crossfeed as an emergency procedure. Using crossfeed to correct a fuel imbalance is not the correct procedure. As fuel systems become more complex in bigger airplanes; it is still my responsibility to fully understand how to use that system. I have also learned that is it especially essential to use the checklist in situations like this so as not to forget anything. Prior to this incident; I had already been training and preparing for the MEI rating and had signed up for an upcoming 'Beechracft Pilot Proficiency Program'. I feel that both of those training opportunities will reinforce the lessons I have learned from this incident and prepare me to deal with future situations.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.