Narrative:

It was a beautiful VFR day with sky clear. We were cruising at FL370 on as planned heading towards dusan intersection. As we exited the dominican fir; the captain contacted curacao control; with jurisdiction of aruba; our destination. Instead of proceeding directly to dusan; we were cleared to fly direct to the 10 mile final fix for the ILS 11 and to descend at pilot's discretion to 9;000 ft. That's what we were expecting.as we approached 9;000 ft and in the vicinity of 37 NM from bea; we were switched to tower frequency. We knew we were entering a non-radar environment. Tower was overseeing clearance; ground; tower and regional approach all on one frequency. The tower frequency was very congested and you could tell the controller was very busy yet was doing a good job. When he acknowledged our frequency check-in; he informed us that an MD80 had just reported inbound on the ILS and 15 miles out from bea and that we were number two behind him.we overheard conversation between the controller and the MD80 but couldn't understand because they were speaking in spanish. The controller asked us our groundspeed and DME from bea VOR and the captain replied about 35 DME at 330 KTS (I can't remember exactly). At no time was the md-80 on our nav display with the transponder traffic knob in the 'look down' position. The controller asked us to slow down for separation and I slowed the aircraft to 250 KTS. At this point we were just within 30 miles out from the field. In the meantime; several ATC exchanges with other aircraft occurred. At this point we were getting high so I slowed the aircraft to 150 KIAS with flaps at two. We flew in this configuration for two to three minutes and were approaching the 10 mile final fix on the ILS approach. The captain repeatedly asked for lower and we were given 6;000 ft. I commanded the gear down and flaps 3. As briefed earlier; I turned all automation off including autothrust and started the descent manually to get a more prompt response and so as not to be too overwhelmed with automation. We were now turning inbound 10 miles from the bea VOR. Visibility was excellent; there were no clouds in the vicinity of the airport and the airport was in sight the entire time. Although we were high; there was no doubt that we would be stabilized well before 1;000 ft AGL.as we approached 6;000 ft we were cleared to descend first to 4;000 ft; then eventually to 2;000 ft MSL; but were not cleared for the approach. At no time did I have to level off. It was a gradual and stabilized descent intended to capture the glideslope. Between 2;000 and 1;500 ft the captain--leaning towards his left window as if he was looking down at a boat--suddenly shouted 'break right - break right; now!' while pointing his finger down. I knew right away he meant there was traffic directly below us so I banked aggressively to the right; added significant power; pitched up and leveled off. Immediately; we heard the caution 'traffic - traffic.' I was not looking inside so I don't know what the lowest separation was but after my maneuver the TCAS showed -800 ft. At no point did I see the traffic. When I was established in the turn; the captain advised ATC we just had a near mid-air collision within 200 ft of the MD80 and we were abandoning the approach. ATC cleared us to continue the turn and rejoin the approach after which we were cleared for and landed uneventfully.it was clear to us that the MD80 flight crew clearly lied about their position from the VOR so as to be number one for the approach. There is no way we would have been able to catch them since we were around 30 miles out slowing to 150 KTS indicated and still heading directly to the 10 mile final fix on the ILS. Furthermore; I strongly believe that the pilots of the MD80 intentionally turned off their transponder which would explain why we never had an advisory but then suddenly received a 'traffic' caution at low altitude (I think the RA was inhibited because of our altitude) so as to disguise their real distance from the VOR and to only turn it back on at the last minute. I am obviously outraged about what happened and believe that it was not merely unsafe but criminal to act like this and jeopardize the lives of more than 300 people in order to shave off three to four minutes of flight time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A-320 flight crew experienced an NMAC with an MD-80 during initial approach to TNCA. The reporter alleges the MD-80 flight crew purposely mis-stated their position and shut off their transponder to gain an arrival advantage.

Narrative: It was a beautiful VFR day with sky clear. We were cruising at FL370 on as planned heading towards DUSAN Intersection. As we exited the Dominican FIR; the Captain contacted Curacao Control; with jurisdiction of Aruba; our destination. Instead of proceeding directly to DUSAN; we were cleared to fly direct to the 10 mile final fix for the ILS 11 and to descend at pilot's discretion to 9;000 FT. That's what we were expecting.As we approached 9;000 FT and in the vicinity of 37 NM from BEA; we were switched to Tower frequency. We knew we were entering a non-radar environment. Tower was overseeing clearance; Ground; Tower and Regional Approach all on one frequency. The Tower frequency was very congested and you could tell the Controller was very busy yet was doing a good job. When he acknowledged our frequency check-in; he informed us that an MD80 had just reported inbound on the ILS and 15 miles out from BEA and that we were number two behind him.We overheard conversation between the Controller and the MD80 but couldn't understand because they were speaking in Spanish. The Controller asked us our groundspeed and DME from BEA VOR and the Captain replied about 35 DME at 330 KTS (I can't remember exactly). At no time was the MD-80 on our Nav Display with the transponder traffic knob in the 'look down' position. The Controller asked us to slow down for separation and I slowed the aircraft to 250 KTS. At this point we were just within 30 miles out from the field. In the meantime; several ATC exchanges with other aircraft occurred. At this point we were getting high so I slowed the aircraft to 150 KIAS with flaps at two. We flew in this configuration for two to three minutes and were approaching the 10 mile final fix on the ILS approach. The Captain repeatedly asked for lower and we were given 6;000 FT. I commanded the gear down and flaps 3. As briefed earlier; I turned all automation off including autothrust and started the descent manually to get a more prompt response and so as not to be too overwhelmed with automation. We were now turning inbound 10 miles from the BEA VOR. Visibility was excellent; there were no clouds in the vicinity of the airport and the airport was in sight the entire time. Although we were high; there was no doubt that we would be stabilized well before 1;000 FT AGL.As we approached 6;000 FT we were cleared to descend first to 4;000 FT; then eventually to 2;000 FT MSL; but were not cleared for the approach. At no time did I have to level off. It was a gradual and stabilized descent intended to capture the glideslope. Between 2;000 and 1;500 FT the Captain--leaning towards his left window as if he was looking down at a boat--suddenly shouted 'break right - break right; now!' while pointing his finger down. I knew right away he meant there was traffic directly below us so I banked aggressively to the right; added significant power; pitched up and leveled off. Immediately; we heard the caution 'TRAFFIC - TRAFFIC.' I was not looking inside so I don't know what the lowest separation was but after my maneuver the TCAS showed -800 FT. At no point did I see the traffic. When I was established in the turn; the Captain advised ATC we just had a near mid-air collision within 200 FT of the MD80 and we were abandoning the approach. ATC cleared us to continue the turn and rejoin the approach after which we were cleared for and landed uneventfully.It was clear to us that the MD80 flight crew clearly lied about their position from the VOR so as to be number one for the approach. There is no way we would have been able to catch them since we were around 30 miles out slowing to 150 KTS indicated and still heading directly to the 10 mile final fix on the ILS. Furthermore; I strongly believe that the pilots of the MD80 intentionally turned off their transponder which would explain why we never had an advisory but then suddenly received a 'Traffic' caution at low altitude (I think the RA was inhibited because of our altitude) so as to disguise their real distance from the VOR and to only turn it back on at the last minute. I am obviously outraged about what happened and believe that it was not merely unsafe but criminal to act like this and jeopardize the lives of more than 300 people in order to shave off three to four minutes of flight time.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.