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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1036816 |
Time | |
Date | 201209 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B777-200 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Nose Gear Door |
Person 1 | |
Function | Technician |
Qualification | Maintenance Airframe Maintenance Powerplant |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
I was sent out to a B777-200 aircraft to assist another mechanic who was answering a call from the [flight] crew regarding a hole in the nose gear door. He couldn't see the hole standing on the tow bar looking up. Supervisor X was standing alongside him claiming it was a paint chip. I put a stand underneath the nose and determined the hole was a burn mark from a lightning strike. Supervisor X kept insisting it was a paint chip. He broadcasted on the radio his disagreement with me and ordered a lead mechanic out to the airplane. He then added he wanted another mechanic sent out because he was removing me from the aircraft. I walked away to look for other signs of lightning strikes. Supervisor X began screaming at me; repeatedly saying 'the damage is over here not over there.' every mechanic and lead mechanic sent out concurred with my findings. The burn mark on the periphery of the paint is obvious. Supervisor X refused to acknowledge the brown marks as burns. Instead; he was trying to rationalize that there were brown marks all over the nose gear door and they weren't burn marks. Those spots were bug spatters and immaterial to the burn mark; but supervisor X kept citing it. Supervisor X later told three union officers that management was the final authority. The union countered that the person signing the logbook was the final authority. Supervisor X doesn't understand the fars and how it applies to the line operation. Management is generally driven by a performance culture rather than safety. These incidents are all too common. Management fails to acknowledge the independence of mechanics to troubleshoot and ascertain conclusions. The performance culture is too ingrain in management. At this point; only an overhaul of management will reverse the toxic environment.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A Line Mechanic reports about the disagreement he had with a Maintenenance Supervisor involving a lightning strike burn mark on the external skin of a B777-200 Nose Landing Gear (NLG) door. Mechanic also raises his concerns about a performance driven management culture versus aircraft safety.
Narrative: I was sent out to a B777-200 aircraft to assist another Mechanic who was answering a call from the [flight] crew regarding a hole in the nose gear door. He couldn't see the hole standing on the tow bar looking up. Supervisor X was standing alongside him claiming it was a paint chip. I put a stand underneath the nose and determined the hole was a burn mark from a lightning strike. Supervisor X kept insisting it was a paint chip. He broadcasted on the radio his disagreement with me and ordered a Lead Mechanic out to the airplane. He then added he wanted another Mechanic sent out because he was removing me from the aircraft. I walked away to look for other signs of lightning strikes. Supervisor X began screaming at me; repeatedly saying 'the damage is over here not over there.' Every Mechanic and Lead Mechanic sent out concurred with my findings. The burn mark on the periphery of the paint is obvious. Supervisor X refused to acknowledge the brown marks as burns. Instead; he was trying to rationalize that there were brown marks all over the nose gear door and they weren't burn marks. Those spots were bug spatters and immaterial to the burn mark; but Supervisor X kept citing it. Supervisor X later told three Union Officers that Management was the final authority. The Union countered that the person signing the logbook was the final authority. Supervisor X doesn't understand the FARs and how it applies to the line operation. Management is generally driven by a performance culture rather than safety. These incidents are all too common. Management fails to acknowledge the independence of mechanics to troubleshoot and ascertain conclusions. The performance culture is too ingrain in Management. At this point; only an overhaul of Management will reverse the toxic environment.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.