Narrative:

During takeoff at a wt of 406;000 pounds with 134.9 pounds of fuel I felt a large vibration at 160 KTS. With vr being 167 I elected to continue. I was later told by the first officer that at liftoff we momentarily lost our right gear safe light. We then retracted the gear normally. I then instructed the first officer to call the tower and have them sweep the runway looking for blown tire parts. At 1;500 AGL I requested climb power and at 3;000 AGL requested flaps 1. At this point I got the master caution light along with a strong left roll. I then gave full right rudder (16 units) and continued the climb on the departure and declared an emergency. With the EICAS message; 'te flap disagree'; I called for the appropriate checklist and noticed the left flap had retracted to 2 degrees while the right flap remained at 5 degrees. We continued our climb to FL120 making sure we were above the mora. It was at this time I turned on the #1 autopilot and told my first officer he had the plane. Also during the climb we told departure we would be dumping fuel and received permission to dump at our location. The relief pilot then started the fuel dump and we were give instructions to hold. With first officer at the controls we set up the hold. We briefed the flight attendants we had an emergency; had them repeat the brief back and continued to hold and dump fuel. During the fuel dump we descended to FL110. We then briefed the passengers we had blown a tire and were in a hold to burn and dump fuel so we could get down to our maximum landing weight of 320;000 pounds. At this point we checked the manual for landing distance with a te flap disagree problem. We also discussed the fact that we would have further braking degradation from the blown tire. I then decided that we should lower the landing gear to check to see if it would lower and to burn fuel quicker. I was also hoping it would give us a little more yaw control so we could use less than max rudder deflection. We then lowered the landing gear and found we had a right sidebrace EICAS message and an unsafe gear indication with no right gear green light. The QRH right sidebrace procedure was then run with no positive results. Before we ran the alt gear extension we elected to call maintenance on the sat com and asked if there would be any problems with our running this procedure. They agreed it could have no adverse affect. We then ran the alt gear extension procedure with no results other than our gear doors now hanging. Here we were; flying with full right rudder; gear doors hanging; right sidebrace EICAS and an unsafe gear indication with no right gear down green light. We then ran the blown tire QRH procedure. We were now down to a weight of 322;000 pounds and after discussing how a missed approach would be flown we were ready to start the approach. After briefing the flight attendants this was now a more serious emergency we briefed the QRH on a possible evacuation while directing my relief first officer to make the announcement to stay seated if there was no need for evacuation. We discussed the need for autobrakes and arming the spoilers but elected to manually operate both due to the multiple problems. At this time I stated I have the aircraft and we started the approach. The autopilot was flown down to 800 AGL and appeared to have a hard time tracking the localizer. I then disconnected the autopilot and autothrottles. Initially the aircraft started to roll but was quickly brought under control. The speed at this time was 175 KTS; (vref 30+30). We touched down firmly on centerline at the 1;000 ft mark with little flare. Full reverse thrust was then applied; spoilers deployed and braking applied as necessary. It was a very rough landing roll due to the blown tire. A full stop was accomplished with about 3;000 ft of runway remaining. The relief pilot then made the announcement for all passengers to remain seated. APU was started; engines shutdown and communication with emergency personal established. Personnel were told to stay clear of the left main gear because brake temps were 8;8;7;7. After all checklist were completed and communications established I elected to make a PA from the flight attendants 1L location feeling this was the best way to lower the passengers tensions. It was at this time I was told of a 4 foot hole through the root of my right wing. I thought it must have been a lost panel but soon discovered I could see the landing gear right thru the wing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 Captain describes a tire failure at 160 KTS during the takeoff roll. The takeoff is continued and when the flaps are retracted a 'TE flap disagree' is annunciated and a pronounced rolling tendency is noted. An emergency is declared; fuel is dumped; and when the gear is extended an unsafe indication is noted for the right main gear. After landing a large hole is found in the right wing directly above the right main landing gear strut.

Narrative: During takeoff at a wt of 406;000 LBS with 134.9 LBS of fuel I felt a large vibration at 160 KTS. With VR being 167 I elected to continue. I was later told by the First Officer that at liftoff we momentarily lost our right gear safe light. We then retracted the gear normally. I then instructed the First Officer to call the Tower and have them sweep the runway looking for blown tire parts. At 1;500 AGL I requested climb power and at 3;000 AGL requested flaps 1. At this point I got the master caution light along with a strong left roll. I then gave full right rudder (16 units) and continued the climb on the departure and declared an emergency. With the EICAS message; 'TE flap disagree'; I called for the appropriate checklist and noticed the left flap had retracted to 2 degrees while the right flap remained at 5 degrees. We continued our climb to FL120 making sure we were above the MORA. It was at this time I turned on the #1 autopilot and told my First Officer he had the plane. Also during the climb we told departure we would be dumping fuel and received permission to dump at our location. The relief pilot then started the fuel dump and we were give instructions to hold. With First Officer at the controls we set up the hold. We briefed the flight attendants we had an emergency; had them repeat the brief back and continued to hold and dump fuel. During the fuel dump we descended to FL110. We then briefed the passengers we had blown a tire and were in a hold to burn and dump fuel so we could get down to our maximum landing weight of 320;000 LBS. At this point we checked the manual for landing distance with a TE flap disagree problem. We also discussed the fact that we would have further braking degradation from the blown tire. I then decided that we should lower the landing gear to check to see if it would lower and to burn fuel quicker. I was also hoping it would give us a little more yaw control so we could use less than max rudder deflection. We then lowered the landing gear and found we had a right sidebrace EICAS message and an unsafe gear indication with no right gear green light. The QRH right sidebrace procedure was then run with no positive results. Before we ran the alt gear extension we elected to call maintenance on the sat com and asked if there would be any problems with our running this procedure. They agreed it could have no adverse affect. We then ran the alt gear extension procedure with no results other than our gear doors now hanging. Here we were; flying with full right rudder; gear doors hanging; right sidebrace EICAS and an unsafe gear indication with no right gear down green light. We then ran the blown tire QRH procedure. We were now down to a weight of 322;000 LBS and after discussing how a missed approach would be flown we were ready to start the approach. After briefing the flight attendants this was now a more serious emergency we briefed the QRH on a possible evacuation while directing my Relief First Officer to make the announcement to stay seated if there was no need for evacuation. We discussed the need for autobrakes and arming the Spoilers but elected to manually operate both due to the multiple problems. At this time I stated I have the aircraft and we started the approach. The autopilot was flown down to 800 AGL and appeared to have a hard time tracking the localizer. I then disconnected the autopilot and autothrottles. Initially the aircraft started to roll but was quickly brought under control. The speed at this time was 175 KTS; (Vref 30+30). We touched down firmly on centerline at the 1;000 FT mark with little flare. Full reverse thrust was then applied; spoilers deployed and braking applied as necessary. It was a very rough landing roll due to the blown tire. A full stop was accomplished with about 3;000 FT of runway remaining. The Relief Pilot then made the announcement for all passengers to remain seated. APU was started; engines shutdown and communication with emergency personal established. Personnel were told to stay clear of the left main gear because brake temps were 8;8;7;7. After all checklist were completed and communications established I elected to make a PA from the flight attendants 1L location feeling this was the best way to lower the passengers tensions. It was at this time I was told of a 4 foot hole through the root of my right wing. I thought it must have been a lost panel but soon discovered I could see the landing gear right thru the wing.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.