Narrative:

In a boeing 757 with pratt and whitney engines; climbing through about 700 feet MSL and 170 knots during a normal reduced thrust takeoff profile. Two very large birds in formation flight appeared directly in front of the nose between cloud layers. The migratory birds quickly split formation; one dove down to our right; and the second bird climbed to our left. The bird that descended flew into our right engine with a loud bang that could be heard by ramp personnel on the ground outside terminal X (mechanics that met our flight afterwords reported hearing our compressor stall and seeing flames from the right engine at the moment of impact). A jump seating offline pilot seated in the right over wing exit row reported to us after landing that the bird appeared to be a goose. We experienced a momentary compressor stall and associated yaw; and a few seconds later; the pungent smell of charred bird flesh; bone; and feathers through the pack air cycle system. The flight deck crew took appropriate immediate action that included the following (this is not a complete list): flew the engine failure t-procedure even though the right engine continued to operate normally (in case of subsequent failure); confirmed and declared the emergency; completed the QRH checklist; coordinated with flight attendants and ATC; made a PA; sent a ACARS message to dispatch; and safely briefed and returned for a 2-engine ILS approach and landing. The flight safely terminated and passengers disembarked at the gate.from an industry safety management system (sms) perspective for large migratory bird encounters; the affected pratt and whitney engine provided normal thrust throughout the emergency. Aircrew training and checklist design for the QRH compressor stall was effective in that the flight crew quickly and accurately accomplished the checklist while coordinating several flight team actions. Written checklist procedures did not exist and air carrier flight crews were not trained for a complete hydraulic system failure; so the flight crew coordinated critical actions with proactive closed-loop communication about planning; implementation; and assessment. Crews were CRM trained with scenarios based on [company CRM policy].

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757 engine sustained damage but continued functioning after striking what appeared to be goose at about 700 feet after takeoff. An emergency was declared and the flight returned safely to the departure airport.

Narrative: In a Boeing 757 with Pratt and Whitney engines; climbing through about 700 feet MSL and 170 knots during a normal reduced thrust takeoff profile. Two very large birds in formation flight appeared directly in front of the nose between cloud layers. The migratory birds quickly split formation; one dove down to our right; and the second bird climbed to our left. The bird that descended flew into our right engine with a loud bang that could be heard by ramp personnel on the ground outside Terminal X (mechanics that met our flight afterwords reported hearing our compressor stall and seeing flames from the right engine at the moment of impact). A jump seating offline pilot seated in the right over wing exit row reported to us after landing that the bird appeared to be a goose. We experienced a momentary compressor stall and associated yaw; and a few seconds later; the pungent smell of charred bird flesh; bone; and feathers through the pack air cycle system. The flight deck crew took appropriate immediate action that included the following (this is not a complete list): flew the engine failure T-Procedure even though the right engine continued to operate normally (in case of subsequent failure); confirmed and declared the emergency; completed the QRH checklist; coordinated with flight attendants and ATC; made a PA; sent a ACARS message to Dispatch; and safely briefed and returned for a 2-engine ILS approach and landing. The flight safely terminated and passengers disembarked at the gate.From an industry Safety Management System (SMS) perspective for large migratory bird encounters; the affected Pratt and Whitney engine provided normal thrust throughout the emergency. Aircrew training and checklist design for the QRH compressor stall was effective in that the flight crew quickly and accurately accomplished the checklist while coordinating several flight team actions. Written checklist procedures did not exist and air carrier flight crews were not trained for a complete hydraulic system failure; so the Flight crew coordinated critical actions with proactive closed-loop communication about planning; implementation; and assessment. Crews were CRM trained with scenarios based on [Company CRM policy].

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.