Narrative:

Forty-five minutes prior to scheduled departure; operations assigned our aircraft for another flight. We had to wait for another aircraft which resulted in delaying our departure approximately 3 hours. When at our foreign destination; the ground staff was efficient and flight departed with just 30 minutes to spare to before the crew would be illegal exceeding their duty time limitation. All was normal through the takeoff phase. After takeoff there was a left engine prv EICAS message associated with bleed light on the overhead panel. Aircraft climbed normally; the crew executed the QRH emergency procedure. Upon intermediate level off with the aircraft at cruise and all items accomplished; dispatch and maintenance control were contacted via satcom. The situation was explained to maintenance control. Maintenance control's explanation to us was contradictory to the written condition statement in the QRH. We declared an emergency and returned to the departure airport without incident. It was several hours after midnight local body time; and our duty day was [about] to expire. The crew entered crew rest with the subsequent departure of the flight to be twelve hours later that day. The crew was then notified the departure time had been delayed another two hours. The entire crew went to the aircraft which was on a remote ramp. Maintenance was still working to complete MEL 32-12c (prv valve) on the left engine. Maintenance said they needed the crew to run the engine since they were not certified to do so because they were contract maintenance. Thinking maintenance was just finishing up securing panels; the crew began preflight duties. On initial preflight inspection; we discovered a right engine duct leak light with associated right bld duct leak EICAS message. Maintenance control was notified. At this point the aircraft had two compromised bleed air systems. Maintenance was still not finished securing the left side. An additional mechanic came up to diagnose the new right side problem. We contacted maintenance control via satcom for maintenance to speak with them. The crew could hear their conversation. Maintenance was concerned about a hot area in the wing root while trying to open a panel to locate the overpressure switch (with only APU air running). Also; the new right side duct leak problem was addressed. Maintenance control told local maintenance to get off the satcom and go to the office to call him. Maintenance returned to the aircraft and said they were having a hard time getting a bolt off of a panel and had to wait to borrow a tool from another airline. We contacted maintenance control again via satcom. There was confusion of what was done and what needed to be done in order to comply with the MEL. Maintenance said according to maintenance control instructions earlier; they tried to exchange the hpsov valve with the prv valve and could not interchange them because one of the valves had been modified (filed). He put the valves back in their respective positions. There was confusion about the completion of the MEL. Maintenance wanted us to run [the] engine and maintenance control said he only had to dry run the engine with soapy water to check for leaks. Maintenance control insisted that local maintenance go back to the office and get the correct and complete paperwork to finish the MEL. Local contract maintenance personnel were working hard; but there was perceived communication breakdowns between maintenance control and local maintenance. There was never a clear; concise information exchange between parties to satisfy the completion of this MEL. This only created more delays in the eventual fix. The crew continued to wait and finally; after much conferring with dispatch; maintenance control; and chief pilot the trip was cancelled. The crew witnessed communication inadequacies between maintenance control and local maintenance. We were not assured that the correct procedures were being preformed to satisfy this complex; involved MEL.the MEL was still not satisfied. It was now almost 6 hours into our new duty after arriving that morning. Two open items still remained: left engine prv and right bld duct leak. A ferry flight was scheduled for the next day. A different mechanic repeated the steps of MEL 36- 12c; and right duct leak problem. He verified; and explained all [that] was accomplished. The crew was satisfied that all MEL items for both systems had been accomplished. The flight returned to the domestic destination.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-300 EICAS alerted L ENG PRV after takeoff so the QRH was complied with; an emergency declared and the flight returned to the foreign departure airport where after two days of failed corrective actions the aircraft was ferried to a domestic destination with the L ENG PRV and R BLD DUCT LEAK MEL'ed.

Narrative: Forty-five minutes prior to scheduled departure; Operations assigned our aircraft for another flight. We had to wait for another aircraft which resulted in delaying our departure approximately 3 hours. When at our foreign destination; the ground staff was efficient and flight departed with just 30 minutes to spare to before the crew would be illegal exceeding their duty time limitation. All was normal through the takeoff phase. After takeoff there was a L ENG PRV EICAS message associated with BLEED light on the overhead panel. Aircraft climbed normally; the crew executed the QRH Emergency Procedure. Upon intermediate level off with the aircraft at cruise and all items accomplished; Dispatch and Maintenance Control were contacted via SATCOM. The situation was explained to Maintenance Control. Maintenance Control's explanation to us was contradictory to the written condition statement in the QRH. We declared an emergency and returned to the departure airport without incident. It was several hours after midnight local body time; and our duty day was [about] to expire. The crew entered crew rest with the subsequent departure of the flight to be twelve hours later that day. The crew was then notified the departure time had been delayed another two hours. The entire crew went to the aircraft which was on a remote ramp. Maintenance was still working to complete MEL 32-12c (PRV valve) on the left engine. Maintenance said they needed the crew to run the engine since they were not certified to do so because they were contract maintenance. Thinking Maintenance was just finishing up securing panels; the crew began preflight duties. On initial preflight inspection; we discovered a RIGHT Engine DUCT LEAK light with associated R BLD DUCT LEAK EICAS message. Maintenance Control was notified. At this point the aircraft had two compromised bleed air systems. Maintenance was still not finished securing the left side. An additional Mechanic came up to diagnose the new right side problem. We contacted Maintenance Control via SATCOM for Maintenance to speak with them. The crew could hear their conversation. Maintenance was concerned about a hot area in the wing root while trying to open a panel to locate the overpressure switch (with only APU air running). Also; the new right side duct leak problem was addressed. Maintenance Control told local Maintenance to get off the SATCOM and go to the office to call him. Maintenance returned to the aircraft and said they were having a hard time getting a bolt off of a panel and had to wait to borrow a tool from another airline. We contacted Maintenance Control again via SATCOM. There was confusion of what was done and what needed to be done in order to comply with the MEL. Maintenance said according to Maintenance Control instructions earlier; they tried to exchange the HPSOV valve with the PRV valve and could not interchange them because one of the valves had been modified (filed). He put the valves back in their respective positions. There was confusion about the completion of the MEL. Maintenance wanted us to run [the] engine and Maintenance Control said he only had to dry run the engine with soapy water to check for leaks. Maintenance Control insisted that local Maintenance go back to the office and get the correct and complete paperwork to finish the MEL. Local contract Maintenance personnel were working hard; but there was perceived communication breakdowns between Maintenance Control and local Maintenance. There was never a clear; concise information exchange between parties to satisfy the completion of this MEL. This only created more delays in the eventual fix. The crew continued to wait and finally; after much conferring with Dispatch; Maintenance Control; and Chief Pilot the trip was cancelled. The crew witnessed communication inadequacies between Maintenance Control and local Maintenance. We were not assured that the correct procedures were being preformed to satisfy this complex; involved MEL.The MEL was still not satisfied. It was now almost 6 hours into our new duty after arriving that morning. Two open items still remained: L ENG PRV and R BLD DUCT LEAK. A ferry flight was scheduled for the next day. A different mechanic repeated the steps of MEL 36- 12c; and R duct leak problem. He verified; and explained all [that] was accomplished. The crew was satisfied that all MEL items for both systems had been accomplished. The flight returned to the domestic destination.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.