Narrative:

Approximately 2 hours and 30 minutes into the flight; at FL350; I was awakened from my resting position by the lead flight attendant. She informed me that aft galley oven #2 was emitting high temperature from the front; side and top of the unit. I immediately went to the aft galley; where I was greeted by approximately three flight attendants. As I entered the galley area; I could feel radiated heat being emitted from the suspect unit. A flight attendant told me that he had notified the cockpit that he had expended a bottle of halon fire extinguishing agent and advised me that he was preparing to have a second bottle standing-by. He described to me that the oven was getting hotter by the minute and explained that it had not cooled in the same manner as the other ovens in the galley which had been deactivated at the same time. I found the circuit breakers serving the ovens and galley were already pulled. Additionally; the pilots in the cockpit had deactivated the galley power switch located on the cockpit upper panel. There should not have been any electrical current serving the unit. All operational lights and indicators on the operating panel located above the front of the oven were extinguished. The front; top and sides of the oven were hot; allowing tactile contact for only a second. We emptied a shelf-cupboard atop the oven which contained only a few plastic drinking cups. I slowly opened the door of the oven with a dry cloth towel to see if the oven contained a fire. The heat was excessive in relation to previous experiences I've had standing in front of open galley-oven doors aboard the A-330. There was no smoke in the galley area; however the smell of an over-heated electrical kitchen appliance was present. I was able to open the oven door enough to see that the oven was empty and clean. It was undoubtedly producing heat. My experience with ovens convinced me that the heat pouring out of the oven was not simply residual heat from a cooling oven. I secured the door and stepped away from the unit for a minute or two and continued to observe the oven. I called the cockpit to ask the pilots to start thinking about the selection of a diversionary landing at the nearest suitable airport. I began emptying the closet area behind the ovens which serves as a cart storage/baggage area to determine if heat was penetrating the storage area. Although the storage space did not extend all the way back to the suspect oven; I could feel that the inner wall closer to the oven was warmer than the outer wall of the aircraft. I deemed this to be a normal condition after consulting assisting flight attendants who were still present in the aft galley area. We had no control of the oven while excessive heat was continually being produced. I advised the flight attendants that I believe we will not be continuing toward our destination and that it is quite probable that we will be diverting to another airport close by. I asked them to keep me advised of the oven's status via intercom and to keep watch over it. We agreed they would treat it as an electrical fire should the situation escalate. Upon returning to the cockpit; I found both pilots had already begun the investigation of some select airports for a landing. I described the situation to them. We displayed and examined pertinent ECAM electrical pages and found no anomalies. We got a status call from the galley that the oven appeared to be getting hotter. It was at this time that I decided to initiate a diversion. The two nearest airports were both behind us. Constant communication and test information was exchanged with the aft cabin and lead flight attendant. The relief pilot communicated with the company over satcom; the first officer flew the aircraft; I communicated with ATC and the relief pilot maintained contact with the cabin; both via intercom and in-person. With four pilots working the situation; clear lines of communication; responsibility and duties made the event entirely manageable; however each of us were still very busy. We contacted ATC; declared an emergency; and turned toward our designated en route alternate; approximately 160 miles behind us. We discussed our overweight situation (at that point; perhaps 80;000 pounds overweight) and agreed on a strategy to get a lower altitude; to slow to gear and flap 1 extension speed; and to use 230 KTS as our new cruise speed toward the alternate in order to exhaust as much fuel as we could to reduce the landing weight. We agreed that if at any point the oven-overheat resulted in the production of flames; we would expedite the arrival by cleaning-up the aircraft to resume a higher speed. After consulting the QRH overweight landing charts it was apparent that the 6;000 ft runway at our planned divert airport was inadequate. The next closest airport was approximately 45 miles farther from our present track; with an 8;000 ft runway. We set course for [the airport with the longer runway] with complete ATC coordination and assistance. We were vectored onto the ILS and landed without incident; taxied clear and parked at a ramp assigned to us by ground control with fire trucks escorting us to the ramp. No stairs at the airport seemed to be high enough to afford access to firefighters but somehow they boarded and assured us that the oven; while still very hot; was no longer producing heat. Fire crews were unsuccessful at pulling the oven out of its rack whereupon it was agreed to keep the oven installed; but that it should be continually observed as long as there was electrical power on the aircraft. Fire fighters kept a log of the oven temperatures long after they boarded. They revealed to us that temperatures of the other three ovens were ambient. Oven number two was still hot an hour after we landed. Despite all efforts; crew was unable to stabilize the escalating temperature of the galley oven. All indications from galley and cockpit revealed that the oven should have been deactivated; yet it continued to generate heat in proportions crew deemed threatening.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A330 Captain is awakened from rest break by the Lead Flight Attendant and informed of an overheating oven in the aft galley. The oven circuit breakers had all been pulled and the galley power had been deactivated in the cockpit and all power indicating lights were extinguished; yet the oven appeared to be getting hotter. The Captain elects to divert to a suitable airport where the fire crew determines that the oven is still hot but cooling and unpowered.

Narrative: Approximately 2 hours and 30 minutes into the flight; at FL350; I was awakened from my resting position by the Lead Flight Attendant. She informed me that Aft Galley Oven #2 was emitting high temperature from the front; side and top of the unit. I immediately went to the aft galley; where I was greeted by approximately three flight attendants. As I entered the galley area; I could feel radiated heat being emitted from the suspect unit. A Flight Attendant told me that he had notified the cockpit that he had expended a bottle of Halon Fire Extinguishing Agent and advised me that he was preparing to have a second bottle standing-by. He described to me that the oven was getting hotter by the minute and explained that it had not cooled in the same manner as the other ovens in the galley which had been deactivated at the same time. I found the circuit breakers serving the ovens and galley were already pulled. Additionally; the pilots in the cockpit had deactivated the Galley Power Switch located on the cockpit upper panel. There should not have been any electrical current serving the unit. All operational lights and indicators on the operating panel located above the front of the oven were extinguished. The front; top and sides of the oven were hot; allowing tactile contact for only a second. We emptied a shelf-cupboard atop the oven which contained only a few plastic drinking cups. I slowly opened the door of the oven with a dry cloth towel to see if the oven contained a fire. The heat was excessive in relation to previous experiences I've had standing in front of open galley-oven doors aboard the A-330. There was no smoke in the galley area; however the smell of an over-heated electrical kitchen appliance was present. I was able to open the oven door enough to see that the oven was empty and clean. It was undoubtedly producing heat. My experience with ovens convinced me that the heat pouring out of the oven was not simply residual heat from a cooling oven. I secured the door and stepped away from the unit for a minute or two and continued to observe the oven. I called the cockpit to ask the pilots to start thinking about the selection of a diversionary landing at the nearest suitable airport. I began emptying the closet area behind the ovens which serves as a cart storage/baggage area to determine if heat was penetrating the storage area. Although the storage space did not extend all the way back to the suspect oven; I could feel that the inner wall closer to the oven was warmer than the outer wall of the aircraft. I deemed this to be a normal condition after consulting assisting flight attendants who were still present in the aft galley area. We had no control of the oven while excessive heat was continually being produced. I advised the flight attendants that I believe we will not be continuing toward our destination and that it is quite probable that we will be diverting to another airport close by. I asked them to keep me advised of the oven's status via intercom and to keep watch over it. We agreed they would treat it as an electrical fire should the situation escalate. Upon returning to the cockpit; I found both pilots had already begun the investigation of some select airports for a landing. I described the situation to them. We displayed and examined pertinent ECAM electrical pages and found no anomalies. We got a status call from the galley that the oven appeared to be getting hotter. It was at this time that I decided to initiate a diversion. The two nearest airports were both behind us. Constant communication and TEST information was exchanged with the Aft Cabin and Lead Flight Attendant. The Relief Pilot communicated with the company over SATCOM; the First Officer flew the aircraft; I communicated with ATC and the Relief Pilot maintained contact with the cabin; both via intercom and in-person. With four pilots working the situation; clear lines of communication; responsibility and duties made the event entirely manageable; however each of us were still very busy. We contacted ATC; declared an emergency; and turned toward our designated en route alternate; approximately 160 miles behind us. We discussed our overweight situation (at that point; perhaps 80;000 LBS overweight) and agreed on a strategy to get a lower altitude; to slow to gear and flap 1 extension speed; and to use 230 KTS as our new cruise speed toward the alternate in order to exhaust as much fuel as we could to reduce the landing weight. We agreed that if at any point the oven-overheat resulted in the production of flames; we would expedite the arrival by cleaning-up the aircraft to resume a higher speed. After consulting the QRH overweight landing charts it was apparent that the 6;000 FT runway at our planned divert airport was inadequate. The next closest airport was approximately 45 miles farther from our present track; with an 8;000 FT runway. We set course for [the airport with the longer runway] with complete ATC coordination and assistance. We were vectored onto the ILS and landed without incident; taxied clear and parked at a ramp assigned to us by Ground Control with fire trucks escorting us to the ramp. No stairs at the airport seemed to be high enough to afford access to firefighters but somehow they boarded and assured us that the oven; while still very hot; was no longer producing heat. Fire crews were unsuccessful at pulling the oven out of its rack whereupon it was agreed to keep the oven installed; but that it should be continually observed as long as there was electrical power on the aircraft. Fire Fighters kept a log of the oven temperatures long after they boarded. They revealed to us that temperatures of the other three ovens were ambient. Oven number two was still hot an hour after we landed. Despite all efforts; crew was unable to stabilize the escalating temperature of the galley oven. All indications from galley and cockpit revealed that the oven should have been deactivated; yet it continued to generate heat in proportions crew deemed threatening.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.