37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1043338 |
Time | |
Date | 201210 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | SNA.Airport |
State Reference | CA |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Learjet 35 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 135 |
Flight Phase | Takeoff |
Route In Use | Direct |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Flight Instructor Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Multiengine |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10 Flight Crew Total 3200 Flight Crew Type 1050 |
Person 2 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying First Officer |
Qualification | Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Flight Instructor |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 42 Flight Crew Total 2150 Flight Crew Type 175 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Procedural FAR Ground Incursion Runway |
Narrative:
In night VMC conditions we lined up on and inadvertently took off from the wrong runway. Santa ana has parallel runways; 19L and 19R. We mistook 19L for 19R. 19L is shorter (2;887 ft) and closed when the tower is not operating. 19R is the longer of the two (5;701 ft) and the preferred runway.upon reaching the end of the taxiway we turned onto 19L; I remember seeing and verifying the runway numbers but it did not register to us that I had said 19L when we; indeed; needed to be using 19R. I lined the plane up; stepped on the brakes; stood the power up and released the brakes. We used nearly every bit of the runway for takeoff. We did not; however; use any portion of the 400 ft overrun. It wasn't until we cleaned the plane up after our initial climb that we discussed the seemingly short takeoff run; discovered our error and realized the seriousness of the situation and the potential catastrophe we averted. It was a shock to both myself and my first officer that we both had failed to properly identify our intended runway of use.the problem was exacerbated by the lighting conditions; our lack of sleep; our failure to use the airport diagram to our advantage; our failure to recognize the runway markings and failure to back one another up as a fail safe. I had been awake for about 19 hours prior to the occurrence. I suspect the first officer had been up at least as long. Although the outcome was successful it was a scary lesson to learn. Always; always use the airport diagram before and while taxiing; always verify that the runway being used is in fact the runway of intended use; always take enough time to ensure a thorough thought process has been used to determine the correct course of action. I narrowly averted a potential disaster and the lessons learned are permanently seared into my memory.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: After an already long day and facing one last leg departing early in the morning hours the flight crew of a Lear 35 took off from the very short Runway 19L at SNA vice the twice as long 19R as intended.
Narrative: In night VMC conditions we lined up on and inadvertently took off from the wrong runway. Santa Ana has parallel runways; 19L and 19R. We mistook 19L for 19R. 19L is shorter (2;887 FT) and closed when the Tower is not operating. 19R is the longer of the two (5;701 FT) and the preferred runway.Upon reaching the end of the taxiway we turned onto 19L; I remember seeing and verifying the runway numbers but it did not register to us that I had said 19L when we; indeed; needed to be using 19R. I lined the plane up; stepped on the brakes; stood the power up and released the brakes. We used nearly every bit of the runway for takeoff. We did not; however; use any portion of the 400 FT overrun. It wasn't until we cleaned the plane up after our initial climb that we discussed the seemingly short takeoff run; discovered our error and realized the seriousness of the situation and the potential catastrophe we averted. It was a shock to both myself and my First Officer that we both had failed to properly identify our intended runway of use.The problem was exacerbated by the lighting conditions; our lack of sleep; our failure to use the airport diagram to our advantage; our failure to recognize the runway markings and failure to back one another up as a fail safe. I had been awake for about 19 hours prior to the occurrence. I suspect the First Officer had been up at least as long. Although the outcome was successful it was a scary lesson to learn. Always; always use the airport diagram before and while taxiing; always verify that the runway being used is in fact the runway of intended use; always take enough time to ensure a thorough thought process has been used to determine the correct course of action. I narrowly averted a potential disaster and the lessons learned are permanently seared into my memory.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.