Narrative:

I hope this may help solve the ATC problem at NAS alameda. We were on final approach to land at NAS alameda runway 13. During the approach I noticed a small tugboat crossing from right to left at the end of runway 13. The boat had a mast light about 20' above the perceived deck. After tower gave landing clearance I turned on the nose gear landing light (about 120' MSL). I gave a quick inside scan to check gear flaps and spoilers, then looked outside and saw a crane in the glide path of the aircraft. I estimate the crane to be coalt or slightly lower about 50' ahead of the aircraft. The crane had no light whatsoever. Had an immediate evasive go around not been initiated, an impact would have been imminent. After landing we were told that tower personnel cannot see the end of runway 13. This poses a major safety hazard due to the canal and ship traffic that may extend into the glide path of landing traffic. Further investigation reveals that the tug I saw was pulling an unlit barge with the crane. I'm not too happy with the way the military is handling this. We almost lost an aircraft and crew and 37 passenger. I recommend communication from the port to tower to monitor crossing ship traffic while runway 13 is in use.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CLOSE PROX MLT AND A CRANE BEING TOWED ACROSS THE ACPH END OF RWY 13 AT NGZ. TWR CLAIMS THEY CANNOT SEE THE APCH END OF RWY 13.

Narrative: I HOPE THIS MAY HELP SOLVE THE ATC PROB AT NAS ALAMEDA. WE WERE ON FINAL APCH TO LAND AT NAS ALAMEDA RWY 13. DURING THE APCH I NOTICED A SMALL TUGBOAT XING FROM RIGHT TO LEFT AT THE END OF RWY 13. THE BOAT HAD A MAST LIGHT ABOUT 20' ABOVE THE PERCEIVED DECK. AFTER TWR GAVE LNDG CLRNC I TURNED ON THE NOSE GEAR LNDG LIGHT (ABOUT 120' MSL). I GAVE A QUICK INSIDE SCAN TO CHK GEAR FLAPS AND SPOILERS, THEN LOOKED OUTSIDE AND SAW A CRANE IN THE GLIDE PATH OF THE ACFT. I ESTIMATE THE CRANE TO BE COALT OR SLIGHTLY LOWER ABOUT 50' AHEAD OF THE ACFT. THE CRANE HAD NO LIGHT WHATSOEVER. HAD AN IMMEDIATE EVASIVE GAR NOT BEEN INITIATED, AN IMPACT WOULD HAVE BEEN IMMINENT. AFTER LNDG WE WERE TOLD THAT TWR PERSONNEL CANNOT SEE THE END OF RWY 13. THIS POSES A MAJOR SAFETY HAZARD DUE TO THE CANAL AND SHIP TFC THAT MAY EXTEND INTO THE GLIDE PATH OF LNDG TFC. FURTHER INVESTIGATION REVEALS THAT THE TUG I SAW WAS PULLING AN UNLIT BARGE WITH THE CRANE. I'M NOT TOO HAPPY WITH THE WAY THE MIL IS HANDLING THIS. WE ALMOST LOST AN ACFT AND CREW AND 37 PAX. I RECOMMEND COM FROM THE PORT TO TWR TO MONITOR XING SHIP TFC WHILE RWY 13 IS IN USE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.