Narrative:

En route at 11000' cruise, new first officer on initial operating experience flight was accelerating to 300 KTS. I noticed a higher rate of cabin clear than normal and was looking at the overhead panel when I felt the aircraft begin to climb. Looking down, I saw the first officer attempting to maintain altitude but we were climbing with maximum climb power. I took control of the aircraft and returned to altitude. The altitude deviation maximum was approximately 500' and was for a very short duration. Center made no report to us and I doubt that they were aware even though we were the only aircraft with the controller at that time. We, needless to say, had no time to communicate with them during the event. The cause was obviously the first officer's inexperience with a complex cockpit. He simply pushed an incorrect button. I feel that I was adequately vigilant. However, something is always bound to happen when you are looking at a different panel. My surprise is the magnitude of his error in minimal time! Due to trim forces, I required full forward control column authority in order to keep the aircraft from further climb. Once power was reduced and the aircraft retrimmed, control was no problem. This reaffirms the need by all crew member for continual vigilance. Also, someone new to a cockpit should always attempt to think before he acts--think what reaction of his input will be--not act and wait for the reaction.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NEW FO DURING IOE WAS ACCELERATING TO 300 KTS AFTER LEVELING AT 11000'. HE MISHANDLED FMC, ACFT BEGAN TO CLIMB WITH CLIMB POWER. CAPT CKP TOOK OVER AND REGAINED CONTROL.

Narrative: ENRTE AT 11000' CRUISE, NEW F/O ON INITIAL OPERATING EXPERIENCE FLT WAS ACCELERATING TO 300 KTS. I NOTICED A HIGHER RATE OF CABIN CLR THAN NORMAL AND WAS LOOKING AT THE OVERHEAD PANEL WHEN I FELT THE ACFT BEGIN TO CLB. LOOKING DOWN, I SAW THE F/O ATTEMPTING TO MAINTAIN ALT BUT WE WERE CLBING WITH MAX CLB PWR. I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND RETURNED TO ALT. THE ALT DEVIATION MAX WAS APPROX 500' AND WAS FOR A VERY SHORT DURATION. CENTER MADE NO RPT TO US AND I DOUBT THAT THEY WERE AWARE EVEN THOUGH WE WERE THE ONLY ACFT WITH THE CTLR AT THAT TIME. WE, NEEDLESS TO SAY, HAD NO TIME TO COMMUNICATE WITH THEM DURING THE EVENT. THE CAUSE WAS OBVIOUSLY THE F/O'S INEXPERIENCE WITH A COMPLEX COCKPIT. HE SIMPLY PUSHED AN INCORRECT BUTTON. I FEEL THAT I WAS ADEQUATELY VIGILANT. HOWEVER, SOMETHING IS ALWAYS BOUND TO HAPPEN WHEN YOU ARE LOOKING AT A DIFFERENT PANEL. MY SURPRISE IS THE MAGNITUDE OF HIS ERROR IN MINIMAL TIME! DUE TO TRIM FORCES, I REQUIRED FULL FORWARD CONTROL COLUMN AUTHORITY IN ORDER TO KEEP THE ACFT FROM FURTHER CLB. ONCE PWR WAS REDUCED AND THE ACFT RETRIMMED, CONTROL WAS NO PROB. THIS REAFFIRMS THE NEED BY ALL CREW MEMBER FOR CONTINUAL VIGILANCE. ALSO, SOMEONE NEW TO A COCKPIT SHOULD ALWAYS ATTEMPT TO THINK BEFORE HE ACTS--THINK WHAT REACTION OF HIS INPUT WILL BE--NOT ACT AND WAIT FOR THE REACTION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.