Narrative:

I was working R7 and R8 combined at zan. I had a radar trnee who was certified on R7 and training on R8 her last radar sector. The morning had been unusual and complex. Sector 7 and 8 are normally decombined on day watch. Sector 7 console was broken due to frequency problems. Everything was combined to sector 8. Radar was set on 400 mi scale, we were monitoring 17 frequencys and working 5 bays full of active strips. Sector 8 has a common boundary with vancouver sandspit sector. Vancouver center was having staffing problems. They had issued a 50 mi flow with everyone over ann VOR. With the personnel shortage at vancouver center they were not answering any of their landlines or voice lines. We were having problems passing information on aircraft according to LOA. The supervisor was aware of the situation. Ktn radio requested clearance on aircraft X to kpae. The d-side issued the clearance ktn ann V317 yzt kpae, maintain 90, hfr. We had an air carrier inbound to ktn. There would be about a 15 min delay. Aircraft X could not wait for the inbound. He departed VFR, would call us at ann for IFR clearance. D-side immediately started coordinating with vancouver center. Vancouver did answer their lines this time and said they needed X on V362 tc. X called over ann requesting IFR clearance. The radar trnee issued the clearance V362 tc as filed, maintain 90, squawk XXXX. X readback V362 as filed, then he was stepped on by a guard aircraft on another frequency, but I hear maintain 90 between the guard's xmissions, then he said the squawk. When X reported over ann I observed a target on radar over ann which dropped off immediately due to poor radar coverage in that area at that altitude. The beacon code issued to X popped up on radar, later on vancouver center's side of the common boundary closer to V317 rather than V362. Vancouver's radar was unmonitored at this time. The d-side was instructed to contact vancouver center to see if they were talking with X, and if they knew that he appeared off course. The d-side attempted contact with vancouver center for 20 mins. They would not answer either line. We assumed vancouver center was talking with X. I listened to the tape of the situation. The first part of aircraft X readback is not on the tape. You hear filed, then the guard aircraft steps on his transmission, then you hear the beacon code at the end. I was told I did not listen to the readback of aircraft X, which caused the system deviation. I do not imagine xmissions from aircraft. The quality of the recorded tape was poor where as the decibel level of the individual frequencys did not match that of the actual sector. Af was questioned on the tape recording and they said if it was said on frequency, it is on the tape. Nobody has questioned them on the possibility of a dirty recording head or a bad tape. I heard the readback, the route, maintain 90 between the guard's transmission, and the beacon code, and it was all correct.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GA ACFT ENTERED CZVR AIRSPACE FROM ZAN AIRSPACE AND WAS NAVIGATING ON WRONG AIRWAY. OPERATIONAL DEVIATION.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING R7 AND R8 COMBINED AT ZAN. I HAD A RADAR TRNEE WHO WAS CERTIFIED ON R7 AND TRNING ON R8 HER LAST RADAR SECTOR. THE MORNING HAD BEEN UNUSUAL AND COMPLEX. SECTOR 7 AND 8 ARE NORMALLY DECOMBINED ON DAY WATCH. SECTOR 7 CONSOLE WAS BROKEN DUE TO FREQ PROBS. EVERYTHING WAS COMBINED TO SECTOR 8. RADAR WAS SET ON 400 MI SCALE, WE WERE MONITORING 17 FREQS AND WORKING 5 BAYS FULL OF ACTIVE STRIPS. SECTOR 8 HAS A COMMON BOUNDARY WITH VANCOUVER SANDSPIT SECTOR. VANCOUVER CENTER WAS HAVING STAFFING PROBS. THEY HAD ISSUED A 50 MI FLOW WITH EVERYONE OVER ANN VOR. WITH THE PERSONNEL SHORTAGE AT VANCOUVER CENTER THEY WERE NOT ANSWERING ANY OF THEIR LANDLINES OR VOICE LINES. WE WERE HAVING PROBS PASSING INFO ON ACFT ACCORDING TO LOA. THE SUPVR WAS AWARE OF THE SITUATION. KTN RADIO REQUESTED CLRNC ON ACFT X TO KPAE. THE D-SIDE ISSUED THE CLRNC KTN ANN V317 YZT KPAE, MAINTAIN 90, HFR. WE HAD AN ACR INBND TO KTN. THERE WOULD BE ABOUT A 15 MIN DELAY. ACFT X COULD NOT WAIT FOR THE INBND. HE DEPARTED VFR, WOULD CALL US AT ANN FOR IFR CLRNC. D-SIDE IMMEDIATELY STARTED COORDINATING WITH VANCOUVER CENTER. VANCOUVER DID ANSWER THEIR LINES THIS TIME AND SAID THEY NEEDED X ON V362 TC. X CALLED OVER ANN REQUESTING IFR CLRNC. THE RADAR TRNEE ISSUED THE CLRNC V362 TC AS FILED, MAINTAIN 90, SQUAWK XXXX. X READBACK V362 AS FILED, THEN HE WAS STEPPED ON BY A GUARD ACFT ON ANOTHER FREQ, BUT I HEAR MAINTAIN 90 BTWN THE GUARD'S XMISSIONS, THEN HE SAID THE SQUAWK. WHEN X RPTED OVER ANN I OBSERVED A TARGET ON RADAR OVER ANN WHICH DROPPED OFF IMMEDIATELY DUE TO POOR RADAR COVERAGE IN THAT AREA AT THAT ALT. THE BEACON CODE ISSUED TO X POPPED UP ON RADAR, LATER ON VANCOUVER CENTER'S SIDE OF THE COMMON BOUNDARY CLOSER TO V317 RATHER THAN V362. VANCOUVER'S RADAR WAS UNMONITORED AT THIS TIME. THE D-SIDE WAS INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT VANCOUVER CENTER TO SEE IF THEY WERE TALKING WITH X, AND IF THEY KNEW THAT HE APPEARED OFF COURSE. THE D-SIDE ATTEMPTED CONTACT WITH VANCOUVER CENTER FOR 20 MINS. THEY WOULD NOT ANSWER EITHER LINE. WE ASSUMED VANCOUVER CENTER WAS TALKING WITH X. I LISTENED TO THE TAPE OF THE SITUATION. THE FIRST PART OF ACFT X READBACK IS NOT ON THE TAPE. YOU HEAR FILED, THEN THE GUARD ACFT STEPS ON HIS XMISSION, THEN YOU HEAR THE BEACON CODE AT THE END. I WAS TOLD I DID NOT LISTEN TO THE READBACK OF ACFT X, WHICH CAUSED THE SYS DEVIATION. I DO NOT IMAGINE XMISSIONS FROM ACFT. THE QUALITY OF THE RECORDED TAPE WAS POOR WHERE AS THE DECIBEL LEVEL OF THE INDIVIDUAL FREQS DID NOT MATCH THAT OF THE ACTUAL SECTOR. AF WAS QUESTIONED ON THE TAPE RECORDING AND THEY SAID IF IT WAS SAID ON FREQ, IT IS ON THE TAPE. NOBODY HAS QUESTIONED THEM ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A DIRTY RECORDING HEAD OR A BAD TAPE. I HEARD THE READBACK, THE ROUTE, MAINTAIN 90 BTWN THE GUARD'S XMISSION, AND THE BEACON CODE, AND IT WAS ALL CORRECT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.