Narrative:

We were a reposition flight; so there wasn't any flight attendant or passengers. The airplane was at the maintenance hangar; but we did not test fly it and it wasn't a maintenance ferry flight; so we treated it like it was a reposition flight from any out station. The first officer was flying this leg and everything was proceeding normally and he was doing a great job. As we approached 10;000 ft with approach control; everything had proceeded normally and all checklists and briefings had been done. We were given a 300 degree heading for the intercept; and a descent to cross the next fix at 7;000 ft and were cleared for the ILS approach; and 250 KTS. Then we were given 180 KTS so the first officer powered back to idle; requested flaps 9 and I believe he used the speed brakes also; and slowed the aircraft down. The airplane ahead of us was apparently slower than us because somewhere between 4;000 and 3;000 on the descent we were told to slow to 170 KTS so the first officer requested gear down and flaps to 22. When I reached for the gear lever I saw that the #1 engine oil pressure was at 33 psi and boxed red. I called it out and the first officer acknowledged and I grabbed the QRH. I thought about quantity and checked it and it was boxed yellow at 3 quarts. I also continued to monitor the oil pressure and it was fluctuating between 30 and 33 psi. Before I found the correct page in the QRH we were at the FAF; so I put the book in my lap and called the tower. We were cleared to land and I acknowledged and immediately suggested that we stay at flaps 22 incase we have to shut down the engine and the first officer agreed. I announced that I would bump the speeds up 5 KTS and did; and then I picked up the QRH again and about that time we got the master warning and the cas message ei oil press low. The first officer had gone to idle thrust to slow down to final approach speed and the pressure had gone down to 20 psi. At that point I was concerned about doing major engine damage if it got any lower; and we were at 37;000 pounds landing weight so I knew that performance wouldn't be a problem; I said that we should shut it down; we were about three miles from landing and the first officer was ok with it; so I reach up and lifted the cover and went to stop on the #1. The thrust lever was at idle and she shut down; and I checked the hydraulics page and saw that #1 hydraulic was 3;000 psi and the pump was on. I then quickly read the QRH about low oil press and at the bottom was the statement to go to the precautionary engine shut down checklist. We were going to be on the ground about a minute and I knew that the shut down checklist was about shutting stuff off like generators etc.; and landing distance; which we had plenty; so I elected not to go there. I felt that monitoring the approach was more important and that we simply didn't have time; and I wasn't going to go around to complete that checklist. It was then that the first officer asked if we should tell the tower. Oops; yes we should (good catch). I told the tower; 'be advised that we have shut down the #1 engine.' so then they asked if we needed any assistance and if we were declaring an emergency. I said; 'yes we are declaring an emergency; and no; we don't need any assistance; there was no fire or anything; it was a precautionary shut down for low oil pressure' (something like that). The first officer did an excellent job; landed normally and I took the bottoms as we slowed and we taxed in to the gate. The first officer called maintenance during the taxi in and reported it to them. At the gate; they immediately knocked on the door; and with no flight attendants the first officer jumped up and opened the door and the parking checklist was never completed. I sent the post flight; and double checked my parking flow; and the first officer was in and out of the flight deck a couple of times but it slipped thru the cracks. We both wanted to go look at the engine; which was covered in oil. No excuse; my bad. I wrote it up and the next crew showed up so we discussed it. I saw them a half hour later (airplane swap) and they said maintenance said it was a bearing or a seal; that they'd have to split the engine open to fix it. I did forget to do the parking checklist. The first officer had gotten up to open the main cabin door because we had no flight attendant. He came back to the flight deck a couple of times but I had forgotten to call for it. I did send the post flight; and double checked my flow; but then forgot to run the checklist. I should have grabbed the checklist immediately after sending the post flight as a reminder to run the parking checklist.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB145 flight crew detects low engine oil pressure on final approach and shuts the engine down. The aircraft had been picked up from the maintenance hangar and was a repositioning flight.

Narrative: We were a reposition flight; so there wasn't any flight attendant or passengers. The airplane was at the maintenance hangar; but we did not test fly it and it wasn't a maintenance ferry flight; so we treated it like it was a reposition flight from any out station. The First Officer was flying this leg and everything was proceeding normally and he was doing a great job. As we approached 10;000 FT with Approach Control; everything had proceeded normally and all checklists and briefings had been done. We were given a 300 degree heading for the intercept; and a descent to cross the next fix at 7;000 FT and were cleared for the ILS approach; and 250 KTS. Then we were given 180 KTS so the First Officer powered back to idle; requested flaps 9 and I believe he used the speed brakes also; and slowed the aircraft down. The airplane ahead of us was apparently slower than us because somewhere between 4;000 and 3;000 on the descent we were told to slow to 170 KTS so the First Officer requested gear down and flaps to 22. When I reached for the gear lever I saw that the #1 engine oil pressure was at 33 PSI and boxed red. I called it out and the First Officer acknowledged and I grabbed the QRH. I thought about quantity and checked it and it was boxed yellow at 3 quarts. I also continued to monitor the oil pressure and it was fluctuating between 30 and 33 PSI. Before I found the correct page in the QRH we were at the FAF; so I put the book in my lap and called the Tower. We were cleared to land and I acknowledged and immediately suggested that we stay at flaps 22 incase we have to shut down the engine and the First Officer agreed. I announced that I would bump the speeds up 5 KTS and did; and then I picked up the QRH again and about that time we got the Master Warning and the CAS message EI OIL PRESS LOW. The First Officer had gone to idle thrust to slow down to final approach speed and the pressure had gone down to 20 PSI. At that point I was concerned about doing major engine damage if it got any lower; and we were at 37;000 LBS landing weight so I knew that performance wouldn't be a problem; I said that we should shut it down; we were about three miles from landing and the First Officer was ok with it; so I reach up and lifted the cover and went to stop on the #1. The thrust lever was at idle and she shut down; and I checked the hydraulics page and saw that #1 hydraulic was 3;000 PSI and the pump was on. I then quickly read the QRH about low oil press and at the bottom was the statement to go to the precautionary engine shut down checklist. We were going to be on the ground about a minute and I knew that the shut down checklist was about shutting stuff off like generators etc.; and landing distance; which we had plenty; so I elected not to go there. I felt that monitoring the approach was more important and that we simply didn't have time; and I wasn't going to go around to complete that checklist. It was then that the First Officer asked if we should tell the Tower. Oops; yes we should (good catch). I told the Tower; 'Be advised that we have shut down the #1 engine.' So then they asked if we needed any assistance and if we were declaring an emergency. I said; 'Yes we are declaring an emergency; and no; we don't need any assistance; there was no fire or anything; it was a precautionary shut down for low oil pressure' (Something like that). The First Officer did an excellent job; landed normally and I took the bottoms as we slowed and we taxed in to the gate. The First Officer called Maintenance during the taxi in and reported it to them. At the gate; they immediately knocked on the door; and with no flight attendants the First Officer jumped up and opened the door and the Parking Checklist was never completed. I sent the post flight; and double checked my parking flow; and the First Officer was in and out of the flight deck a couple of times but it slipped thru the cracks. We both wanted to go look at the engine; which was covered in oil. No excuse; my bad. I wrote it up and the next crew showed up so we discussed it. I saw them a half hour later (airplane swap) and they said Maintenance said it was a bearing or a seal; that they'd have to split the engine open to fix it. I did forget to do the Parking Checklist. The First Officer had gotten up to open the main cabin door because we had no flight attendant. He came back to the flight deck a couple of times but I had forgotten to call for it. I did send the post flight; and double checked my flow; but then forgot to run the checklist. I should have grabbed the checklist immediately after sending the post flight as a reminder to run the parking checklist.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.