Narrative:

I was working sky sector radar when I received a handoff from the mnn sector on air carrier X (cmh fdy pmm, etc). The only pertinent traffic in my sector was air carrier Z climbing southbound from dtw via rod. After verbal coordination, the mnn controller climbed X to FL240, with respect to Z. I later observed a limited data block at FL230 northwest of fdy and sebnd. I did not expect to talk to X until that traffic situation was resolved by the low altitude sectors involved. However, mnn sector switched X to my frequency when air carrier Z was no longer a factor (apparently unaware of corp Y traffic at FL230). When X called, he was out of FL225 (approximately) climbing (to FL240) and approximately 20 mi from traffic (head on at FL230). I instructed X to expedite his climb to FL240 and issued traffic, opp direction at FL230. When it became apparent that air carrier X climb rate might be insufficient to ensure vertical sep, and that no action had been taken with the other aircraft (corp Y), I issued an immediate left turn to X and instructed pan radar to do likewise with aircraft Y. Latitude sep was lost prior to the pilot's report level at FL240. Upon later review, I discovered that the pan controller chose not to work air carrier X. He informed mnn of the southbound aircraft, but not of corp Y. He assumed that the climbing traffic would be above corp Y. I am not aware of his workload at the time, but I believe (the same) controller should be working aircraft that may be a traffic problem. By the time X came on my frequency, there was no positive control being used. Had I not taken action at once, these 2 aircraft would have been very close. Another problem is the routing of the air carrier X. It is a 'kamikaze' route, cutting across several departure and arrival routes into and out of cle and dtw. The route cuts across too many transitioning sectors and conflicts with too many transitioning (climbing/descending) aircraft. Also, the sectors involved are very complex and generally very busy. Had I not had time to notice the FL230 limited data block in the pandora sector, I believe no action would have been taken. Many controllers believe that when they are busy, they are better off not working some aircraft, merely taking a pointout. Unfortunately, when traffic does present itself, they are not in a position to correct it. I do not believe many controllers are as aware of traffic pointed out as they are of those on their frequency.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION BETWEEN ACR AND CORP ACFT. OPERATIONAL ERROR.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING SKY SECTOR RADAR WHEN I RECEIVED A HDOF FROM THE MNN SECTOR ON ACR X (CMH FDY PMM, ETC). THE ONLY PERTINENT TFC IN MY SECTOR WAS ACR Z CLBING SBND FROM DTW VIA ROD. AFTER VERBAL COORD, THE MNN CTLR CLBED X TO FL240, WITH RESPECT TO Z. I LATER OBSERVED A LIMITED DATA BLOCK AT FL230 NW OF FDY AND SEBND. I DID NOT EXPECT TO TALK TO X UNTIL THAT TFC SITUATION WAS RESOLVED BY THE LOW ALT SECTORS INVOLVED. HOWEVER, MNN SECTOR SWITCHED X TO MY FREQ WHEN ACR Z WAS NO LONGER A FACTOR (APPARENTLY UNAWARE OF CORP Y TFC AT FL230). WHEN X CALLED, HE WAS OUT OF FL225 (APPROX) CLBING (TO FL240) AND APPROX 20 MI FROM TFC (HEAD ON AT FL230). I INSTRUCTED X TO EXPEDITE HIS CLB TO FL240 AND ISSUED TFC, OPP DIRECTION AT FL230. WHEN IT BECAME APPARENT THAT ACR X CLB RATE MIGHT BE INSUFFICIENT TO ENSURE VERT SEP, AND THAT NO ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN WITH THE OTHER ACFT (CORP Y), I ISSUED AN IMMEDIATE LEFT TURN TO X AND INSTRUCTED PAN RADAR TO DO LIKEWISE WITH ACFT Y. LAT SEP WAS LOST PRIOR TO THE PLT'S RPT LEVEL AT FL240. UPON LATER REVIEW, I DISCOVERED THAT THE PAN CTLR CHOSE NOT TO WORK ACR X. HE INFORMED MNN OF THE SBND ACFT, BUT NOT OF CORP Y. HE ASSUMED THAT THE CLBING TFC WOULD BE ABOVE CORP Y. I AM NOT AWARE OF HIS WORKLOAD AT THE TIME, BUT I BELIEVE (THE SAME) CTLR SHOULD BE WORKING ACFT THAT MAY BE A TFC PROB. BY THE TIME X CAME ON MY FREQ, THERE WAS NO POSITIVE CTL BEING USED. HAD I NOT TAKEN ACTION AT ONCE, THESE 2 ACFT WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY CLOSE. ANOTHER PROB IS THE ROUTING OF THE ACR X. IT IS A 'KAMIKAZE' ROUTE, CUTTING ACROSS SEVERAL DEP AND ARR ROUTES INTO AND OUT OF CLE AND DTW. THE ROUTE CUTS ACROSS TOO MANY TRANSITIONING SECTORS AND CONFLICTS WITH TOO MANY TRANSITIONING (CLBING/DSNDING) ACFT. ALSO, THE SECTORS INVOLVED ARE VERY COMPLEX AND GENERALLY VERY BUSY. HAD I NOT HAD TIME TO NOTICE THE FL230 LIMITED DATA BLOCK IN THE PANDORA SECTOR, I BELIEVE NO ACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN. MANY CTLRS BELIEVE THAT WHEN THEY ARE BUSY, THEY ARE BETTER OFF NOT WORKING SOME ACFT, MERELY TAKING A POINTOUT. UNFORTUNATELY, WHEN TFC DOES PRESENT ITSELF, THEY ARE NOT IN A POS TO CORRECT IT. I DO NOT BELIEVE MANY CTLRS ARE AS AWARE OF TFC POINTED OUT AS THEY ARE OF THOSE ON THEIR FREQ.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.