Narrative:

I was the first officer on this flight. We had just come from iah; where we had been delayed because of a mechanical problem with the bleed valve on the right engine. In iah we had just started up the right engine; so I shut off the cross bleed valve; turned the pack on and shut off the right engine bleed valve; this would allow the deice fluid to burn off. The right duct pressure read 10 psi in this configuration which meant we had a leaking bleed valve on the right engine. We went back to the gate and called contract maintenance. Maintenance asked us to do an engine run to check the indications again; and this time the pressure read 16 psi. Maintenance control informed us that this was out of limits and that the valve was bad. The mechanic visually confirmed this; the valve was showing signs of excessive heat damage. We followed the MEL and were dispatched accordingly. We switched planes for the last leg of our three day trip. We had an FAA inspector on the jump seat for this leg. He asked why we were late; so I informed him of the problem that we had had in iah; including all of the indications and what we had done to resolve it. He was impressed with how we handled the situation. During pushback we started the right engine; and after engine start; I configured the panel just like in iah to see if this plane had a problem also. This aircraft had the indications of a leak too; with the right duct pressure reading 20 psi! I commented that; 'we have the same problem as houston.' the captain said not to worry about it. I asked him if he wanted to trouble shoot this off the gate and talk with maintenance. He said yes. We started the second engine and taxied to a holding spot. I asked the captain several more times if he wanted to talk with maintenance and go back to the gate; he said no; 'we are good; there is no problem.' I asked him do you want to take it like this. He just nodded his head. I asked again; he nodded again. I finally said yes or no; and he verbalized his answer was yes. The FAA inspector observed this interaction. We continued to destination with no problems. The FAA inspector thanked us for the ride and told us merry christmas. When the FAA was gone; I asked the captain why he didn't want to go back to the gate to get this looked at; seeing as how this plane had the same indications as the one in iah. His answer was that; 'he had been on the plane for three [years] and had never seen a problem like this; so the odds of it happening on two planes in a row were low.' he thought that the indications may have been bad; even though these indications were worse than the first plane in iah. He commented that we didn't have any problems enroute so what was the big deal. He intentionally ignored the indications of a bad bleed valve; my concerns; and then flew the plane to destination.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737 First Officer reported detecting a leaking right engine bleed valve after engine start. Maintenance deactivated the valve and placed it on MEL. On the next leg; in a different aircraft; the same problem arose and the Captain chose to ignore it; despite some insistence from the First Officer.

Narrative: I was the First Officer on this flight. We had just come from IAH; where we had been delayed because of a mechanical problem with the bleed valve on the right engine. In IAH we had just started up the right engine; so I shut off the cross bleed valve; turned the pack on and shut off the right engine bleed valve; this would allow the deice fluid to burn off. The right duct pressure read 10 psi in this configuration which meant we had a leaking bleed valve on the right engine. We went back to the gate and called Contract Maintenance. Maintenance asked us to do an engine run to check the indications again; and this time the pressure read 16 psi. Maintenance Control informed us that this was out of limits and that the valve was bad. The Mechanic visually confirmed this; the valve was showing signs of excessive heat damage. We followed the MEL and were dispatched accordingly. We switched planes for the last leg of our three day trip. We had an FAA Inspector on the jump seat for this leg. He asked why we were late; so I informed him of the problem that we had had in IAH; including all of the indications and what we had done to resolve it. He was impressed with how we handled the situation. During pushback we started the right engine; and after engine start; I configured the panel just like in IAH to see if this plane had a problem also. This aircraft had the indications of a leak too; with the right duct pressure reading 20 psi! I commented that; 'we have the same problem as Houston.' The captain said not to worry about it. I asked him if he wanted to trouble shoot this off the gate and talk with Maintenance. He said yes. We started the second engine and taxied to a holding spot. I asked the Captain several more times if he wanted to talk with Maintenance and go back to the gate; he said no; 'we are good; there is no problem.' I asked him do you want to take it like this. He just nodded his head. I asked again; he nodded again. I finally said yes or no; and he verbalized his answer was yes. The FAA inspector observed this interaction. We continued to destination with no problems. The FAA Inspector thanked us for the ride and told us Merry Christmas. When the FAA was gone; I asked the Captain why he didn't want to go back to the gate to get this looked at; seeing as how this plane had the same indications as the one in IAH. His answer was that; 'he had been on the plane for three [years] and had never seen a problem like this; so the odds of it happening on two planes in a row were low.' He thought that the indications may have been bad; even though these indications were worse than the first plane in IAH. He commented that we didn't have any problems enroute so what was the big deal. He intentionally ignored the indications of a bad bleed valve; my concerns; and then flew the plane to destination.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.