Narrative:

Captain flew normal ILS approach to runway 36. Flaps 40 degrees landing and medium automatic braking chosen because of 6869' runway length, wet conditions and 4 KT tailwind. Bug speed, 130 KTS, flare and smooth T/D at 125 KTS within first 1000' of runway. Normal automatic ground spoiler deployment, automatic braking, and normal reversing. At 80 KTS reversers stowed and manual braking applied by 60 KTS. Tower instructed exit active runway 36 via runway 33 after passing taxiway H/M. As increased manual braking applied, captain noticed brakes and nose wheel steering intermittent and instructed first officer to tell tower unable to exit on runway 33, but must continue to the end of runway 36 for exit. Tower approved, but after crossing runway 33 braking and nose wheel steering rapidly deteriorated to nil. Brake and hydraulic pressure reconfirmed good, so hydroplaning on the wet runway coated with heavy rubber deposits from the runway 18 T/D zone was assumed to be the problem. At this point reverse thrust was re-engaged and the aircraft came to a stop on the concrete overrun past exit J. Tower was informed and approved a 180 degree turn so as to permit exit on taxiway J, but after 90 degrees of turn it became apparent that the nose wheel would not clear the runway threshold lights that delineate the runway and the runway overrun. Tower was informed and the runway was closed as we awaited the assistance of a company tug which promptly arrived and negotiated the aircraft clear of the runway lights. A normal taxi resumed to the gate. The flight crew proceeded to operations where we briefed the FAA airport safety officer for dca. Previous and subsequent landing aircraft reported braking action 'poor' and the airport was turned around to a runway 18 operation. Suggestions: 1) initiate more rigid standards for the removal of rubber buildup from tire skid marks, especially at airports having runways with danger areas immediately beyond the overruns (bodies of water, terrain dropoffs, etc). 2) do not permit high speed turbojet aircraft operations on wet runways under 7000' in length during tailwind conditions. Supplemental information from acn 106069: it was of interest to note, although teletype message was available reporting braking action poor, ATIS nor tower provided us with this information.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HYDROPLANING. ACFT WENT OFF END OF RWY ACCOUNT HYDROPLANING ON SLICK SURFACE.

Narrative: CAPT FLEW NORMAL ILS APCH TO RWY 36. FLAPS 40 DEGS LNDG AND MEDIUM AUTO BRAKING CHOSEN BECAUSE OF 6869' RWY LENGTH, WET CONDITIONS AND 4 KT TAILWIND. BUG SPD, 130 KTS, FLARE AND SMOOTH T/D AT 125 KTS WITHIN FIRST 1000' OF RWY. NORMAL AUTO GND SPOILER DEPLOYMENT, AUTO BRAKING, AND NORMAL REVERSING. AT 80 KTS REVERSERS STOWED AND MANUAL BRAKING APPLIED BY 60 KTS. TWR INSTRUCTED EXIT ACTIVE RWY 36 VIA RWY 33 AFTER PASSING TXWY H/M. AS INCREASED MANUAL BRAKING APPLIED, CAPT NOTICED BRAKES AND NOSE WHEEL STEERING INTERMITTENT AND INSTRUCTED F/O TO TELL TWR UNABLE TO EXIT ON RWY 33, BUT MUST CONTINUE TO THE END OF RWY 36 FOR EXIT. TWR APPROVED, BUT AFTER XING RWY 33 BRAKING AND NOSE WHEEL STEERING RAPIDLY DETERIORATED TO NIL. BRAKE AND HYD PRESSURE RECONFIRMED GOOD, SO HYDROPLANING ON THE WET RWY COATED WITH HVY RUBBER DEPOSITS FROM THE RWY 18 T/D ZONE WAS ASSUMED TO BE THE PROB. AT THIS POINT REVERSE THRUST WAS RE-ENGAGED AND THE ACFT CAME TO A STOP ON THE CONCRETE OVERRUN PAST EXIT J. TWR WAS INFORMED AND APPROVED A 180 DEG TURN SO AS TO PERMIT EXIT ON TXWY J, BUT AFTER 90 DEGS OF TURN IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE NOSE WHEEL WOULD NOT CLEAR THE RWY THRESHOLD LIGHTS THAT DELINEATE THE RWY AND THE RWY OVERRUN. TWR WAS INFORMED AND THE RWY WAS CLOSED AS WE AWAITED THE ASSISTANCE OF A COMPANY TUG WHICH PROMPTLY ARRIVED AND NEGOTIATED THE ACFT CLR OF THE RWY LIGHTS. A NORMAL TAXI RESUMED TO THE GATE. THE FLT CREW PROCEEDED TO OPS WHERE WE BRIEFED THE FAA ARPT SAFETY OFFICER FOR DCA. PREVIOUS AND SUBSEQUENT LNDG ACFT RPTED BRAKING ACTION 'POOR' AND THE ARPT WAS TURNED AROUND TO A RWY 18 OPERATION. SUGGESTIONS: 1) INITIATE MORE RIGID STANDARDS FOR THE REMOVAL OF RUBBER BUILDUP FROM TIRE SKID MARKS, ESPECIALLY AT ARPTS HAVING RWYS WITH DANGER AREAS IMMEDIATELY BEYOND THE OVERRUNS (BODIES OF WATER, TERRAIN DROPOFFS, ETC). 2) DO NOT PERMIT HIGH SPD TURBOJET ACFT OPS ON WET RWYS UNDER 7000' IN LENGTH DURING TAILWIND CONDITIONS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 106069: IT WAS OF INTEREST TO NOTE, ALTHOUGH TELETYPE MESSAGE WAS AVAILABLE RPTING BRAKING ACTION POOR, ATIS NOR TWR PROVIDED US WITH THIS INFO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.