Narrative:

We experienced a thrust instability event (tie) on climb. Having read recent safety reports on tie's and discussed this at great length during my annual quality check; I had carefully studied and reviewed the engine limit/surge/stall checklist should this ever happen to me in flight. The tie occurred about 30 miles from the expected handoff [on an overwater flight]. I accomplished the checklist correctly from memory to the point that we had a fully recovered engine; but before I could call for the checklist; the first officer expressed concern with getting turned around before ATC wanted to hand us off to [oceanic] radio. The engine was running fine with no need to consider an engine shutdown (which would have then definitely driven us to the checklist); so I concentrated on advising the company of our situation; coordinating with ATC; and notifying the cabin crew - planning to then pull the checklist out. After coordinating our course of action with the company and reversing course with ATC; we were very close to our top of descent back to [departure station]. I briefed the planned approach; and as I called for the descent checklist with the intent to refer to the engine checklist afterwards; I asked the first officer; 'is there anything else you can think of; we need to do?' he then mentioned we should pull out the checklist. I didn't take the time to say that was my plan; instead; I asked him to read and call out the checklist and every required item had been correctly accomplished in accordance with the checklist. Though I was totally certain all checklist items were accomplished; and the checklist as planned was later pulled out for review after first 'flying the aircraft' for a return; 'refer to the checklist' should have been done sooner.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-800 flight crew reported engine surge that drove a decision to return to departure airport. Workload caused a slight delay in running the checklists.

Narrative: We experienced a Thrust Instability Event (TIE) on climb. Having read recent safety reports on TIE's and discussed this at great length during my annual Quality Check; I had carefully studied and reviewed the Engine Limit/Surge/Stall checklist should this ever happen to me in flight. The TIE occurred about 30 miles from the expected handoff [on an overwater flight]. I accomplished the checklist correctly from memory to the point that we had a fully recovered engine; but before I could call for the checklist; the First Officer expressed concern with getting turned around before ATC wanted to hand us off to [Oceanic] Radio. The engine was running fine with no need to consider an engine shutdown (which would have then definitely driven us to the checklist); so I concentrated on advising the Company of our situation; coordinating with ATC; and notifying the cabin crew - planning to then pull the checklist out. After coordinating our course of action with the Company and reversing course with ATC; we were very close to our top of descent back to [departure station]. I briefed the planned approach; and as I called for the descent checklist with the intent to refer to the engine checklist afterwards; I asked the First Officer; 'Is there anything else you can think of; we need to do?' He then mentioned we should pull out the checklist. I didn't take the time to say that was my plan; instead; I asked him to read and call out the checklist and every required item had been correctly accomplished in accordance with the checklist. Though I was totally certain all checklist items were accomplished; and the checklist as planned was later pulled out for review after first 'flying the aircraft' for a return; 'Refer to the checklist' should have been done sooner.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.