37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1072752 |
Time | |
Date | 201303 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ORD.Airport |
State Reference | IL |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer |
Route In Use | None |
Person 1 | |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Deviation - Procedural Clearance |
Narrative:
Operations vehicle X and operations vehicle Y (trailing vehicle) were cleared to drive 32R and to cross runway right and runway 4L for snow removal. One aircraft (9R arrival) was sent around when the snow team didn't clear 9R in time. A second 9R arrival reported the marker and the controller told him to expect landing clearance closer in because of vehicles crossing. A minute later; operations vehicle X and operations vehicle Y were observed to be well clear of 32R; in fact they were 2;500 feet north of 9R at the weight intersection. The controller asked operations vehicle Y to confirm he was clear of 9R and he didn't respond. The controller asked him again and he responded 'no.' the controller then told operations vehicle Y that his target was showing him well clear at the intersection of runway 32R and was asked if that was not him. Operations vehicle Y's response was 'we are not clear; [and] then something garbled; and send your airplanes around if you have to.' operations vehicle X and operations vehicle Y then turned around on 32R and started back southeast bound towards 9R without coordination. At this point the controller; not knowing operations vehicle X intentions; sent the second arrival around. Both the controller working the traffic and myself called the supervisor over to voice our concern over the lack of coordination/cooperation from both the snow team and the city ops representative who was in the tower and directly communicating with the snow team. Note: the city rep is sent to the FAA cab with a radio so he/she can talk directly with the snow team and coordinate directly with the tower supervisor/controller. The tower supervisor did not hear us so I walked over to him and explained the situation. He agreed it was a problem but did nothing and walked away. At this point I asked the city representative directly what the snow team was going to do and he replied he didn't know. I asked him to please find out so we could plan accordingly but he was uncooperative and refused to do anything. The level of coordination and cooperation reference the snow team movement is unacceptable. There has to be positive coordination and a willingness to work as a team if we are expected to maintain a safe operation. This event is one of several which have occurred this snow season. There have been other unsafe situations involving city vehicles. One involved a vehicle who had clearance on a runway; was visually observed exiting the runway but didn't call clear and refused to talk to answer the controller calls. The vehicle then re-entered the runway forcing a go-around. Another incident involved a snow team which was cleared to drive 14L but then turned off 14L and onto the intersecting runway 4L without clearance. The vehicle then joined the parallel taxiway uniform. An error involved a broom team driving onto a runway with out clearance also occurred. The cooperation from the city operations people has always been outstanding. This year there seems to be a noticeable degradation. There seems to be an attitude of 'it's our runway and you don't need to know what we are doing on it.' it seems that some of the operations personnel being sent to the tower during snow events don't know what they are there for. Vehicles and airplanes don't mix; especially when we are talking numerous vehicles and during a heavy snow storm with RVR conditions. Coordination must take place and it must be as specific as possible. There should be no guessing by controllers as to what a vehicle is going to do. Communication has to be there. The city operations people have to know what their purpose is while in the tower and are able/willing to communicate with ATC. This has to be addressed as soon as possible before something very serious occurs. There should have been more involvement from the tower supervisor as well. The tower needs to meet with the city and formally inform them of the issues. The supervisors in the tower should be soliciting specific problems from controllers so they can be logged and addressed. City personnel should be trained appropriately so they know what there responsibilities are when they are in the tower and part of the team. Drivers should know that they can't keep secrets and need to have constant communication with the controller they are talking to. They also need to know that they should not stray from what was specifically coordinated until they get additional clearance.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ORD Controller described a go-around event when it became unclear if snow removal vehicles were in fact clear of the landing runway.
Narrative: Operations Vehicle X and Operations Vehicle Y (trailing vehicle) were cleared to drive 32R and to cross Runway R and Runway 4L for snow removal. One aircraft (9R arrival) was sent around when the snow team didn't clear 9R in time. A second 9R arrival reported the marker and the Controller told him to expect landing clearance closer in because of vehicles crossing. A minute later; Operations Vehicle X and Operations Vehicle Y were observed to be well clear of 32R; in fact they were 2;500 feet North of 9R at the WT Intersection. The Controller asked Operations Vehicle Y to confirm he was clear of 9R and he didn't respond. The Controller asked him again and he responded 'no.' The Controller then told Operations Vehicle Y that his target was showing him well clear at the intersection of Runway 32R and was asked if that was not him. Operations Vehicle Y's response was 'we are not clear; [and] then something garbled; and send your airplanes around if you have to.' Operations Vehicle X and Operations Vehicle Y then turned around on 32R and started back SE bound towards 9R without coordination. At this point the Controller; not knowing Operations Vehicle X intentions; sent the second arrival around. Both the Controller working the traffic and myself called the Supervisor over to voice our concern over the lack of coordination/cooperation from both the Snow Team and the City Ops representative who was in the Tower and directly communicating with the snow team. Note: the city rep is sent to the FAA cab with a radio so he/she can talk directly with the snow team and coordinate directly with the Tower Supervisor/Controller. The Tower Supervisor did not hear us so I walked over to him and explained the situation. He agreed it was a problem but did nothing and walked away. At this point I asked the City Representative directly what the snow team was going to do and he replied he didn't know. I asked him to please find out so we could plan accordingly but he was uncooperative and refused to do anything. The level of coordination and cooperation reference the snow team movement is unacceptable. There has to be positive coordination and a willingness to work as a team if we are expected to maintain a safe operation. This event is one of several which have occurred this snow season. There have been other unsafe situations involving city vehicles. One involved a vehicle who had clearance on a runway; was visually observed exiting the runway but didn't call clear and refused to talk to answer the Controller calls. The vehicle then re-entered the runway forcing a go-around. Another incident involved a snow team which was cleared to drive 14L but then turned off 14L and onto the intersecting Runway 4L without clearance. The vehicle then joined the parallel Taxiway Uniform. An error involved a broom team driving onto a runway with out clearance also occurred. The cooperation from the City Operations people has always been outstanding. This year there seems to be a noticeable degradation. There seems to be an attitude of 'it's our runway and you don't need to know what we are doing on it.' It seems that some of the Operations personnel being sent to the Tower during snow events don't know what they are there for. Vehicles and airplanes don't mix; especially when we are talking numerous vehicles and during a heavy snow storm with RVR conditions. Coordination must take place and it must be as specific as possible. There should be no guessing by controllers as to what a vehicle is going to do. Communication has to be there. The city operations people have to know what their purpose is while in the Tower and are able/willing to communicate with ATC. This has to be addressed ASAP before something very serious occurs. There should have been more involvement from the Tower Supervisor as well. The Tower needs to meet with the City and formally inform them of the issues. The supervisors in the Tower should be soliciting specific problems from controllers so they can be logged and addressed. City personnel should be trained appropriately so they know what there responsibilities are when they are in the Tower and part of the team. Drivers should know that they can't keep secrets and need to have constant communication with the Controller they are talking to. They also need to know that they should not stray from what was specifically coordinated until they get additional clearance.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.