Narrative:

I was working sector 5 and had paperwork (provided by our mlss) on 1 altrv mission scheduled to enter sector 5. There were several aircraft in the altrv. I started to get transfers from guam cerap and tokyo acc on many other military aircraft flying in different directions, destinations, altitudes, etc. The supervisors were in a staff meeting and I asked the staff specialist temporarily in charge for another controller to help. Later we were still unable to stay in control of the sector, so I said that we needed 2 more controllers. Aircraft were entering the sector west/O flight plan information and even some west/O an transfer from tokyo acc. This was a massive air refueling mission that we had no prior knowledge of. Some were a part of the altrv and some were not, but were on some other refueling mission that we knew nothing about. There were many other aircraft involved that helped put this sector down the tubes. 4 controllers worked this 1 sector for a long time before it was able to be returned to its normal operation of 1 controller. I believe the main problem was lack of proper notification of these military exercises. With the proper information at the sector, I would have been able to plan ahead and be prepared and plot out all the routes and have a plan of attack. Also the supervisor should be more aware of the sector overloading before it happens and the take the appropriate corrective actions. There should be an average known # of airplanes that the sector can handle and controllers and supervisors should know what that # is. I don't believe that there was a loss of standard sep during this fiasco, but the sector was definitely out of hand at times.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SECTOR WORKLOAD REQUIRED ADDITIONAL STAFFING TO HANDLE TRAFFIC.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING SECTOR 5 AND HAD PAPERWORK (PROVIDED BY OUR MLSS) ON 1 ALTRV MISSION SCHEDULED TO ENTER SECTOR 5. THERE WERE SEVERAL ACFT IN THE ALTRV. I STARTED TO GET TRANSFERS FROM GUAM CERAP AND TOKYO ACC ON MANY OTHER MIL ACFT FLYING IN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS, DESTINATIONS, ALTS, ETC. THE SUPVRS WERE IN A STAFF MEETING AND I ASKED THE STAFF SPECIALIST TEMPORARILY IN CHARGE FOR ANOTHER CTLR TO HELP. LATER WE WERE STILL UNABLE TO STAY IN CTL OF THE SECTOR, SO I SAID THAT WE NEEDED 2 MORE CTLRS. ACFT WERE ENTERING THE SECTOR W/O FLT PLAN INFO AND EVEN SOME W/O AN TRANSFER FROM TOKYO ACC. THIS WAS A MASSIVE AIR REFUELING MISSION THAT WE HAD NO PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF. SOME WERE A PART OF THE ALTRV AND SOME WERE NOT, BUT WERE ON SOME OTHER REFUELING MISSION THAT WE KNEW NOTHING ABOUT. THERE WERE MANY OTHER ACFT INVOLVED THAT HELPED PUT THIS SECTOR DOWN THE TUBES. 4 CTLRS WORKED THIS 1 SECTOR FOR A LONG TIME BEFORE IT WAS ABLE TO BE RETURNED TO ITS NORMAL OPERATION OF 1 CTLR. I BELIEVE THE MAIN PROB WAS LACK OF PROPER NOTIFICATION OF THESE MIL EXERCISES. WITH THE PROPER INFO AT THE SECTOR, I WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PLAN AHEAD AND BE PREPARED AND PLOT OUT ALL THE ROUTES AND HAVE A PLAN OF ATTACK. ALSO THE SUPVR SHOULD BE MORE AWARE OF THE SECTOR OVERLOADING BEFORE IT HAPPENS AND THE TAKE THE APPROPRIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. THERE SHOULD BE AN AVERAGE KNOWN # OF AIRPLANES THAT THE SECTOR CAN HANDLE AND CTLRS AND SUPVRS SHOULD KNOW WHAT THAT # IS. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS A LOSS OF STANDARD SEP DURING THIS FIASCO, BUT THE SECTOR WAS DEFINITELY OUT OF HAND AT TIMES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.