Narrative:

I was giving the first leg of operating experience (oe) to a new hire first officer. This was the 6th straight day of work; which had included early morning wake-ups and the first two legs had been cancelled from our trip; however we had already checked in early because the first officer was a new hire and needed an introductory briefing. Our aircraft had an MEL for an inoperative idg; which required repetitive maintenance action. It was a short leg; so I flew so the new first officer would have time to settle in. At first ATC check in; approach cleared us to cross sabbi at 15;000 on the ravnn 3 arrival. Shortly after crossing sabbi; we were given a 070 heading with descent to 8;000. After leaving the arrival for a period of time; we were given direct to ravnn and cross ravnn at 6;000. Because ravnn was noted 'for runway 33; expect radar vectors'; it was my assumption that we were simply going direct to a fix with a crossing restriction (all intervening fixes were deleted) and no longer on the STAR. The ATIS stated that runway 33L visual approaches were in use; and I cleared the additional legs beyond that point from the FMS so it would be easier for the first officer to clean up the FMS when we were on vectors. Approaching ravnn; we were given a frequency change and the new controller cleared us to 5;000. Remembering that maintenance had not acted to comply with the MEL to check APU oil on each departure; I asked the first officer to make sure that operations had notified contract maintenance to accomplish the MEL follow-up action. Shortly after crossing ravnn and now on a 050 heading; the controller asked why we did not proceed to navey (the fix beyond ravnn's 'runway 33 expect radar vectors' notation). I simply replied that we had been expecting radar vectors as noted. The controller then cleared us direct to the FAF and subsequently for a visual approach.although the assumption that we would be given radar vectors (as noted on the approach chart) was the primary cause; contributing was my personal fatigue at the end of a 6 day stretch of early mornings; as well as the task loading associated with oe for a highly inexperienced first officer and the additional task-loading while making sure that our MEL follow-up action was going to be accomplished.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 Check Airman conducting IOE; neglected to proceed to the next approach fix on an arrival procedure.

Narrative: I was giving the first leg of Operating Experience (OE) to a new hire First Officer. This was the 6th straight day of work; which had included early morning wake-ups and the first two legs had been cancelled from our trip; however we had already checked in early because the First Officer was a new hire and needed an introductory briefing. Our aircraft had an MEL for an inoperative IDG; which required repetitive maintenance action. It was a short leg; so I flew so the new First Officer would have time to settle in. At first ATC check in; Approach cleared us to cross SABBI at 15;000 on the RAVNN 3 arrival. Shortly after crossing SABBI; we were given a 070 heading with descent to 8;000. After leaving the arrival for a period of time; we were given direct to RAVNN and cross RAVNN at 6;000. Because RAVNN was noted 'for Runway 33; expect radar vectors'; it was my assumption that we were simply going direct to a fix with a crossing restriction (all intervening fixes were deleted) and no longer on the STAR. The ATIS stated that Runway 33L visual approaches were in use; and I cleared the additional legs beyond that point from the FMS so it would be easier for the First Officer to clean up the FMS when we were on vectors. Approaching RAVNN; we were given a frequency change and the new Controller cleared us to 5;000. Remembering that Maintenance had not acted to comply with the MEL to check APU oil on each departure; I asked the First Officer to make sure that Operations had notified Contract Maintenance to accomplish the MEL follow-up action. Shortly after crossing RAVNN and now on a 050 heading; the Controller asked why we did not proceed to NAVEY (the fix beyond RAVNN's 'Runway 33 expect radar vectors' notation). I simply replied that we had been expecting radar vectors as noted. The Controller then cleared us direct to the FAF and subsequently for a visual approach.Although the assumption that we would be given radar vectors (as noted on the approach chart) was the primary cause; contributing was my personal fatigue at the end of a 6 day stretch of early mornings; as well as the task loading associated with OE for a highly inexperienced First Officer and the additional task-loading while making sure that our MEL follow-up action was going to be accomplished.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.