Narrative:

Surviving seven minutes of inadvertent IMC.I was attempting to return a rental airplane to an airport.... I was the pilot (military test pilot and civilian pilot) and had one passenger (military test [pilot]; instrument rated...). The field did not have weather reporting and the nearest weather stations (20 NM west and 15 NM south) reported BKN008. Having flown in the morning with a low scattered layer; the ceiling appeared to be higher than what the nearby reporting stations indicated. The terrain west...is quite flat; with a small 100-200 ft ridge in the vicinity. The highest obstacle on our route of flight was an 850 ft MSL (450 ft AGL) tower. We briefed a low altitude scud run; remaining above the obstacles and below the cloud deck. We also briefed crew coordination; involving obstacle avoidance and lookout. My passenger's role was as copilot in this single-pilot aircraft.the airplane was not fit for IMC flight; as the gyroscopic pitch and bank indicator was not functional and the directional gyro precessed at a rate of about 10 degrees per minute. It was acknowledged that we were partial panel before takeoff. Shortly after takeoff; we started to enter clouds at 350 ft AGL (650 ft MSL). This was not as anticipated. I called out that I was losing sight of the ground to my copilot who announced 'continue'. Thinking it was indeed a broken or scattered layer; I hesitated pushing the nose over and when I looked up as I watched the ground reference disappear; I realized we were 100% IMC. I immediately started flying instruments and climbed to 1;500 ft MSL; well above any obstacles in the area. Immediately after leveling off; my partial panel scan broke down and the airplane entered an unrecognized right descending spiral. Seeing the vsi descent rate increase to 500 FPM; I pulled back on the yoke and the rate increased to 1;000 FPM; accompanied by increasing airspeed and airframe noise. I glanced at the turn/bank indicator and we were above the standard rate mark. As I realized we were in the 'graveyard spiral;' I rolled left to center the turn/bank and pulled back. Our altitude had dropped to 1;300 ft MSL in the 10-15 seconds the spiral lasted.... After realizing we were in a graveyard spiral; my mind raced [with] flash memories of past incident reports and the knowledge that we were about to die; leaving our wives to deal with our stupidity for the rest of their lives. Survival instinct kicked in as I thought; 'my last conscious act in this world is not going to involve letting us die in this...little airplane.' through effective crew coordination from our military training; my copilot helped my scan improve and he was calling out values of parameters I wasn't watching. I attempted to execute a turn to the west in order to clear the 100-200 ft ridge... I was not able to make a coordinated turn using the turn/bank needle and the ball and the wet compass. I was getting confused by the compass and why I couldn't maintain a heading or make a decent turn. At the same time; my copilot was using his cell phone to verify our position over the ground. We were clear of obstacles; but still over the ridge. I announced that if we were going to live; we needed to descend. I announced that I wanted a steady heading descent at less than 500 FPM to 1;000 ft MSL. This was done with only one excursion past 500 FPM. At 1;000 ft MSL; we did not have ground contact. Starting another descent; this time to 800 ft MSL; I announced 'contact; continuing' at 900 ft MSL. We were above trees at about 350 ft AGL and my copilot verified 'contact' as we descended past 850 ft MSL. We were completely VMC at 800 ft MSL. Total time in IMC was seven minutes. We continued our flight west and landed uneventfully.human performance considerations: the perceived pressure to get the plane back to its home field played heavily into this incident. Decision to takeoff should have been aborted with nearby weather less than VFR minimums and no local AWOS. Decision to takeoff should have been aborted with acknowledged partial panel. We rationalized it by saying 'we're going to stay VMC.' decision to not push the nose over upon entering the base of clouds perceived concurrence to continue from a qualified navigator made it very difficult to push the nose over at 350 ft AGL. Lack of proficiency in model I normally fly 4th generation fighter airplanes and a complex; IFR capable single engine piston. The IMC capabilities of both are quite different. Though legally my IFR time carries over to all platforms; the scan and workload are not. Lack of proficiency in model; basic piloting skills broke down. I think I couldn't make turns because I was channeling my attention on the turn/bank indicator; vsi and altimeter. I rarely; if ever; looked at the ball. I have no recollection if I was coordinating turns or not; I imagine not. Other factors [include] a lack of local weather reporting. The cloud base we entered was 200 ft lower than the nearby AWOS stations led us to believe. What saved our lives [was] effective crew coordination. Thank you to my copilot and his military training. Commit to the instruments even though I haven't flown partial panel in eight years; thorough IFR training and military background was a huge factor in our survival. Preflight planning though some aspects were poorly planned; I feel that our knowledge of the terrain and obstacles in the area was a key factor in our survival. Physiology training we're required to attend every four years and I just had my refresher a month ago. Acknowledging the incipient spiral was difficult based on inner ear sensations....

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A well-qualified pilot inadvertantly entered IMC in a non-IFR equipped aircraft; became disoriented; lost aircraft control at 1;500 FT MSL and descended to 1;300 FT MSL. With the copilot's assistance; pilot regained aircraft control and descended to VMC.

Narrative: Surviving seven minutes of inadvertent IMC.I was attempting to return a rental airplane to an airport.... I was the pilot (military test pilot and civilian pilot) and had one passenger (military test [pilot]; instrument rated...). The field did not have weather reporting and the nearest weather stations (20 NM west and 15 NM south) reported BKN008. Having flown in the morning with a low scattered layer; the ceiling appeared to be higher than what the nearby reporting stations indicated. The terrain west...is quite flat; with a small 100-200 FT ridge in the vicinity. The highest obstacle on our route of flight was an 850 FT MSL (450 FT AGL) tower. We briefed a low altitude scud run; remaining above the obstacles and below the cloud deck. We also briefed crew coordination; involving obstacle avoidance and lookout. My passenger's role was as copilot in this single-pilot aircraft.The airplane was not fit for IMC flight; as the gyroscopic pitch and bank indicator was not functional and the directional gyro precessed at a rate of about 10 degrees per minute. It was acknowledged that we were partial panel before takeoff. Shortly after takeoff; we started to enter clouds at 350 FT AGL (650 FT MSL). This was not as anticipated. I called out that I was losing sight of the ground to my copilot who announced 'continue'. Thinking it was indeed a broken or scattered layer; I hesitated pushing the nose over and when I looked up as I watched the ground reference disappear; I realized we were 100% IMC. I immediately started flying instruments and climbed to 1;500 FT MSL; well above any obstacles in the area. Immediately after leveling off; my partial panel scan broke down and the airplane entered an unrecognized right descending spiral. Seeing the VSI descent rate increase to 500 FPM; I pulled back on the yoke and the rate increased to 1;000 FPM; accompanied by increasing airspeed and airframe noise. I glanced at the turn/bank indicator and we were above the standard rate mark. As I realized we were in the 'graveyard spiral;' I rolled left to center the turn/bank and pulled back. Our altitude had dropped to 1;300 FT MSL in the 10-15 seconds the spiral lasted.... After realizing we were in a graveyard spiral; my mind raced [with] flash memories of past incident reports and the knowledge that we were about to die; leaving our wives to deal with our stupidity for the rest of their lives. Survival instinct kicked in as I thought; 'my last conscious act in this world is not going to involve letting us die in this...little airplane.' Through effective crew coordination from our military training; my copilot helped my scan improve and he was calling out values of parameters I wasn't watching. I attempted to execute a turn to the west in order to clear the 100-200 FT ridge... I was not able to make a coordinated turn using the turn/bank needle and the ball and the wet compass. I was getting confused by the compass and why I couldn't maintain a heading or make a decent turn. At the same time; my copilot was using his cell phone to verify our position over the ground. We were clear of obstacles; but still over the ridge. I announced that if we were going to live; we needed to descend. I announced that I wanted a steady heading descent at less than 500 FPM to 1;000 FT MSL. This was done with only one excursion past 500 FPM. At 1;000 FT MSL; we did not have ground contact. Starting another descent; this time to 800 FT MSL; I announced 'contact; continuing' at 900 FT MSL. We were above trees at about 350 FT AGL and my copilot verified 'contact' as we descended past 850 FT MSL. We were completely VMC at 800 FT MSL. Total time in IMC was seven minutes. We continued our flight west and landed uneventfully.Human Performance Considerations: The perceived pressure to get the plane back to its home field played heavily into this incident. Decision to takeoff should have been aborted with nearby weather less than VFR minimums and no local AWOS. Decision to takeoff should have been aborted with acknowledged partial panel. We rationalized it by saying 'we're going to stay VMC.' Decision to not push the nose over upon entering the base of clouds perceived concurrence to continue from a qualified navigator made it very difficult to push the nose over at 350 FT AGL. Lack of proficiency in model I normally fly 4th generation fighter airplanes and a complex; IFR capable single engine piston. The IMC capabilities of both are quite different. Though legally my IFR time carries over to all platforms; the scan and workload are not. Lack of proficiency in model; basic piloting skills broke down. I think I couldn't make turns because I was channeling my attention on the turn/bank indicator; VSI and altimeter. I rarely; if ever; looked at the ball. I have no recollection if I was coordinating turns or not; I imagine not. Other factors [include] a lack of local weather reporting. The cloud base we entered was 200 FT lower than the nearby AWOS stations led us to believe. What saved our lives [was] effective crew coordination. Thank you to my copilot and his military training. Commit to the instruments even though I haven't flown partial panel in eight years; thorough IFR training and military background was a huge factor in our survival. Preflight planning though some aspects were poorly planned; I feel that our knowledge of the terrain and obstacles in the area was a key factor in our survival. Physiology training we're required to attend every four years and I just had my refresher a month ago. Acknowledging the incipient spiral was difficult based on inner ear sensations....

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.