Narrative:

Two major points here: 1) I'm tired of flying around with people who are predisposed to let LNAV and automation lead them around by the nose; and 2) charts have gotten ridiculous! We were departing ewr; it was the first officer's leg. We were late; but I really try to provide a laid back; don't rush CRM posture. We did all the things we were supposed to do; but I guess we didn't spend 15 minutes reading every word on the newark one 22L/right departure page. Come on; this chart is a triple folded; 10-inch wide encyclopedia. The only important piece of information on that poster sized document is what to do on takeoff; yet it's practically hidden in a box towards the bottom of the page. Who cares about where all those navaids and fixes are? It's a 'takeoff; fly some headings; radar vector departure;' yet the page is clogged with things that have no true bearing on what you're actually being asked to do! When you consider the congested airspace in that area; it's critical you don't turn the wrong way after takeoff; which is exactly what we did. Why we did that; I don't know. We're human I guess; but at 400 ft the first officer said LNAV. I immediately furrowed by brow; scratched my head and thought; 'okay maybe I missed something.' but I went ahead and punched LNAV and looked down at the legs page on my side and saw lanna at the top. I think I said something like; 'that doesn't sound right;' while our vsi was pegged because we were climbing like a fighter since we only had twenty-some people onboard.while we were in the right turn; obviously towards the wrong place; tower doesn't say anything like; 'company; where ya going?' instead they tell us to contact departure. I'm still sitting there not feeling like this is going well while the first officer is climbing and turning right toward an rj crossing our nose from left to right. He's still a bit away; but my fighter pilot brain is telling me we're pulling too much lead on him and this looks like it's going to be unusually close. I say something to the first officer like; 'watch that guy;' pointing at the rj; when I hear departure say 'company; flight number. 'I answer and he says; 'did tower give you a heading?' all my senses now tell me my first gut feeling was correct and I answer something like; 'ah; we're checking;' while departure rapidly rattles off; 'stop at 4;000 ft; turn left to 270; traffic 12 o'clock.' I told him we had him in sight and he says something like; 'you guys need to be careful.' he vectored us around a little more and handed us off without any indication that we were in real trouble; but I think I know better.so; back to point number one. When I first was blessed to be a part of this fine group of pilots; the captains I flew with all told me; 'never trust that box.' and we didn't. We used our brains to fly the airplane. Now however; we bow to that thing! This is the second time this has happened to me and yes; of course it's 'my fault;' but both times it's because the first officers just let LNAV lead them around. These are not RNAV departures; they are heading departures but we've brainwashed everyone to think; 'just hit LNAV and it will be all right.' it's not. Please don't tell me; a 'proper briefing' would've solved all this because we've reached briefing overload. [Pilots] are more worried about doing all the briefings than paying attention to actually flying the airplane. Make all charts one page with a very simple; succinct depiction of the required departure procedure in the middle of the page in a manner that a human can understand. Ban the use of LNAV in highly congested airspace. The first officer didn't see the rj because he was face down in the instrument panel following the FD LNAV guidance. When all this happened; his first reaction was to put on the autopilot and start reading the departure chart to see where we screwed up. I had to ask him to let it go until we get higher.if crews have repeated issues with a departure or arrival procedure it might not be the crews entirely at fault and maybe someone ought to examine why and fix the procedure! How many [reports] do we need to get about some error being constantly made when someone ought to be pointing to the root cause of the error and demanding it be removed or changed to prevent further issues? We're not the first people to miss the heading and won't be the last.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier flight crew turned in the wrong direction departing on the Newark One Runway 22L/R departure. Captain attributed the error to dependency on LNAV and complexity of the charted departure procedure.

Narrative: Two major points here: 1) I'm tired of flying around with people who are predisposed to let LNAV and automation lead them around by the nose; and 2) Charts have gotten ridiculous! We were departing EWR; it was the First Officer's leg. We were late; but I really try to provide a laid back; don't rush CRM posture. We did all the things we were supposed to do; but I guess we didn't spend 15 minutes reading every word on the NEWARK ONE 22L/R departure page. Come on; this chart is a triple folded; 10-inch wide encyclopedia. The only important piece of information on that poster sized document is what to do on takeoff; yet it's practically hidden in a box towards the bottom of the page. Who cares about where all those navaids and fixes are? It's a 'takeoff; fly some headings; radar vector departure;' yet the page is clogged with things that have no true bearing on what you're actually being asked to do! When you consider the congested airspace in that area; it's critical you don't turn the wrong way after takeoff; which is exactly what we did. Why we did that; I don't know. We're human I guess; but at 400 FT the First Officer said LNAV. I immediately furrowed by brow; scratched my head and thought; 'Okay maybe I missed something.' But I went ahead and punched LNAV and looked down at the LEGS page on my side and saw LANNA at the top. I think I said something like; 'That doesn't sound right;' while our VSI was pegged because we were climbing like a fighter since we only had twenty-some people onboard.While we were in the right turn; obviously towards the wrong place; Tower doesn't say anything like; 'Company; where ya going?' Instead they tell us to contact Departure. I'm still sitting there not feeling like this is going well while the First Officer is climbing and turning right toward an RJ crossing our nose from left to right. He's still a bit away; but my fighter pilot brain is telling me we're pulling too much lead on him and this looks like it's going to be unusually close. I say something to the First Officer like; 'Watch that guy;' pointing at the RJ; when I hear Departure say 'Company; Flight Number. 'I answer and he says; 'Did Tower give you a heading?' All my senses now tell me my first gut feeling was correct and I answer something like; 'Ah; we're checking;' while Departure rapidly rattles off; 'Stop at 4;000 FT; turn left to 270; traffic 12 o'clock.' I told him we had him in sight and he says something like; 'You guys need to be careful.' He vectored us around a little more and handed us off without any indication that we were in real trouble; but I think I know better.So; back to point number one. When I first was blessed to be a part of this fine group of pilots; the captains I flew with all told me; 'Never trust that box.' And we didn't. We used our brains to fly the airplane. Now however; we bow to that thing! This is the second time this has happened to me and yes; of course it's 'my fault;' but both times it's because the first officers just let LNAV lead them around. These are not RNAV departures; they are heading departures but we've brainwashed everyone to think; 'Just hit LNAV and it will be all right.' It's not. Please don't tell me; a 'proper briefing' would've solved all this because we've reached briefing overload. [Pilots] are more worried about doing all the briefings than paying attention to actually flying the airplane. Make all charts one page with a very simple; succinct depiction of the required departure procedure in the middle of the page in a manner that a human can understand. Ban the use of LNAV in highly congested airspace. The First Officer didn't see the RJ because he was face down in the instrument panel following the FD LNAV guidance. When all this happened; his first reaction was to put on the autopilot and start reading the departure chart to see where we screwed up. I had to ask him to let it go until we get higher.If crews have repeated issues with a departure or arrival procedure it might not be the crews entirely at fault and maybe someone ought to examine why and fix the procedure! How many [reports] do we need to get about some error being constantly made when someone ought to be pointing to the root cause of the error and demanding it be removed or changed to prevent further issues? We're not the first people to miss the heading and won't be the last.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.