Narrative:

At the time; I was working tower controller in charge. I was monitoring the local position and the flight data/clearance delivery/ground control position. I observed the arrival sequence on the d-brite prior to the loss of separation and advised the local controller to watch the speed of the E190 aircraft. An E145 checked on frequency without incident and appeared to be on a normal profile with regard to slowing speed and descending from 3;000 ft MSL. The E190's speed was still indicating 310 and rapidly overtaking the E145. I did not expect to talk to the E190 because of the overtake. We observed the E190 make the turn to final and as he did; he contacted the tower. The local controller tried to determine if the E190 had the E145 in sight and requested that he slow down. The E190 did not have the E145 visually and indicated that he was slowing rapidly. I advised him to break out the E190. At the same time west radar was trying to talk in local's ear with regard to whether the E190 saw the E145 or not. I again; much louder; told him to break out the E190 and he complied. I believe the west radar controller failed to account for the high tailwind on the base leg and did not maintain situational awareness prior to transferring the E190 to the tower. He was also slow to take corrective action; considering both aircraft were IMC and those conditions were known to him via prior pireps. My recommendations would not be appreciated at this point in time because of the current philosophy with regard to the 'new generation' and personal responsibility and pride in doing the job.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Tower CIC described an over-take event resulting in a loss of separation. The reporter indicated the RADAR Controller failed to take into account several factors.

Narrative: At the time; I was working Tower CIC. I was monitoring the Local position and the Flight Data/Clearance Delivery/Ground Control position. I observed the arrival sequence on the D-BRITE prior to the loss of separation and advised the Local Controller to watch the speed of the E190 aircraft. An E145 checked on frequency without incident and appeared to be on a normal profile with regard to slowing speed and descending from 3;000 FT MSL. The E190's speed was still indicating 310 and rapidly overtaking the E145. I did not expect to talk to the E190 because of the overtake. We observed the E190 make the turn to final and as he did; he contacted the Tower. The Local Controller tried to determine if the E190 had the E145 in sight and requested that he slow down. The E190 did not have the E145 visually and indicated that he was slowing rapidly. I advised him to break out the E190. At the same time West RADAR was trying to talk in Local's ear with regard to whether the E190 saw the E145 or not. I again; much louder; told him to break out the E190 and he complied. I believe the West RADAR Controller failed to account for the high tailwind on the base leg and did not maintain situational awareness prior to transferring the E190 to the Tower. He was also slow to take corrective action; considering both aircraft were IMC and those conditions were known to him via prior PIREPs. My recommendations would not be appreciated at this point in time because of the current philosophy with regard to the 'new generation' and personal responsibility and pride in doing the job.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.