Narrative:

Due to an earlier flight cancellation our flight was oversold. Noting that we had a deadheading check airman on board; I asked him to join us up front so that we could accommodate an additional revenue passenger. Everything prior to departure proceeded normally. After takeoff and calling 'gear-up'; I noted that the first officer was unable to raise the landing gear handle despite several attempts. Shortly after that we got a cascade of ECAM malfunctions and inoperative systems on the status page: first officer tat; ap 1+2; a/thr; CAT 2; anti skid; north/west strg; norm brk; automatic brk; left/G retract. Since my hands were already on the controls and flying the aircraft without autopilot or autothrust; I directed first officer to consult the QRH for ECAM exceptions and immediate action items and our jump seating check airman to assist with QRH and ECAM procedures while I flew and discussed our situation with ATC. Tower had noted our gear was still down and I told them we had some issues that needed to be addressed; would need some time for checklists and evaluation but would probably be returning for landing. They gave us a series of headings and altitudes that allowed us to continue with addressing the failures. After evaluating the various failures I elected to declare an emergency and requested a low-pass over the airport for determination of nose-gear alignment. During that low-pass I noted we were now down to maximum landing weight. After a ground observer and the tower confirmed nose-gear alignment we requested some short delaying vectors to make sure all parties were briefed and in agreement. We then accepted vectors for the ILS to an uneventful landing. After landing and slowing with use of reverse-thrust and limited braking; we exited at a high-speed taxiway and entered a ramp as directed by ground control; started our APU and shutdown our engines. We were subsequently towed back to the gate and deplaned. During this entire time; the deadheading captain provided great assistance with QRH; ECAM; ECAM supplemental and calls to company and cabin. Passengers; flight attendants and the company were kept fully informed during the entire event.apparently; as told to us by maintenance technicians; this aircraft has a long history of write-ups involving system failures associated with the right-hand main landing gear strut not maintaining pressure. Without the unloaded strut 'popping' into full extension; sensors would not allow normal retraction. The other pilots and I were all surprised at the numerous faults triggered by a seemingly simple 'low' strut. From our 'last leg ECAM rep': windshear det fault; left/G shock absorber fault; anti ice first officer tat; engine 1 eiu; engine 2 eiu; automatic flight a/thr off; brakes automatic brk fault; brakes a/skid north/ws fault all occurred within the first two minutes. During our low-pass we also received an engine 2 hp valve fault. During maintenance's review of our aircraft's history they noted the history of strut issues and some thought by servicing the strut we would be able to ferry the aircraft back to base. Of major concern on our part with that thought was if we had the same failure; they absolutely didn't want us to return. The plan was two releases with two different conditions...normal gear-up or gear-down with lots of fuel. Although initially on board with this plan; when I considered that if the fault occurred again it would not just be a simple slow; gear-down flight but also one without autopilot or autothrottle and at night for an extended time; I elected to decline. Maintenance obviously didn't want the FAA scrutiny of an air-turn back on a ferry flight...the request should have never been made.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 Captain reports the inability of the First Officer to raise the landing gear handle after takeoff. Shortly after that a cascade of ECAM malfunctions and INOP Systems on the Status Page including First Officer TAT; AP 1+2; A/THR; CAT 2; ANTI SKID; N/W STRG; NORM BRK; AUTO BRK; L/G RETRACT. After some discussion flight returns to the departure airport. This aircraft had a long history of similar anomalies which Maintenance believed were caused by a leaking (nitrogen) main landing gear strut. The Captain declines a request to ferry the aircraft.

Narrative: Due to an earlier flight cancellation our flight was oversold. Noting that we had a deadheading check airman on board; I asked him to join us up front so that we could accommodate an additional revenue passenger. Everything prior to departure proceeded normally. After takeoff and calling 'Gear-up'; I noted that the First Officer was unable to raise the Landing Gear Handle despite several attempts. Shortly after that we got a cascade of ECAM malfunctions and INOP Systems on the Status Page: F/O TAT; AP 1+2; A/THR; CAT 2; ANTI SKID; N/W STRG; NORM BRK; AUTO BRK; L/G RETRACT. Since my hands were already on the controls and flying the aircraft without autopilot or autothrust; I directed First Officer to consult the QRH for ECAM Exceptions and Immediate Action Items and our jump seating Check Airman to assist with QRH and ECAM procedures while I flew and discussed our situation with ATC. Tower had noted our gear was still down and I told them we had some issues that needed to be addressed; would need some time for checklists and evaluation but would probably be returning for landing. They gave us a series of headings and altitudes that allowed us to continue with addressing the failures. After evaluating the various failures I elected to declare an emergency and requested a low-pass over the airport for determination of nose-gear alignment. During that low-pass I noted we were now down to Maximum Landing Weight. After a ground observer and the Tower confirmed nose-gear alignment we requested some short delaying vectors to make sure all parties were briefed and in agreement. We then accepted vectors for the ILS to an uneventful landing. After landing and slowing with use of reverse-thrust and limited braking; we exited at a high-speed taxiway and entered a ramp as directed by Ground Control; started our APU and shutdown our engines. We were subsequently towed back to the gate and deplaned. During this entire time; the deadheading Captain provided great assistance with QRH; ECAM; ECAM Supplemental and calls to company and cabin. Passengers; flight attendants and the company were kept fully informed during the entire event.Apparently; as told to us by Maintenance Technicians; this aircraft has a long history of write-ups involving system failures associated with the Right-hand Main Landing Gear Strut not maintaining pressure. Without the unloaded strut 'popping' into full extension; sensors would not allow normal retraction. The other pilots and I were all surprised at the numerous faults triggered by a seemingly simple 'low' strut. From our 'LAST LEG ECAM REP': WINDSHEAR DET FAULT; L/G SHOCK ABSORBER FAULT; ANTI ICE FIRST OFFICER TAT; ENG 1 EIU; ENG 2 EIU; AUTO FLT A/THR OFF; BRAKES AUTO BRK FAULT; BRAKES A/SKID N/WS FAULT all occurred within the first two minutes. During our low-pass we also received an ENG 2 HP VALVE FAULT. During Maintenance's review of our aircraft's history they noted the history of strut issues and some thought by servicing the strut we would be able to ferry the aircraft back to base. Of major concern on our part with that thought was if we had the same failure; they absolutely didn't want us to return. The plan was two releases with two different conditions...normal gear-up or gear-down with lots of fuel. Although initially on board with this plan; when I considered that if the fault occurred again it would not just be a simple slow; gear-down flight but also one without autopilot or autothrottle and at night for an extended time; I elected to decline. Maintenance obviously didn't want the FAA scrutiny of an air-turn back on a ferry flight...the request should have never been made.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.