Narrative:

I served as the first officer for a part 91 flight in a hawker 700...that departed [a mexican] airport.... The intended destination was [in the us]; but the flight ended at [an airport in mexico]. Approximately 40 minutes into the flight; after having reached flight level 350; the aircraft's master warning system (mws) alerted us to a low oil pressure condition for the number two engine. I was the pilot flying at the time of the mws warning and I identified the problem and called it out. During this time the captain was reviewing charts and other data and after my callout; he immediately took command of the aircraft controls and directed me to begin working through the checklist. We proceeded to perform the recommended shutdown of the number two engine; and once that was completed I contacted center to advise that we needed clearance to descend from FL350 and I advised that we had performed a precautionary shutdown of our number two engine. I also advised that we would likely need to change our planned destination and asked for a few minutes to complete some cockpit work and review of data before we advised of our intentions. The controller at ZZZZ center had a difficult time understanding what I said and I was forced to repeat this multiple times. Eventually we received clearance to descend to 13;000 ft and were handed off to ZZZZ1 center. By the time we checked in with ZZZZ1 we had determined that we should divert...and on initial contact with the new controller I requested clearance to [a mexican divert] airport and advised that we were a single engine aircraft. I also requested that trucks and equipment be standing by for us upon landing. Yet again I encountered a communication deficiency on the part of the controller; who responded to me literally with 'hawker [callsign]; I do not understand your request.' again; it took multiple transmissions from me to explain our situation and to ask for emergency equipment to be standing by. After being handed off from ZZZZ center to the tower controller...I again encountered serious communication challenges (for the third time) as the tower controller believed that we were east rather that west of his airport. Again; it took several communication exchanges to explain that we needed a visual approach and that we needed left traffic to [the] runway.... By this point it had become clear to me that the coordination between the various center and tower controllers was simply awful. We performed a textbook single engine approach and landing in VMC conditions...and were met by trucks and equipment that followed us to parking. I believe that the captain and I performed as well as any crew could perform and that we made the correct decisions and tried to communicate as effectively as possible to facilities on the ground. However; I believe that the common thread of risk in this situation was the poor communication and coordination capabilities of the controllers and of the ability of the controllers to understand non-standard requests in english. The numerous requests for repeat; and the fact that I literally was told 'I do not understand your request' when asking for trucks and equipment; leads me to believe that this situation is worthy of [a] report....

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: After a precautionary shutdown of the Number Two Engine for a low oil pressure indication; an H25B flight crew encountered numerous communication difficulties with Mexican Air Traffic controllers which the crew attributed to non-standard phraseology associated with the emergency.

Narrative: I served as the First Officer for a Part 91 flight in a Hawker 700...that departed [a Mexican] airport.... The intended destination was [in the U.S.]; but the flight ended at [an airport in Mexico]. Approximately 40 minutes into the flight; after having reached Flight Level 350; the aircraft's Master Warning System (MWS) alerted us to a low oil pressure condition for the Number Two Engine. I was the pilot flying at the time of the MWS warning and I identified the problem and called it out. During this time the Captain was reviewing charts and other data and after my callout; he immediately took command of the aircraft controls and directed me to begin working through the checklist. We proceeded to perform the recommended shutdown of the Number Two Engine; and once that was completed I contacted Center to advise that we needed clearance to descend from FL350 and I advised that we had performed a precautionary shutdown of our Number Two Engine. I also advised that we would likely need to change our planned destination and asked for a few minutes to complete some cockpit work and review of data before we advised of our intentions. The Controller at ZZZZ Center had a difficult time understanding what I said and I was forced to repeat this multiple times. Eventually we received clearance to descend to 13;000 FT and were handed off to ZZZZ1 Center. By the time we checked in with ZZZZ1 we had determined that we should divert...and on initial contact with the new Controller I requested clearance to [a Mexican divert] airport and advised that we were a single engine aircraft. I also requested that trucks and equipment be standing by for us upon landing. Yet again I encountered a communication deficiency on the part of the Controller; who responded to me literally with 'Hawker [Callsign]; I do not understand your request.' Again; it took multiple transmissions from me to explain our situation and to ask for emergency equipment to be standing by. After being handed off from ZZZZ Center to the Tower Controller...I again encountered serious communication challenges (for the third time) as the Tower Controller believed that we were EAST rather that WEST of his airport. Again; it took several communication exchanges to explain that we needed a visual approach and that we needed LEFT traffic to [the] runway.... By this point it had become clear to me that the coordination between the various Center and Tower controllers was simply awful. We performed a textbook single engine approach and landing in VMC conditions...and were met by trucks and equipment that followed us to parking. I believe that the Captain and I performed as well as any crew could perform and that we made the correct decisions and tried to communicate as effectively as possible to facilities on the ground. However; I believe that the common thread of risk in this situation was the poor communication and coordination capabilities of the Controllers and of the ability of the controllers to understand non-standard requests in English. The numerous requests for repeat; and the fact that I literally was told 'I do not understand your request' when asking for trucks and equipment; leads me to believe that this situation is worthy of [a] report....

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.