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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1084359 |
Time | |
Date | 201304 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Takeoff |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Pneumatic System |
Person 1 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Person 2 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying Captain |
Events | |
Anomaly | Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor |
Narrative:
First flight of pairing we received aircraft with two mels; APU bleed leak message and APU inoperative. Flew aircraft normally [on the initial leg]. Turned aircraft and preformed correct QRH for starting engines with ground air. Then we preformed a QRH cross bleed start and taxied to the end of the runway. There was a delay at the end of the runway due to F-16 fighter traffic in the pattern and we both commented on the bounced landings and tire smoke of the fighter jets. Once we received a line up and wait and takeoff clearance we exchanged controls and finished the normal checklists and began the takeoff roll. At around 80-100 KTS (I can't be certain) the captain made a comment about the smell of the fighters and then we got a chime from the flight attendant. The captain aborted the takeoff roll and regained positive control of the aircraft and exited the first available high speed taxiway. I told the tower of our abort and asked to 'roll the trucks' I also told the folks in the back to remain seated. Once we were stopped I did notice a light smoke/haze in the cockpit. I opened my window to ventilate and the captain asked to perform the smoke in the cockpit checklist and to drop the masks in the back. Once the air cleared and the trucks showed up the captain determined it would be safe to taxi back to the gate. He increased power and the smell came back right away. At that point we shut down the engines and had fire personnel board the aircraft. After some coordination and safety concerns about the passengers it was decided to have the aircraft towed back to the gate. After reaching the gate all passengers exited safely and the event came to a close. The APU MEL's were a distraction and the abnormal procedures always call for extra diligence. The fighter jets were a distraction and probably delayed the abort for a second or two. Outside influences can always effect what is going on in the cockpit and diligence should always be maintained. Checklist usage can never be understated. It's really all you have to fall back on. Whether or not related to the actual event the wording of 'APU bleed leak message' MEL in not very clear in its writing.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: EMB145 flight crew reports rejecting a takeoff for smoke in the cockpit just as the Flight Attendant pressed her Cabin Emergency button. The smoke dissipates with the engines at idle on the taxiway but the smoke returns when thrust is increased to return to the gate. The engines are shut down and a tow in is requested.
Narrative: First flight of pairing we received aircraft with two MELs; APU Bleed Leak Message and APU inoperative. Flew aircraft normally [on the initial leg]. Turned aircraft and preformed correct QRH for starting engines with ground air. Then we preformed a QRH cross bleed start and taxied to the end of the runway. There was a delay at the end of the runway due to F-16 fighter traffic in the pattern and we both commented on the bounced landings and tire smoke of the fighter jets. Once we received a line up and wait and takeoff clearance we exchanged controls and finished the normal checklists and began the takeoff roll. At around 80-100 KTS (I can't be certain) the Captain made a comment about the smell of the fighters and then we got a chime from the Flight Attendant. The Captain aborted the takeoff roll and regained positive control of the aircraft and exited the first available high speed taxiway. I told the Tower of our abort and asked to 'roll the trucks' I also told the folks in the back to remain seated. Once we were stopped I did notice a light smoke/haze in the cockpit. I opened my window to ventilate and the Captain asked to perform the Smoke in the Cockpit Checklist and to drop the masks in the back. Once the air cleared and the trucks showed up the Captain determined it would be safe to taxi back to the gate. He increased power and the smell came back right away. At that point we shut down the engines and had fire personnel board the aircraft. After some coordination and safety concerns about the passengers it was decided to have the aircraft towed back to the gate. After reaching the gate all passengers exited safely and the event came to a close. The APU MEL's were a distraction and the abnormal procedures always call for extra diligence. The fighter jets were a distraction and probably delayed the abort for a second or two. Outside influences can always effect what is going on in the cockpit and diligence should always be maintained. Checklist usage can never be understated. It's really all you have to fall back on. Whether or not related to the actual event the wording of 'APU Bleed leak message' MEL in not very clear in its writing.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.