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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1084377 |
Time | |
Date | 201304 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Citation X (C750) |
Flight Phase | Other Non-Flight |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Fuel System |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Because the aircraft I was to ferry the next evening empty and then with passengers to ZZZ; [which has] a short narrow runway; was written up with discrepancies that would preclude this flight to this runway; I requested that I be able to use another airplane tail for this trip. Another crew had been dispatched to bring [an aircraft down]; but when this crew picked up this airplane it had a 2;500 pound fuel imbalance and they didn't investigate the problem except to transfer fuel to correct the imbalance. This crew did not refuel and when the aircraft arrived; the first officer stood by while refueling took place and during this refueling; approximately 10 gallons of fuel spilled on the ramp through the left wing over pressure valve on the underside of the wing and he directed that fueling be stoped. When I arrived; I conducted a pre-check of the fuel valves at the single point refueling panel while the truck again pumped fuel and found the valves were not sequencing properly and didn't shut fuel off from the fueling truck. Maintenance was then called and I spoke with maintenance control. He secured maintenance on the field but they were unable to correct the problem; and they were also not knowledgeable of the citation X systems. Maintenance control stated that we could complete our mission if we went over wing with the fuel hose and pulled the 'T' handle under the fuselage to fuel the center tank. I told him I wouldn't conduct the mission this way and to have the aircraft fixed before we flew it. Maintenance control instructed us to fly the ferry leg to where he said he felt better about maintenance and to try the refueling operation again there; which ended in the same result. Dispatch recommended we fly the aircraft to bhm; a 1 hour and 24 minute flight which would consume 3;100 pounds of fuel. The first officer and I discussed the fact that we recommended that the airplane be taken to the citation service center (ccsc) in mco because it was a 36 minute flight and would only consume 1;070 pounds of fuel. More importantly; since no one knew the extent of the discrepancy it would expose the crew and the non-flying public over which the aircraft would traverse to less danger if it were brought to the closer maintenance facility; a cessna citation service center in mco. Dispatch personnel agreed with our assessment but said someone in management instructed that it be taken to bhm anyway. I again prompted dispatch that we could save $2;000 in fuel costs and one hour of flight time on the aircraft and it would be safer; but was instructed that we take the airplane to bhm because they said the ccsc charges $30 an hour more for labor. This fuel savings would equate to 66 hours of labor on the airplane at the ccsc in mco. The flight was canceled that evening; but another crew made the flight to bhm the next morning. An attempt was made to contact the assistant chief pilot to discuss this issue but he did not answer his phone.the aircraft commander's authority as final authority for safety of the flight should not be usurped. Additionally; an aircraft with an unknown discrepancy should not be repositioned until it is determined by properly trained personnel that it is safe to do so and more importantly; that it should be flown to the 'nearest' maintenance facility with maintenance personnel who have expertise in this aircraft type; not to where its cheaper to complete the maintenance. This approach should be taken so as to reduce the exposure to the crew and the non-flying public to a possible off field emergency landing should the fuel lines become clogged with FOD in the case of a fuel system problem. If I had this to do over again; I would not have flown the empty leg because of pressure being forced on me by management. I should have stuck with my first decision to have it fixed as I originally recommended to maintenance control.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CE750 Captain reports refusing two aircraft for a revenue flight. The second aircraft was refused for a fueling valve fault that allowed fuel to spill during refueling.
Narrative: Because the aircraft I was to ferry the next evening empty and then with passengers to ZZZ; [which has] a short narrow runway; was written up with discrepancies that would preclude this flight to this runway; I requested that I be able to use another airplane tail for this trip. Another crew had been dispatched to bring [an aircraft down]; but when this crew picked up this airplane it had a 2;500 pound Fuel Imbalance and they didn't investigate the problem except to transfer fuel to correct the imbalance. This crew did not refuel and when the aircraft arrived; the First Officer stood by while refueling took place and during this refueling; approximately 10 gallons of fuel spilled on the ramp through the left wing over pressure valve on the underside of the wing and he directed that fueling be stoped. When I arrived; I conducted a pre-check of the fuel valves at the Single Point Refueling Panel while the truck again pumped fuel and found the valves were not sequencing properly and didn't shut fuel off from the fueling truck. Maintenance was then called and I spoke with Maintenance Control. He secured Maintenance on the field but they were unable to correct the problem; and they were also not knowledgeable of the Citation X Systems. Maintenance Control stated that we could complete our mission if we went over wing with the fuel hose and pulled the 'T' Handle under the fuselage to fuel the center tank. I told him I wouldn't conduct the mission this way and to have the aircraft fixed before we flew it. Maintenance Control instructed us to fly the ferry leg to where he said he felt better about maintenance and to try the refueling operation again there; which ended in the same result. Dispatch recommended we fly the aircraft to BHM; a 1 hour and 24 minute flight which would consume 3;100 pounds of fuel. The First Officer and I discussed the fact that we recommended that the airplane be taken to the Citation Service Center (CCSC) in MCO because it was a 36 minute flight and would only consume 1;070 pounds of fuel. More importantly; since no one knew the extent of the discrepancy it would expose the crew and the non-flying public over which the aircraft would traverse to less danger if it were brought to the closer maintenance facility; a Cessna Citation Service Center in MCO. Dispatch personnel agreed with our assessment but said someone in management instructed that it be taken to BHM anyway. I again prompted Dispatch that we could save $2;000 in Fuel costs and one hour of flight time on the aircraft and it would be safer; but was instructed that we take the airplane to BHM because they said the CCSC charges $30 an hour more for labor. This fuel savings would equate to 66 hours of labor on the airplane at the CCSC in MCO. The flight was canceled that evening; but another crew made the flight to BHM the next morning. An attempt was made to contact the Assistant Chief pilot to discuss this issue but he did not answer his phone.The aircraft Commander's authority as final authority for safety of the flight should not be usurped. Additionally; an aircraft with an unknown discrepancy should not be repositioned until it is determined by properly trained personnel that it is safe to do so and more importantly; that it should be flown to the 'nearest' maintenance facility with maintenance personnel who have expertise in this aircraft type; not to where its cheaper to complete the maintenance. This approach should be taken so as to reduce the exposure to the crew and the non-flying public to a possible off field emergency landing should the fuel lines become clogged with FOD in the case of a fuel system problem. If I had this to do over again; I would not have flown the empty leg because of pressure being forced on me by Management. I should have stuck with my first decision to have it fixed as I originally recommended to Maintenance Control.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.