Narrative:

Shortly after signing my flight dispatch release, I proceeded to the aircraft to begin my preflight.I met the first officer in the jetway. He was headed for the crew room to get his flight bag. I reviewed the aircraft log books, noted that the aircraft had just completed a maintenance 'a' check. I set the parking brake and turned on the wheel well lights in preparation for the external preflight. I then departed the cockpit and performed the exterior preflight. No discrepancies were found. While I was outside, the first officer returned and began his cockpit preflight. Our operation calls for either a complete origination checklist (if the aircraft has been shut down for the night or if maintenance has been performed away from the gate), or an intermediate checklist (if the aircraft has been flying and is not shut down). Normally, when an aircraft is brought in by another crew, the radios are left on and tuned, the transponder is left in standby, and numerous other systems are pwred up. Normally, when an aircraft is delivered from hangar maintenance, all these systems are shut off. As the first officer began his preflight, he noted that the aircraft was pwred up, and appeared to have recently been flown in by another crew. Assuming this was the case, it only required an intermediate checklist, which he performed. I completed the external preflight and then went inside to call scheduling to set up a hotel day room for our arrival in miami. When I returned to the cockpit, I asked the first officer if the checklist was complete. He indicated that it was and there were no problems. We boarded our passenger and departed the gate. After pushback and engine start, we completed the after start and before takeoff checklists. We noted no discrepancies prior to takeoff. How it was discovered: as our speed increased after takeoff, the nose attempted to pitch up. I manually held the yoke forward and tried to trim the nose down. The trim wheel moved down to one unit nose up and would move no further down. At this point I stopped my acceleration, and climb (approximately 1500-200' AGL) and told departure control we needed to return for landing.I interpreted the abnormal forward pressure on the yoke and the inoperative control wheel as possible control binding in pitch mode. Departure handed us right back to tower who cleared us for an immediate landing. I turned on downwind and remained in the pattern to complete an uneventful landing. Maintenance in troubleshooting the problem found both tail plane trim actuator (tpi) switches in the off position. These must have been switched off during the maintenance 'a' check, and not turned back on. Contributing factors: 1) the only time a positive check is made that the tpi switches are on is during the originating checklist which was not completed. The first officer didn't do the originating check because the aircraft was pwred up. I knew that an originating check was required, but when I queried the first officer about it I only asked if 'the checklist' was complete, not specifying intermediate or originating. 2) my company flies 5 versions of this type aircraft. Only 2 out of 18 airplanes have had the modification to install tpi switches. There is no time during normal operations when these switches would be turned off, so it is not normally a confign that needs to be double-checked. 3) considering the significance of an unpowered stabilizer (tail plane), there is no caution light or horn to indicate a switch positioned to 'off.' the tpi switches had been switched off with the tail trim in the normal takeoff range, so the position indicator and trim wheel indication were normal. This also satisfied the takeoff warning horn which we did not get. 4) my company has made little effort to standardize the cockpit confign among our aircraft, and differences training received very little emphasis. 5) this was the last trip of the month for my crew. The first officer is captain qualified on this type aircraft and his performance was excellent throughout the month. I did not question his ability to perform the appropriate checklist. Corrective action: 1) require an originating checklist be completed at each crew change (my company immediately changed to this). 2) I feel that it should be part of the requirements for anacr certificate holder that its aircraft be standardized among similar make/model airframes. I am required to fly all these same type aircraft we have; they should be required to ensure they all fly the same. 3) more specific questioning on my part would have caught the intermediate versus originating checklist problem.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AFTER TKOF FLT CREW WAS UNABLE TO TRIM THE ACFT. HEAVY FORWARD PRESSURE ON YOKE AND REDUCED AIRSPEED KEPT THE ACFT UNDER CONTROL. FLT RETURNED AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT.

Narrative: SHORTLY AFTER SIGNING MY FLT DISPATCH RELEASE, I PROCEEDED TO THE ACFT TO BEGIN MY PREFLT.I MET THE F/O IN THE JETWAY. HE WAS HEADED FOR THE CREW ROOM TO GET HIS FLT BAG. I REVIEWED THE ACFT LOG BOOKS, NOTED THAT THE ACFT HAD JUST COMPLETED A MAINT 'A' CHK. I SET THE PARKING BRAKE AND TURNED ON THE WHEEL WELL LIGHTS IN PREPARATION FOR THE EXTERNAL PREFLT. I THEN DEPARTED THE COCKPIT AND PERFORMED THE EXTERIOR PREFLT. NO DISCREPANCIES WERE FOUND. WHILE I WAS OUTSIDE, THE F/O RETURNED AND BEGAN HIS COCKPIT PREFLT. OUR OPERATION CALLS FOR EITHER A COMPLETE ORIGINATION CHKLIST (IF THE ACFT HAS BEEN SHUT DOWN FOR THE NIGHT OR IF MAINT HAS BEEN PERFORMED AWAY FROM THE GATE), OR AN INTERMEDIATE CHKLIST (IF THE ACFT HAS BEEN FLYING AND IS NOT SHUT DOWN). NORMALLY, WHEN AN ACFT IS BROUGHT IN BY ANOTHER CREW, THE RADIOS ARE LEFT ON AND TUNED, THE XPONDER IS LEFT IN STANDBY, AND NUMEROUS OTHER SYSTEMS ARE PWRED UP. NORMALLY, WHEN AN ACFT IS DELIVERED FROM HANGAR MAINT, ALL THESE SYSTEMS ARE SHUT OFF. AS THE F/O BEGAN HIS PREFLT, HE NOTED THAT THE ACFT WAS PWRED UP, AND APPEARED TO HAVE RECENTLY BEEN FLOWN IN BY ANOTHER CREW. ASSUMING THIS WAS THE CASE, IT ONLY REQUIRED AN INTERMEDIATE CHKLIST, WHICH HE PERFORMED. I COMPLETED THE EXTERNAL PREFLT AND THEN WENT INSIDE TO CALL SCHEDULING TO SET UP A HOTEL DAY ROOM FOR OUR ARR IN MIAMI. WHEN I RETURNED TO THE COCKPIT, I ASKED THE F/O IF THE CHKLIST WAS COMPLETE. HE INDICATED THAT IT WAS AND THERE WERE NO PROBS. WE BOARDED OUR PAX AND DEPARTED THE GATE. AFTER PUSHBACK AND ENG START, WE COMPLETED THE AFTER START AND BEFORE TKOF CHKLISTS. WE NOTED NO DISCREPANCIES PRIOR TO TKOF. HOW IT WAS DISCOVERED: AS OUR SPD INCREASED AFTER TKOF, THE NOSE ATTEMPTED TO PITCH UP. I MANUALLY HELD THE YOKE FORWARD AND TRIED TO TRIM THE NOSE DOWN. THE TRIM WHEEL MOVED DOWN TO ONE UNIT NOSE UP AND WOULD MOVE NO FURTHER DOWN. AT THIS POINT I STOPPED MY ACCELERATION, AND CLB (APPROX 1500-200' AGL) AND TOLD DEP CTL WE NEEDED TO RETURN FOR LNDG.I INTERPRETED THE ABNORMAL FORWARD PRESSURE ON THE YOKE AND THE INOP CTL WHEEL AS POSSIBLE CTL BINDING IN PITCH MODE. DEP HANDED US RIGHT BACK TO TWR WHO CLRED US FOR AN IMMEDIATE LNDG. I TURNED ON DOWNWIND AND REMAINED IN THE PATTERN TO COMPLETE AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG. MAINT IN TROUBLESHOOTING THE PROB FOUND BOTH TAIL PLANE TRIM ACTUATOR (TPI) SWITCHES IN THE OFF POS. THESE MUST HAVE BEEN SWITCHED OFF DURING THE MAINT 'A' CHK, AND NOT TURNED BACK ON. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) THE ONLY TIME A POSITIVE CHK IS MADE THAT THE TPI SWITCHES ARE ON IS DURING THE ORIGINATING CHKLIST WHICH WAS NOT COMPLETED. THE F/O DIDN'T DO THE ORIGINATING CHK BECAUSE THE ACFT WAS PWRED UP. I KNEW THAT AN ORIGINATING CHK WAS REQUIRED, BUT WHEN I QUERIED THE F/O ABOUT IT I ONLY ASKED IF 'THE CHKLIST' WAS COMPLETE, NOT SPECIFYING INTERMEDIATE OR ORIGINATING. 2) MY COMPANY FLIES 5 VERSIONS OF THIS TYPE ACFT. ONLY 2 OUT OF 18 AIRPLANES HAVE HAD THE MODIFICATION TO INSTALL TPI SWITCHES. THERE IS NO TIME DURING NORMAL OPS WHEN THESE SWITCHES WOULD BE TURNED OFF, SO IT IS NOT NORMALLY A CONFIGN THAT NEEDS TO BE DOUBLE-CHKED. 3) CONSIDERING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AN UNPOWERED STABILIZER (TAIL PLANE), THERE IS NO CAUTION LIGHT OR HORN TO INDICATE A SWITCH POSITIONED TO 'OFF.' THE TPI SWITCHES HAD BEEN SWITCHED OFF WITH THE TAIL TRIM IN THE NORMAL TKOF RANGE, SO THE POS INDICATOR AND TRIM WHEEL INDICATION WERE NORMAL. THIS ALSO SATISFIED THE TKOF WARNING HORN WHICH WE DID NOT GET. 4) MY COMPANY HAS MADE LITTLE EFFORT TO STANDARDIZE THE COCKPIT CONFIGN AMONG OUR ACFT, AND DIFFERENCES TRNING RECEIVED VERY LITTLE EMPHASIS. 5) THIS WAS THE LAST TRIP OF THE MONTH FOR MY CREW. THE F/O IS CAPT QUALIFIED ON THIS TYPE ACFT AND HIS PERFORMANCE WAS EXCELLENT THROUGHOUT THE MONTH. I DID NOT QUESTION HIS ABILITY TO PERFORM THE APPROPRIATE CHKLIST. CORRECTIVE ACTION: 1) REQUIRE AN ORIGINATING CHKLIST BE COMPLETED AT EACH CREW CHANGE (MY COMPANY IMMEDIATELY CHANGED TO THIS). 2) I FEEL THAT IT SHOULD BE PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ANACR CERTIFICATE HOLDER THAT ITS ACFT BE STANDARDIZED AMONG SIMILAR MAKE/MODEL AIRFRAMES. I AM REQUIRED TO FLY ALL THESE SAME TYPE ACFT WE HAVE; THEY SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO ENSURE THEY ALL FLY THE SAME. 3) MORE SPECIFIC QUESTIONING ON MY PART WOULD HAVE CAUGHT THE INTERMEDIATE VERSUS ORIGINATING CHKLIST PROB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.