Narrative:

I was the captain on flight in 5/89 from ord to dca. The aircraft was an large transport with a full passenger load. We departed ord with forecasts of possible thunderstorm activity in the dc area. Our WX radar was functional, but dca VORTAC was OTS. About midway in our descent into dca a SIGMET for the general area was issued, but we had no more than light rain echoes on our radar. Dca ATIS reported 4000' and scattered to broken with river visibility's to runway 18. As we passed armel VOR at 8000' some more intense radar echoes became visible on our radar. Shortly thereafter, approach indicated that we were now on a vector for the lda 18 approach. Almost immediately we began to paint more intense rainfall (red return on 40 mi scale) and we informed approach we could not continue on this heading. We were then vectored for a visibility to 36 and descended to 1500'. I still could not see the airport so approach suggested a left downwind for runway 18, indicating that the wind was becoming very gusty from 270 degrees. During this vectoring we received 2 or 3 lightning or static strikes and severe rain and turbulence. Cockpit and radio communication was degraded due to static electricity and rain intensity. Due to reduced visibility I was not in position to land on runway 18,so I elected to miss. Approach suggested an ILS 36, and since fuel was not a problem at this time, I agreed. I felt that getting the aircraft on the ground was preferable at this time to repenetrating a rapidly building thunderstorm system. Due to near 0 visibility and extreme crosswind (40+ KTS), I missed this approach also. At this point I requested clearance to pit. Soon after, dispatch notified us that pit was unsatisfactory due to thunderstorms. Bwi, dulles and other local airports were down, so we requested phl which was good WX. Departure control was unable to give clearance because of traffic and suggested another dca approach indicating a momentary clear area. We executed an ILS 36 in heavy rain and 20 KT wind shear to a successful landing. During the vectoring over washington, approach mentioned that we were close to P56 and they issued a vector that I could not immediately execute due to severe WX on that heading. We were not in sufficient ground contact to assess whether or not we violated P56, and since dca VORTAC was down, we had no navigational aid for position confirmation. No further mention was made by approach control. The field probably should have been closed prior to our arrival, but I'm sure the WX situation decayed so quickly there was no opportunity for dca tower to assess the severity of the situation until an aircraft arrived in the traffic area. My concern was the possible overflt of P56 but I felt that under the circumstances I acted in the best interests of safety of my aircraft and passenger. After landing, maintenance found more than 100 burn spots from electrical discharges.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: POSSIBLE PENETRATION OF PROHIBITED AREA.

Narrative: I WAS THE CAPT ON FLT IN 5/89 FROM ORD TO DCA. THE ACFT WAS AN LGT WITH A FULL PAX LOAD. WE DEPARTED ORD WITH FORECASTS OF POSSIBLE TSTM ACTIVITY IN THE DC AREA. OUR WX RADAR WAS FUNCTIONAL, BUT DCA VORTAC WAS OTS. ABOUT MIDWAY IN OUR DSCNT INTO DCA A SIGMET FOR THE GENERAL AREA WAS ISSUED, BUT WE HAD NO MORE THAN LIGHT RAIN ECHOES ON OUR RADAR. DCA ATIS RPTED 4000' AND SCATTERED TO BROKEN WITH RIVER VIS'S TO RWY 18. AS WE PASSED ARMEL VOR AT 8000' SOME MORE INTENSE RADAR ECHOES BECAME VISIBLE ON OUR RADAR. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, APCH INDICATED THAT WE WERE NOW ON A VECTOR FOR THE LDA 18 APCH. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY WE BEGAN TO PAINT MORE INTENSE RAINFALL (RED RETURN ON 40 MI SCALE) AND WE INFORMED APCH WE COULD NOT CONTINUE ON THIS HDG. WE WERE THEN VECTORED FOR A VIS TO 36 AND DSNDED TO 1500'. I STILL COULD NOT SEE THE ARPT SO APCH SUGGESTED A LEFT DOWNWIND FOR RWY 18, INDICATING THAT THE WIND WAS BECOMING VERY GUSTY FROM 270 DEGS. DURING THIS VECTORING WE RECEIVED 2 OR 3 LIGHTNING OR STATIC STRIKES AND SEVERE RAIN AND TURB. COCKPIT AND RADIO COM WAS DEGRADED DUE TO STATIC ELECTRICITY AND RAIN INTENSITY. DUE TO REDUCED VISIBILITY I WAS NOT IN POS TO LAND ON RWY 18,SO I ELECTED TO MISS. APCH SUGGESTED AN ILS 36, AND SINCE FUEL WAS NOT A PROB AT THIS TIME, I AGREED. I FELT THAT GETTING THE ACFT ON THE GND WAS PREFERABLE AT THIS TIME TO REPENETRATING A RAPIDLY BUILDING TSTM SYS. DUE TO NEAR 0 VISIBILITY AND EXTREME XWIND (40+ KTS), I MISSED THIS APCH ALSO. AT THIS POINT I REQUESTED CLRNC TO PIT. SOON AFTER, DISPATCH NOTIFIED US THAT PIT WAS UNSATISFACTORY DUE TO TSTMS. BWI, DULLES AND OTHER LCL ARPTS WERE DOWN, SO WE REQUESTED PHL WHICH WAS GOOD WX. DEP CTL WAS UNABLE TO GIVE CLRNC BECAUSE OF TFC AND SUGGESTED ANOTHER DCA APCH INDICATING A MOMENTARY CLR AREA. WE EXECUTED AN ILS 36 IN HVY RAIN AND 20 KT WIND SHEAR TO A SUCCESSFUL LNDG. DURING THE VECTORING OVER WASHINGTON, APCH MENTIONED THAT WE WERE CLOSE TO P56 AND THEY ISSUED A VECTOR THAT I COULD NOT IMMEDIATELY EXECUTE DUE TO SEVERE WX ON THAT HDG. WE WERE NOT IN SUFFICIENT GND CONTACT TO ASSESS WHETHER OR NOT WE VIOLATED P56, AND SINCE DCA VORTAC WAS DOWN, WE HAD NO NAVIGATIONAL AID FOR POS CONFIRMATION. NO FURTHER MENTION WAS MADE BY APCH CTL. THE FIELD PROBABLY SHOULD HAVE BEEN CLOSED PRIOR TO OUR ARR, BUT I'M SURE THE WX SITUATION DECAYED SO QUICKLY THERE WAS NO OPPORTUNITY FOR DCA TWR TO ASSESS THE SEVERITY OF THE SITUATION UNTIL AN ACFT ARRIVED IN THE TFC AREA. MY CONCERN WAS THE POSSIBLE OVERFLT OF P56 BUT I FELT THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES I ACTED IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF SAFETY OF MY ACFT AND PAX. AFTER LNDG, MAINT FOUND MORE THAN 100 BURN SPOTS FROM ELECTRICAL DISCHARGES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.