Narrative:

Air carrier airlines flight xx mci to ord 5/mon/89. We were being vectored for a visibility approach to 27L (approaching from the southwest). The controller had us on a heading of 060 degrees at 7000'. As we approached the shoreline of lake erie I noticed traffic which I thought we would follow at our 11 O'clock position. The controller then turned us left to 030 degrees and asked if we had the airport in sight. I answered affirmative and he cleared us for the visibility to 27L. The captain had the autoplt engaged and had armed the ILS capture mode. The autoplt captured the localizer but he elected to disengage the autoplt because he thought we needed more room to descend safely to the runway. Meanwhile I was still watching the traffic mentioned above, the approach controller told us cleared for the visibility and contact tower at the marker. I believe the captain became disoriented because he was either attempting to land on 22L on 27R. We drifted in to the approach course of 27R. I told him I thought we were north of the 27L final and needed to turn back to the left. I could tell by the expression on his face that I didn't understand what I was saying. I told him again that we were not lined up for the proper runway. At about that time I saw a widebody transport go underneath as he was on the 27R final. We were at 3500' MSL and I'm not sure how close we came but I believe it was between 500 and 1300'. At this time the tower called us and requested we maintain present altitude and return to approach control. We did this and they vectored us to an approach for 22R. We landed west/O further incident. In concluding let me first say I feel the captain and myself were completely responsible for this incident; he for disconnecting the autoplt and heading for the wrong runway, and myself for not monitoring the approach control frequency until the OM (I switched to tower when the controller stated contact tower at the marker) and for not realizing soon enough what the captain was doing. Additionally I was focused on watching the traffic I mentioned earlier because it seemed our spacing was extremely close. A contributing factor is ord's policy to keep aircraft high to long, which results in a steep approach path (known in the cockpit as a slam dunk) which caused the captain to go off course in order to have more room for descent.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PIC APPEARED TO BECOME MOMENTARILY DISORIENTED AND LINED UP FOR AN APCH TO THE WRONG RWY.

Narrative: ACR AIRLINES FLT XX MCI TO ORD 5/MON/89. WE WERE BEING VECTORED FOR A VIS APCH TO 27L (APCHING FROM THE SW). THE CTLR HAD US ON A HDG OF 060 DEGS AT 7000'. AS WE APCHED THE SHORELINE OF LAKE ERIE I NOTICED TFC WHICH I THOUGHT WE WOULD FOLLOW AT OUR 11 O'CLOCK POS. THE CTLR THEN TURNED US LEFT TO 030 DEGS AND ASKED IF WE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT. I ANSWERED AFFIRMATIVE AND HE CLRED US FOR THE VIS TO 27L. THE CAPT HAD THE AUTOPLT ENGAGED AND HAD ARMED THE ILS CAPTURE MODE. THE AUTOPLT CAPTURED THE LOC BUT HE ELECTED TO DISENGAGE THE AUTOPLT BECAUSE HE THOUGHT WE NEEDED MORE ROOM TO DSND SAFELY TO THE RWY. MEANWHILE I WAS STILL WATCHING THE TFC MENTIONED ABOVE, THE APCH CTLR TOLD US CLRED FOR THE VIS AND CONTACT TWR AT THE MARKER. I BELIEVE THE CAPT BECAME DISORIENTED BECAUSE HE WAS EITHER ATTEMPTING TO LAND ON 22L ON 27R. WE DRIFTED IN TO THE APCH COURSE OF 27R. I TOLD HIM I THOUGHT WE WERE N OF THE 27L FINAL AND NEEDED TO TURN BACK TO THE LEFT. I COULD TELL BY THE EXPRESSION ON HIS FACE THAT I DIDN'T UNDERSTAND WHAT I WAS SAYING. I TOLD HIM AGAIN THAT WE WERE NOT LINED UP FOR THE PROPER RWY. AT ABOUT THAT TIME I SAW A WDB GO UNDERNEATH AS HE WAS ON THE 27R FINAL. WE WERE AT 3500' MSL AND I'M NOT SURE HOW CLOSE WE CAME BUT I BELIEVE IT WAS BTWN 500 AND 1300'. AT THIS TIME THE TWR CALLED US AND REQUESTED WE MAINTAIN PRESENT ALT AND RETURN TO APCH CTL. WE DID THIS AND THEY VECTORED US TO AN APCH FOR 22R. WE LANDED W/O FURTHER INCIDENT. IN CONCLUDING LET ME FIRST SAY I FEEL THE CAPT AND MYSELF WERE COMPLETELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS INCIDENT; HE FOR DISCONNECTING THE AUTOPLT AND HDG FOR THE WRONG RWY, AND MYSELF FOR NOT MONITORING THE APCH CTL FREQ UNTIL THE OM (I SWITCHED TO TWR WHEN THE CTLR STATED CONTACT TWR AT THE MARKER) AND FOR NOT REALIZING SOON ENOUGH WHAT THE CAPT WAS DOING. ADDITIONALLY I WAS FOCUSED ON WATCHING THE TFC I MENTIONED EARLIER BECAUSE IT SEEMED OUR SPACING WAS EXTREMELY CLOSE. A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IS ORD'S POLICY TO KEEP ACFT HIGH TO LONG, WHICH RESULTS IN A STEEP APCH PATH (KNOWN IN THE COCKPIT AS A SLAM DUNK) WHICH CAUSED THE CAPT TO GO OFF COURSE IN ORDER TO HAVE MORE ROOM FOR DSCNT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.