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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1108712 |
Time | |
Date | 201308 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZBW.ARTCC |
State Reference | NH |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | Mixed |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B737-300 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Descent |
Route In Use | STAR RAVNN 3 |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 219 Flight Crew Type 219 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met Deviation - Procedural Clearance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown |
Narrative:
During the ravnn 3 arrival; we had received a few unsolicited shortcuts and eventually found ourselves three thousand feet high (or so) with approximately 10 miles to go before crossing sabbi (published altitude 15;000 feet). I had mentioned it to the pilot flying and he made a correction. Other pilot monitoring duties pulled my attention away for a minute or two but when I came back to our vertical profile it was evident we would not be crossing sabbi at the published altitude. Due to radio congestion; I was not able to advise potomac approach in advance of the impending altitude deviation before crossing sabbi. Upon eventual contact; about one mile past sabbi; approach said no problem but to make sure we meet the next one. The aircraft was on autopilot in VNAV path. If there was a flight management status change; it was never communicated. Prior to this event; there were some communication issues with the pilot flying. I will not attempt to assign background experience as a cause but he would often mumble checklist responses and use incorrect terminology. The turn was very quiet in the cockpit aside from the required callouts. From a technical standpoint; I do not know what happened with the aircraft in regards to remaining high. VNAV path was highlighted on the FMA and there were no notes on the CDU that we would not attain the crossing restriction. Ultimately the deviation distills into poor monitoring (my part) and poor communication (our part). Correct terminology and clear communications would certainly make the work environment easier but I cannot be certain if it was the cause of this situation. Concerning pilot monitoring; one can always make the argument the pilot monitoring needs to do more.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Air carrier on the RAVNN STAR into BWI missed a crossing restriction due to miscommunications within the cockpit and also listed unsolicited ATC 'shortcuts' as contributing to the event.
Narrative: During the RAVNN 3 Arrival; we had received a few unsolicited shortcuts and eventually found ourselves three thousand feet high (or so) with approximately 10 miles to go before crossing SABBI (published altitude 15;000 feet). I had mentioned it to the Pilot Flying and he made a correction. Other Pilot Monitoring duties pulled my attention away for a minute or two but when I came back to our vertical profile it was evident we would not be crossing SABBI at the published altitude. Due to radio congestion; I was not able to advise Potomac Approach in advance of the impending altitude deviation before crossing SABBI. Upon eventual contact; about one mile past SABBI; Approach said no problem but to make sure we meet the next one. The aircraft was on Autopilot in VNAV PATH. If there was a flight management status change; it was never communicated. Prior to this event; there were some communication issues with the Pilot Flying. I will not attempt to assign background experience as a cause but he would often mumble checklist responses and use incorrect terminology. The turn was very quiet in the cockpit aside from the required callouts. From a technical standpoint; I do not know what happened with the aircraft in regards to remaining high. VNAV PATH was highlighted on the FMA and there were no notes on the CDU that we would not attain the crossing restriction. Ultimately the deviation distills into poor monitoring (my part) and poor communication (our part). Correct terminology and clear communications would certainly make the work environment easier but I cannot be certain if it was the cause of this situation. Concerning Pilot Monitoring; one can always make the argument the Pilot Monitoring needs to do more.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.