Narrative:

During approach it became apparent the aircraft ahead of us might not clear the runway in time for us to land. At 1;300 ft we discussed allowing our aircraft to descend until 200 ft on the approach; if the aircraft had not vacated the runway; we would go-around. I reviewed the steps of the go-around with the first officer. At 250 ft the 757 had not began a turn off the runway (at a 90 degree turn for the taxiway) so I called for the go-around. The first officer executed a textbook go-around climbing toward 3;000 ft (assigned altitude by the tower) for the missed approach. When approaching the 3;000 ft clearance altitude; the first officer noted the yoke was extremely heavy and he had trouble pushing over. He had the trim switches full down with no effect. I assisted in the push over; we were able to stop the climb using excessive force on the yoke; [and] we reached an altitude of 3;150 ft and then engaged the autopilot. The autopilot immediately kicked off so I took the airplane; pushed over with the first officer's help and held the yoke in place engaging the autopilot. I could feel the pressures trimming off with the autopilot engaged. This time the autopilot held the altitude. We discussed what we both saw and elected to execute an autoland. We briefed the approach and received vectors. [Briefed] the first officer during his pm duties that if he saw anything unusual to call it out and we would go missed approach again if needed. During the autoland I noted the aircraft was slower than usual to introduce the wing low correction needed to counter the 9 knot crosswind. At 100 ft the aircraft began tracking to the right of center line; so I disconnected the autopilot and kept the aircraft on the centerline. The landing itself was uneventful however when attempting to fly the nose wheel to the runway; it was very difficult to push the nose over. I was able to get the nose down and complete the landing. There was definitely something wrong with the aircraft flight controls. It felt as if the lsas would enter a pitch hold mode and not allow normal flight control manipulation to counter this mode in leveling out. Our election to use the auto pilot for autoland was to take the lsas out of the picture.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD-11 Captain reported flight control anomalies during go-around and subsequent landing. Reporter could not be reached for follow up comments.

Narrative: During approach it became apparent the aircraft ahead of us might not clear the runway in time for us to land. At 1;300 FT we discussed allowing our aircraft to descend until 200 FT on the approach; if the aircraft had not vacated the runway; we would go-around. I reviewed the steps of the go-around with the First Officer. At 250 FT the 757 had not began a turn off the runway (at a 90 degree turn for the taxiway) so I called for the go-around. The First Officer executed a textbook go-around climbing toward 3;000 FT (assigned altitude by the Tower) for the missed approach. When approaching the 3;000 FT clearance altitude; the First Officer noted the yoke was extremely heavy and he had trouble pushing over. He had the trim switches full down with no effect. I assisted in the push over; we were able to stop the climb using excessive force on the yoke; [and] we reached an altitude of 3;150 FT and then engaged the autopilot. The autopilot immediately kicked off so I took the airplane; pushed over with the First Officer's help and held the yoke in place engaging the autopilot. I could feel the pressures trimming off with the autopilot engaged. This time the autopilot held the altitude. We discussed what we both saw and elected to execute an autoland. We briefed the approach and received vectors. [Briefed] the First Officer during his PM duties that if he saw anything unusual to call it out and we would go missed approach again if needed. During the autoland I noted the aircraft was slower than usual to introduce the wing low correction needed to counter the 9 knot crosswind. At 100 FT the aircraft began tracking to the right of center line; so I disconnected the autopilot and kept the aircraft on the centerline. The landing itself was uneventful however when attempting to fly the nose wheel to the runway; it was very difficult to push the nose over. I was able to get the nose down and complete the landing. There was definitely something wrong with the aircraft flight controls. It felt as if the LSAS would enter a pitch hold mode and not allow normal flight control manipulation to counter this mode in leveling out. Our election to use the auto pilot for autoland was to take the LSAS out of the picture.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.