Narrative:

Our dispatcher chose skcl (cali columbia) as our alternate for mpto. I checked and found that cali was not in our database and was significantly far from mpto. Having never been into cali and being very familiar with the B757 crash there; I decided I had better review the approaches and surrounding terrain. I found the airport to be wedged into a valley between mountains that rose to 16;000 ft on one side; and 14;000 ft on the other. Next; I attempted to load skcl into the database and found it wasn't there. I would consider myself to be very experienced as a B767 PIC operating in south america; but I was very uncomfortable with this choice of alternate due to the dangerous terrain; my unfamiliarity with the airport; nighttime operations; not in the database; and the thunderstorms that were present throughout the area. I called my dispatcher and explained my concerns and asked for a more suitable alternate. We both agreed on skbq since it was closer and near the coast with friendlier terrain and in the database. At some point during our exchange; the supervisor took it upon himself to call [the duty manager] about what was occurring. He relayed to my dispatcher that he instructed me to use latitude/longitude and that skcl was indeed a suitable alternate. This concerned my first officer deeply and he warned me 'not to end up like captain X.' I made it very clear that I was not refusing skcl as an alternate; but I wanted a better one. We copied all the new weather and fuel figures and did an amendment that changed our alternate to skbq. I then called [the duty manager] to explain my decision and to make sure he understood that I wasn't refusing an alternate. Paramount on my mind was the recent dismissal of captain X for doing the very same thing; and I certainly did not want to lose my job as well; which brings up my reason for this report.the decisions I make as a captain should never have to be based on the possible termination of my employment as long as I am making those decisions to the best of my ability and in the interest of safety. My thought process prior to captain X being terminated would have been to reject skcl altogether and insist on a more suitable alternate; period. Instead; I was prepared to accept skcl because of my fear of being terminated; reasoning with myself that our chances of actually going there were slim and not worth the risk of losing my job. However; I was also aware that the pilots of the ill-fated cali accident made a keystroke error that put them into the side of a mountain; and that was with cali being in their database. If I am going to continue as an effective PIC with this airline; I need to be free to make sound judgment calls; which I believe this to be; without the fear of termination. The command authority written as law in the far's needs to be recognized by management and our pilot group needs immediate reassurance that our management agrees that the captain has the final say on such things as this; without fear of any discipline whatsoever. Anything less; and there will be a serious degradation of safety at our airline.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 reports being filed to MPTO with SKCL as an alternate and being very uncomfortable with that choice of alternate due to the dangerous terrain; unfamiliarity with the airport; nighttime operations and airport not in the FMC database. A suitable alternate is agreed upon after being counseled by the Duty Manager.

Narrative: Our Dispatcher chose SKCL (Cali Columbia) as our alternate for MPTO. I checked and found that Cali was not in our database and was significantly far from MPTO. Having never been into Cali and being very familiar with the B757 crash there; I decided I had better review the approaches and surrounding terrain. I found the airport to be wedged into a valley between mountains that rose to 16;000 FT on one side; and 14;000 FT on the other. Next; I attempted to load SKCL into the database and found it wasn't there. I would consider myself to be very experienced as a B767 PIC operating in South America; but I was very uncomfortable with this choice of alternate due to the dangerous terrain; my unfamiliarity with the airport; nighttime operations; not in the database; and the thunderstorms that were present throughout the area. I called my Dispatcher and explained my concerns and asked for a more suitable alternate. We both agreed on SKBQ since it was closer and near the coast with friendlier terrain and in the database. At some point during our exchange; the Supervisor took it upon himself to call [the Duty Manager] about what was occurring. He relayed to my Dispatcher that he instructed me to use latitude/longitude and that SKCL was indeed a suitable alternate. This concerned my First Officer deeply and he warned me 'not to end up like Captain X.' I made it very clear that I was not refusing SKCL as an alternate; but I wanted a better one. We copied all the new weather and fuel figures and did an amendment that changed our alternate to SKBQ. I then called [the Duty Manager] to explain my decision and to make sure he understood that I wasn't refusing an alternate. Paramount on my mind was the recent dismissal of Captain X for doing the very same thing; and I certainly did not want to lose my job as well; which brings up my reason for this report.The decisions I make as a Captain should never have to be based on the possible termination of my employment as long as I am making those decisions to the best of my ability and in the interest of safety. My thought process prior to Captain X being terminated would have been to reject SKCL altogether and insist on a more suitable alternate; period. Instead; I was prepared to accept SKCL because of my fear of being terminated; reasoning with myself that our chances of actually going there were slim and not worth the risk of losing my job. However; I was also aware that the pilots of the ill-fated Cali accident made a keystroke error that put them into the side of a mountain; and that was with Cali being in their database. If I am going to continue as an effective PIC with this airline; I need to be free to make sound judgment calls; which I believe this to be; without the fear of termination. The command authority written as law in the FAR's needs to be recognized by management and our pilot group needs immediate reassurance that our management agrees that the Captain has the final say on such things as this; without fear of any discipline whatsoever. Anything less; and there will be a serious degradation of safety at our airline.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.