Pdk controller described a less than standard runway separation event when a second aircraft landed ...

Narrative:

I was working cab coordinator at pdk tower; runway 34 and runway 3R where in use. Local 1 was busy and had cessna X cleared number 1 to land on runway 34. Cessna Y was on the right downwind and was cleared to land number behind cessna X number 2 for runway 34. Cessna Y turned from the downwind quickly and on a much tighter base leg than the local controller had planned. I advised the local controller that it was not going to work and to send cessna Y around; but he did not. I advised the local controller again; a second time; to send cessna Y around but he did not. Cessna X landed and almost came to a complete stop even though local 1 was advising cessna X to exit the runway to the left. Cessna Y questioned local 1 about possibly going around; but local 1 did not send cessna Y around. I believe local 1 thought it was too late in the landing to safely send the aircraft around. Cessna Y landed with cessna X exiting but still on runway 34 ahead of it. The required separation did not exist. The ground controllers a pdk block the exit points of the active runways on a routine basis; even though our SOP states that they shall keep the exit points open to allow landing aircraft to exit the runway. This is not enforced by local management. Enforce the local procedure and require the ground controller to keep the exit points open/unblocked.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PDK Controller described a less than standard runway separation event when a second aircraft landed with the prior arrival still on the runway; the reporter listed non compliance with local SOP requirements as a causal factor.

Narrative: I was working Cab Coordinator at PDK Tower; Runway 34 and Runway 3R where in use. Local 1 was busy and had Cessna X cleared number 1 to land on Runway 34. Cessna Y was on the right downwind and was cleared to land number behind Cessna X number 2 for Runway 34. Cessna Y turned from the downwind quickly and on a much tighter base leg than the Local Controller had planned. I advised the Local Controller that it was not going to work and to send Cessna Y around; but he did not. I advised the Local Controller again; a second time; to send Cessna Y around but he did not. Cessna X landed and almost came to a complete stop even though Local 1 was advising Cessna X to exit the runway to the left. Cessna Y questioned Local 1 about possibly going around; but Local 1 did not send Cessna Y around. I believe Local 1 thought it was too late in the landing to safely send the aircraft around. Cessna Y landed with Cessna X exiting but still on Runway 34 ahead of it. The required separation did not exist. The Ground Controllers a PDK block the exit points of the active runways on a routine basis; even though our SOP states that they shall keep the exit points open to allow landing aircraft to exit the runway. This is not enforced by local management. Enforce the local procedure and require the Ground Controller to keep the exit points open/unblocked.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	1111894
Time
Date	201308
Local Time Of Day	1801-2400
Place
Locale Reference	PDK.Airport
State Reference	GA
Aircraft 1
Make Model Name	Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 91
Flight Phase	Landing
Route In Use	None
Flight Plan	VFR
Aircraft 2
Make Model Name	Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 91
Flight Phase	Landing
Route In Use	None
Flight Plan	VFR
Person 1
Function	Coordinator
Qualification	Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Events
Anomaly	ATC Issue All Types Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Ground Incursion Runway

Pdk controller described a less than standard runway separation event when a second aircraft landed with the prior arrival still on the runway; the reporter listed non compliance with local SOP requirements as a causal factor.