Narrative:

I was following the IFR departure procedure for runway 26 at jackson, flying northbound on the i-jac localizer course intending to intercept V298 to dunoir VOR eastbound. After takeoff ZLC cleared me to 14000'. Prior to reaching V298, center cleared me direct dunoir VOR, and I had not yet reached my assigned altitude. I turned toward dunoir VOR, and continued my climb. Shortly afterward center advised me of opp direction traffic at 15000', to which I responded that I was in IMC but would be looking. The other pilot gave a similar response. At about that time I had reached 14000', but failed to scan my altimeter and continued climbing. Upon reaching 14500' center advised me that I was 500' high and to start an immediate descent to 14000'. Just as center began the transmission, I also realized my altitude error and immediately descended back down to 14000'. Afterward, I was advised of the close proximity situation I created and was advised to phone FAA quality assurance once I landed. I feel the following factors contributed to my error: 1) fatigue, resulting from waking up at the unusually early hour for me of 5 am. I believe my feeling of tiredness allowed me to be distracted by radio communications which ultimately led to an inadequate scan of my altimeter. 2) a previously alleged violation I incurred which is still under investigation by the FAA. Up until I had approximately 3300 hours of flight time I've had an unblemished record as a pilot, and receiving a possible FAA violation and its resulting effect on my career has caused me a great deal of mental stress, adversely affecting my ability to concentrate. 3) overconfidence and complacency, resulting in my inattentiveness in a situation that required total alertness. I believe this occurrence could have been avoided in 2 ways. First, I should have been more aware of my state of mind prior to the flight, and thus could have brought myself to a higher level of alertness. Secondly, ATC should be more conservative in their sep of IFR traffic in its departure and/or arrival phase. The center controller allowed only 1000' of vertical sep for 2 aircraft that were instructed to follow flight paths that headed directly toward each other. This especially seemed unnecessary since we were the only 2 aircraft in the area.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF SMT ON IFR DEP JAC INSTRUCTED TO LEVEL AT 14000'. OVERSHOT HIS ALT IN CLIMB TO 14500'. ARTCC CTLR INTERVENED. PLT RETURNED TO 14000'--HAD CREATED A CONFLICT WITH TRAFFIC AT 15000', 5 MILE SEPARATION.

Narrative: I WAS FOLLOWING THE IFR DEP PROC FOR RWY 26 AT JACKSON, FLYING NBOUND ON THE I-JAC LOC COURSE INTENDING TO INTERCEPT V298 TO DUNOIR VOR EBND. AFTER TKOF ZLC CLRED ME TO 14000'. PRIOR TO REACHING V298, CENTER CLRED ME DIRECT DUNOIR VOR, AND I HAD NOT YET REACHED MY ASSIGNED ALT. I TURNED TOWARD DUNOIR VOR, AND CONTINUED MY CLB. SHORTLY AFTERWARD CENTER ADVISED ME OF OPP DIRECTION TFC AT 15000', TO WHICH I RESPONDED THAT I WAS IN IMC BUT WOULD BE LOOKING. THE OTHER PLT GAVE A SIMILAR RESPONSE. AT ABOUT THAT TIME I HAD REACHED 14000', BUT FAILED TO SCAN MY ALTIMETER AND CONTINUED CLBING. UPON REACHING 14500' CENTER ADVISED ME THAT I WAS 500' HIGH AND TO START AN IMMEDIATE DSCNT TO 14000'. JUST AS CENTER BEGAN THE XMISSION, I ALSO REALIZED MY ALT ERROR AND IMMEDIATELY DSNDED BACK DOWN TO 14000'. AFTERWARD, I WAS ADVISED OF THE CLOSE PROX SITUATION I CREATED AND WAS ADVISED TO PHONE FAA QUALITY ASSURANCE ONCE I LANDED. I FEEL THE FOLLOWING FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO MY ERROR: 1) FATIGUE, RESULTING FROM WAKING UP AT THE UNUSUALLY EARLY HOUR FOR ME OF 5 AM. I BELIEVE MY FEELING OF TIREDNESS ALLOWED ME TO BE DISTRACTED BY RADIO COMS WHICH ULTIMATELY LED TO AN INADEQUATE SCAN OF MY ALTIMETER. 2) A PREVIOUSLY ALLEGED VIOLATION I INCURRED WHICH IS STILL UNDER INVESTIGATION BY THE FAA. UP UNTIL I HAD APPROX 3300 HRS OF FLT TIME I'VE HAD AN UNBLEMISHED RECORD AS A PLT, AND RECEIVING A POSSIBLE FAA VIOLATION AND ITS RESULTING EFFECT ON MY CAREER HAS CAUSED ME A GREAT DEAL OF MENTAL STRESS, ADVERSELY AFFECTING MY ABILITY TO CONCENTRATE. 3) OVERCONFIDENCE AND COMPLACENCY, RESULTING IN MY INATTENTIVENESS IN A SITUATION THAT REQUIRED TOTAL ALERTNESS. I BELIEVE THIS OCCURRENCE COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IN 2 WAYS. FIRST, I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE AWARE OF MY STATE OF MIND PRIOR TO THE FLT, AND THUS COULD HAVE BROUGHT MYSELF TO A HIGHER LEVEL OF ALERTNESS. SECONDLY, ATC SHOULD BE MORE CONSERVATIVE IN THEIR SEP OF IFR TFC IN ITS DEP AND/OR ARR PHASE. THE CENTER CTLR ALLOWED ONLY 1000' OF VERT SEP FOR 2 ACFT THAT WERE INSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW FLT PATHS THAT HEADED DIRECTLY TOWARD EACH OTHER. THIS ESPECIALLY SEEMED UNNECESSARY SINCE WE WERE THE ONLY 2 ACFT IN THE AREA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.