Narrative:

We were level at FL240 waiting for a descent clearance from ZAB, established on the blythe 089 degree right for the arlin 7 arrival into phx. At this point we were a bit confused on our upcoming clearance as chandler VOR was notamed OTS. We were then issued a clearance of 'intercept the chd 256 degree right and cross a point 40 DME on the srp VOR DME at 11000'/280 KTS.' now we were confused, as the day before we were told chd was OTS and to fly the 'old routing' of the srp 246 degree right/42 DME. After asking the controller to confirm the clearance (3 times), he again stated cross on the chd radial 256 degrees at a point 40 DME from srp at 11000'/280 KTS. After a quick check of our vertical position, we realized that we could not make the speed restriction and asked for relief. The center controller issued the speed relief and asked if we were going to make the 11000' crossing. I increased our speed to maximum, employed the speed brakes, and stated that we would do our best on the altitude. We were then switched to phx approach control and immediately asked if the center had relieved us of the 11000' restriction. We were now about 7 mi from the crossing point and I told the controller we would do our best. We crossed the 40 DME fix approximately 1500' high and 350 KTS. Now the approach controller wanted to know everything about our clearance from center; started a rather lengthy questioning during a rather busy flight phase. We continued to slow to 280 KTS and proceeded at that speed for the next 25 mi, only to be 'dumped' in on the power plant visibility to runway 26L. An uneventful landing was completed although the rate of descent was far above comfortable, just to make the field. I believe a combination of factors caused this messy and uncomfortable approach: 1) the initial clearance was confusing, considering the fact that srp VOR was functioning normally with azimuth and DME. 2) we were held at FL240 too late to make a normal descent and make all restrictions. 3) I was too slow in admitting our inability to make the crossing restriction. I will, in the future, inform the controller immediately, that I cannot make a restriction and will do whatever he would like to avoid any conflicts. Finally, I see increased problems with ZAB and phx approach control. With the pilots playing the middle man. The concept of making the ATC system work has changed to a fear of 'FAA action' against a person, should some crossing restriction not be made. Airplanes are not helicopter's and mistakes are made on all sides (this pilot included). However, the spirit of cooperation and 'system safety' is being subordinated to 'career protectionism.' I hope this is a trend we can all help to turn around.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF ACR ON APCH TO PHX BECAME CONFUSED REGARDING THE CLRNC AS IT DID NOT CONFORM TO FLT CREW'S UNDERSTANDING OF CHD VOR BEING OUT OF SERVICE. BY THE TIME CLRNC WAS REPEATED IT WAS TOO LATE FOR THE FLT TO MAKE A CROSSING RESTRICTION.

Narrative: WE WERE LEVEL AT FL240 WAITING FOR A DSCNT CLRNC FROM ZAB, ESTABLISHED ON THE BLYTHE 089 DEG R FOR THE ARLIN 7 ARR INTO PHX. AT THIS POINT WE WERE A BIT CONFUSED ON OUR UPCOMING CLRNC AS CHANDLER VOR WAS NOTAMED OTS. WE WERE THEN ISSUED A CLRNC OF 'INTERCEPT THE CHD 256 DEG R AND CROSS A POINT 40 DME ON THE SRP VOR DME AT 11000'/280 KTS.' NOW WE WERE CONFUSED, AS THE DAY BEFORE WE WERE TOLD CHD WAS OTS AND TO FLY THE 'OLD ROUTING' OF THE SRP 246 DEG R/42 DME. AFTER ASKING THE CTLR TO CONFIRM THE CLRNC (3 TIMES), HE AGAIN STATED CROSS ON THE CHD RADIAL 256 DEGS AT A POINT 40 DME FROM SRP AT 11000'/280 KTS. AFTER A QUICK CHK OF OUR VERT POS, WE REALIZED THAT WE COULD NOT MAKE THE SPD RESTRICTION AND ASKED FOR RELIEF. THE CENTER CTLR ISSUED THE SPD RELIEF AND ASKED IF WE WERE GOING TO MAKE THE 11000' XING. I INCREASED OUR SPD TO MAX, EMPLOYED THE SPD BRAKES, AND STATED THAT WE WOULD DO OUR BEST ON THE ALT. WE WERE THEN SWITCHED TO PHX APCH CTL AND IMMEDIATELY ASKED IF THE CENTER HAD RELIEVED US OF THE 11000' RESTRICTION. WE WERE NOW ABOUT 7 MI FROM THE XING POINT AND I TOLD THE CTLR WE WOULD DO OUR BEST. WE CROSSED THE 40 DME FIX APPROX 1500' HIGH AND 350 KTS. NOW THE APCH CTLR WANTED TO KNOW EVERYTHING ABOUT OUR CLRNC FROM CENTER; STARTED A RATHER LENGTHY QUESTIONING DURING A RATHER BUSY FLT PHASE. WE CONTINUED TO SLOW TO 280 KTS AND PROCEEDED AT THAT SPD FOR THE NEXT 25 MI, ONLY TO BE 'DUMPED' IN ON THE PWR PLANT VIS TO RWY 26L. AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG WAS COMPLETED ALTHOUGH THE RATE OF DSCNT WAS FAR ABOVE COMFORTABLE, JUST TO MAKE THE FIELD. I BELIEVE A COMBINATION OF FACTORS CAUSED THIS MESSY AND UNCOMFORTABLE APCH: 1) THE INITIAL CLRNC WAS CONFUSING, CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT SRP VOR WAS FUNCTIONING NORMALLY WITH AZIMUTH AND DME. 2) WE WERE HELD AT FL240 TOO LATE TO MAKE A NORMAL DSCNT AND MAKE ALL RESTRICTIONS. 3) I WAS TOO SLOW IN ADMITTING OUR INABILITY TO MAKE THE XING RESTRICTION. I WILL, IN THE FUTURE, INFORM THE CTLR IMMEDIATELY, THAT I CANNOT MAKE A RESTRICTION AND WILL DO WHATEVER HE WOULD LIKE TO AVOID ANY CONFLICTS. FINALLY, I SEE INCREASED PROBS WITH ZAB AND PHX APCH CTL. WITH THE PLTS PLAYING THE MIDDLE MAN. THE CONCEPT OF MAKING THE ATC SYS WORK HAS CHANGED TO A FEAR OF 'FAA ACTION' AGAINST A PERSON, SHOULD SOME XING RESTRICTION NOT BE MADE. AIRPLANES ARE NOT HELI'S AND MISTAKES ARE MADE ON ALL SIDES (THIS PLT INCLUDED). HOWEVER, THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION AND 'SYS SAFETY' IS BEING SUBORDINATED TO 'CAREER PROTECTIONISM.' I HOPE THIS IS A TREND WE CAN ALL HELP TO TURN AROUND.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.