Narrative:

During climb through FL230; about 20 minutes into flight. We believe we encountered two compressor stalls; one on each engine; at separate times; within 60 seconds of each other. We departed in heavy rain; +25 C. There was a large weather system that stretched [over the south]. During climb we encountered heavier than anticipated and continuous light turbulence; occasional moderate. OAT at FL230 1*C tat. Engine; wing; brake a/I was on. Aircraft was climbing at 250 KIAS; fluctuating -20KIAS due turbulence. First event on number 2 engine; we felt and heard a thump; followed by a small yaw movement. Within 60 seconds we felt same on engine number 1. We immediately leveled at FL250; reduced power and turned igniters on continuous. All engine parameters were observed to be normal with no indications of any aircraft abnormal (no fault warning lights or messages). Using the aircraft synoptic pages; a thorough systems check showed all aircraft systems normal. We continued climb to altitude with igniters on until out of weather system. All systems were continuously monitored for any anomaly. No further discrepancies were noticed. Flight was continued (2.4 hours) to home base uneventfully. On our postflight we inspected number 1 and number 2 engine intakes. No damage visible. Company maintenance was informed of event. Upon review of engine computer data; by the engine manufacturer (pratt & whitney) it was determined that the number 2 engine flamed out 6 times and automatically relit each time. It was also determined that the #1 engine flamed out once and relit automatically. Both flameouts occurred simultaneously. Pratt & whitney determined that the engines operated exactly as designed and ran with nearly perfect parameters for the remainder of flight. They determined that the flameouts occurred due to environmental conditions. It is obviously a disconcerting feeling now knowing that we could have potentially lost both engines; in poor weather conditions. I am thankful that the aircraft and engines are so highly advanced that they relit themselves with only two discernible small yaw movements as our only clue that an event even occurred. The relit were so spontaneous that by the time I looked up to the engine gauges there was no indication of any power loss. At the time of the event we were being vectored around areas of stronger precipitation by ATC.after 13 years of flying advanced corporate jet aircraft it is easy to become complacent with the reliability of modern jet engines. Engine flameouts are commonly thought of as things from the past; or just practice in our bi-annual recurrent simulator training. Obviously this not the case. It is still possible to have an engine flameout under the right environmental conditions; in this case heavy precipitation; turbulence; and possibly my high climb angle and desire to climb above weather quickly contributed to this event that is 'not supposed to happen'. It is unfortunately not practical to say that in the future we will avoid this type of event again by not flying through heavy precipitation. Flying through weather is part of the job and at times you may find yourself; as I did; in heavier than anticipated weather conditions. We had flown into the weather system and landed 1.5 hours earlier. When we departed the inflight conditions worsened. Ceiling and visibility was 1;000 feet and 1 with +RA on departure. Winds were northeast at 15 with gusts up to 26 knots (7;000 foot runway X was used for departure). There were no reports of windshear or thunderstorms at the time of departure. The weather was within normal operating parameters. In order to prevent this from happening ever again I will be more pro-active about finding a better route through and around weather. In this case we departed on our filed flight plan route which turned out to contain the worst of the weather. We spoke with the tower controller to coordinate vectors immediately after departure. He passed us off to departure control who initiated the first deviations. We were then handed over to center who also helped vector us around the heavier precipitation. Unfortunately we were not getting a good radar return; from our on board radar; for the 5 miles directly in front of us. I think we inadvertently wandered into an area of extreme precipitation. In the future I would look to re-file the flight plan route so that it would depart us in a more favorable direction. I was not the PIC on this particular trip and did not file this flight plan. That is no excuse as I am a seasoned captain. I should have been more proactive in prompting or recommending to the PIC that better options were available. ATC was most likely already overloaded due to the massive weather system and it is not fair to them for us to blast off into the system and start asking for reroutes. They were very helpful and accommodating nonetheless. They're vectors kept us away from the worst areas. Ultimately the safest option is to just delay the flight until conditions improve. As I mentioned above I am thankful that our aircraft is so advanced and reliable that a potentially disastrous event only lasted barely seconds in our engine computers. I will rely on them in the future but also do my best to avoid the potential re-occurrence by avoiding the worst weather.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Both DA-2000 engines flamed out then automatically relit without crew knowledge or intervention as the aircraft climbed out to FL250 after takeoff in heavy precipitation and turbulence.

Narrative: During climb through FL230; about 20 minutes into flight. We believe we encountered two compressor stalls; one on each engine; at separate times; within 60 seconds of each other. We departed in heavy rain; +25 C. There was a large weather system that stretched [over the South]. During climb we encountered heavier than anticipated and continuous light turbulence; occasional moderate. OAT at FL230 1*C TAT. Engine; Wing; Brake A/I was on. Aircraft was climbing at 250 KIAS; fluctuating -20KIAS due turbulence. First event on Number 2 engine; we felt and heard a thump; followed by a small yaw movement. Within 60 seconds we felt same on Engine Number 1. We immediately leveled at FL250; reduced power and turned igniters ON Continuous. All engine parameters were observed to be normal with no indications of any aircraft abnormal (no fault warning lights or messages). Using the aircraft synoptic pages; a thorough systems check showed all aircraft systems normal. We continued climb to altitude with igniters ON until out of weather system. All systems were continuously monitored for any anomaly. No further discrepancies were noticed. Flight was continued (2.4 hours) to home base uneventfully. On our postflight we inspected Number 1 and Number 2 engine intakes. No damage visible. Company Maintenance was informed of event. Upon review of engine computer data; by the engine manufacturer (Pratt & Whitney) it was determined that the Number 2 Engine flamed out 6 times and automatically relit each time. It was also determined that the #1 Engine flamed out once and relit automatically. Both flameouts occurred simultaneously. Pratt & Whitney determined that the engines operated exactly as designed and ran with nearly perfect parameters for the remainder of flight. They determined that the flameouts occurred due to environmental conditions. It is obviously a disconcerting feeling now knowing that we could have potentially lost both engines; in poor weather conditions. I am thankful that the aircraft and engines are so highly advanced that they relit themselves with only two discernible small yaw movements as our only clue that an event even occurred. The relit were so spontaneous that by the time I looked up to the engine gauges there was no indication of any power loss. At the time of the event we were being vectored around areas of stronger precipitation by ATC.After 13 years of flying advanced corporate jet aircraft it is easy to become complacent with the reliability of modern jet engines. Engine flameouts are commonly thought of as things from the past; or just practice in our bi-annual recurrent simulator training. Obviously this not the case. It is still possible to have an engine flameout under the right environmental conditions; in this case heavy precipitation; turbulence; and possibly my high climb angle and desire to climb above weather quickly contributed to this event that is 'not supposed to happen'. It is unfortunately not practical to say that in the future we will avoid this type of event again by not flying through heavy precipitation. Flying through weather is part of the job and at times you may find yourself; as I did; in heavier than anticipated weather conditions. We had flown into the weather system and landed 1.5 hours earlier. When we departed the inflight conditions worsened. Ceiling and visibility was 1;000 feet and 1 with +RA on departure. Winds were NE at 15 with gusts up to 26 knots (7;000 foot Runway X was used for departure). There were no reports of windshear or thunderstorms at the time of departure. The weather was within normal operating parameters. In order to prevent this from happening ever again I will be more pro-active about finding a better route through and around weather. In this case we departed on our filed flight plan route which turned out to contain the worst of the weather. We spoke with the Tower Controller to coordinate vectors immediately after departure. He passed us off to Departure Control who initiated the first deviations. We were then handed over to Center who also helped vector us around the heavier precipitation. Unfortunately we were not getting a good radar return; from our on board radar; for the 5 miles directly in front of us. I think we inadvertently wandered into an area of extreme precipitation. In the future I would look to re-file the flight plan route so that it would depart us in a more favorable direction. I was not the PIC on this particular trip and did not file this flight plan. That is no excuse as I am a seasoned Captain. I should have been more proactive in prompting or recommending to the PIC that better options were available. ATC was most likely already overloaded due to the massive weather system and it is not fair to them for us to blast off into the system and start asking for reroutes. They were very helpful and accommodating nonetheless. They're vectors kept us away from the worst areas. Ultimately the safest option is to just delay the flight until conditions improve. As I mentioned above I am thankful that our aircraft is so advanced and reliable that a potentially disastrous event only lasted barely seconds in our engine computers. I will rely on them in the future but also do my best to avoid the potential re-occurrence by avoiding the worst weather.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.