Narrative:

I was the aircraft commander/instructor/pilot flying operating a training sortie to sju. The weather was forecast to be VFR with possible rain showers in the vicinity. We briefed the ILS approach to runway 10 for currency training. We could see some dark clouds; rain; and lightning east and northeast of the field. On radar dogleg to final we were informed an air carrier ahead of us elected to go-around with a thunderstorm approaching the field. ATIS was unavailable but we got weather from approach; which was still reported well above minimums. We calculated a reference ground speed in case of gusty winds; but winds were never gusty and always below 10 KTS through landing roll. We could see the field from over 20 miles away. Approach control queried our intentions after the other air carrier went around. We elected to continue the approach. We could see the field and the weather approaching it. My boom operator communicated that he was comfortable with the approach. He pointed out the lightning strikes on the far side of the field. My flight engineer was comfortable continuing the approach. The co-pilot; the pilot not flying recommended loading the holding pattern at the FAF; remsy in case we needed to hold. I had him load this. In the post flight debriefs he recollected voicing his concerns about continuing the approach. I recall him recommending holding through the storm [versus getting on the ground before the storm]. We lost sight of the field visually around 2-3 miles from the field encountering clouds and heavy rain. We continued on the ILS. I don't recall the pilot not flying callout of 'approaching minimums' but he said he made the call in post mission debriefs. I acquired the approach lights about 100 ft above minimums. I would have called continuing or landing at minimums had the pilot not flying made a 'minimums' callout. At approximately 40 ft above minimums the pilot not flying called; 'go-around? Go-around.' I responded that; 'I have the runway lights in sight.' he responded; 'I didn't think you had it.' I acquired the runway visually at minimums. I took his 'I didn't think you had it' response to mean he was calling a go-around because he didn't see the runway. Since the weather on the missed approach track was likely worse and I had the runway in sight in; stable condition; I elected the safer option was to land. It is highly unusual to land if any crew member calls a go-around.in hindsight not trying to beat the weather to the field and holding/diverting would have been the safer option. I pushed.no turbulence was encountered at anytime after descent through landing. We had plenty of fuel for holding with far divert options. Both systems of radar painted no weather; but did paint ground return if dialed down.it should be noted that while my young lieutenant student pilot not flying co-pilot is new to our aircraft; he has a couple thousand hours flying regional jets. This was his first approach to minimums in a large aircraft. I clearly pushed his comfort level with no detailed pre-brief of an approach to minimums due to unforecast weather and a rush to beat the weather.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Military Aircraft Commander landed at SJU in heavy weather after acquiring the runway near approach minimums even though the First Officer was calling for a go-around.

Narrative: I was the Aircraft Commander/Instructor/pilot flying operating a training sortie to SJU. The weather was forecast to be VFR with possible rain showers in the vicinity. We briefed the ILS approach to Runway 10 for currency training. We could see some dark clouds; rain; and lightning east and northeast of the field. On radar dogleg to final we were informed an air carrier ahead of us elected to go-around with a thunderstorm approaching the field. ATIS was unavailable but we got weather from Approach; which was still reported well above minimums. We calculated a reference ground speed in case of gusty winds; but winds were never gusty and always below 10 KTS through landing roll. We could see the field from over 20 miles away. Approach Control queried our intentions after the other air carrier went around. We elected to continue the approach. We could see the field and the weather approaching it. My Boom Operator communicated that he was comfortable with the approach. He pointed out the lightning strikes on the far side of the field. My Flight Engineer was comfortable continuing the approach. The co-pilot; the pilot not flying recommended loading the holding pattern at the FAF; REMSY in case we needed to hold. I had him load this. In the post flight debriefs he recollected voicing his concerns about continuing the approach. I recall him recommending holding through the storm [versus getting on the ground before the storm]. We lost sight of the field visually around 2-3 miles from the field encountering clouds and heavy rain. We continued on the ILS. I don't recall the pilot not flying callout of 'approaching minimums' but he said he made the call in post mission debriefs. I acquired the approach lights about 100 FT above minimums. I would have called continuing or landing at minimums had the pilot not flying made a 'minimums' callout. At approximately 40 FT above minimums the pilot not flying called; 'Go-around? Go-around.' I responded that; 'I have the runway lights in sight.' He responded; 'I didn't think you had it.' I acquired the runway visually at minimums. I took his 'I didn't think you had it' response to mean he was calling a go-around because he didn't see the runway. Since the weather on the missed approach track was likely worse and I had the runway in sight in; stable condition; I elected the safer option was to land. It is highly unusual to land if any crew member calls a go-around.In hindsight not trying to beat the weather to the field and holding/diverting would have been the safer option. I pushed.No turbulence was encountered at anytime after descent through landing. We had plenty of fuel for holding with far divert options. Both systems of radar painted no weather; but did paint ground return if dialed down.It should be noted that while my young lieutenant student pilot not flying co-pilot is new to our aircraft; he has a couple thousand hours flying regional jets. This was his first approach to minimums in a large aircraft. I clearly pushed his comfort level with no detailed pre-brief of an approach to minimums due to unforecast weather and a rush to beat the weather.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.