Narrative:

Descending through 11;000 feet on approach.... One of the flight attendants called up to the flight deck and the first officer was talking to her on the intercom. We had not yet run the in-range below the line check for sterile cockpit since we were still above 10;000 feet. At that time the gen 2 off EICAS message annunciated. The QRH procedure for gen 1(2) off calls for the affected generator switch to be selected to off/reset then back on. I was the pilot flying and since the first officer was talking the with the flight attendant on the intercom and we were in clear; VMC fight conditions I reached up to reset the number 2 generator. I inadvertently grabbed the gen 1 switch instead of the gen 2 switch. As soon as I lifted the gen 1 switch out of its on position detent I realized I had inadvertently grabbed the wrong generator switch. I immediately returned the gen 1 switch back to the on position detent but apparently the gcu had already taken gen 1 off line. The aircraft sensed it had experienced a total loss of electrical power and auto-deployed the air driven generated (air driven generator). I had flown air driven generator deploy test flights in past years so I knew what to expect for the short remainder of the flight. After determining that the aircraft had full electrical power from gen 1 and the air driven generator and re-engaging the autopilot which had disconnected with the air driven generator deploy; I called for the QRH procedure for gen 2 off. The generator would not reset. We ran the remainder of the in-range checklist and continued the brief remainder of the flight and made a normal visual approach and landing without further incident. There is no QRH checklist for air driven generator deploy so no further action was taken. No emergency was declared and we briefed the flight attendants before landing that other than the obvious loud noise the air driven generator was producing that it would be a normal approach and landing. I should have waited for the first officer to finish his conversation with the flight attendant and called for the QRH procedure to attempt to reset the gen 2 failure. My overconfidence in knowing the QRH procedure by memory and flying in clear; VMC conditions led me to inadvertently grab the wrong generator switch and compound a very simple situation increasing the work load for both the first officer and myself. Two sets of eyes looking at the correct generator switch to reset would have prevented this situation from occurring. I will no longer rely on memory and will not act alone in even the simplest of abnormalities in the future. There simply is no excuse for not following established abnormal procedures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: After experiencing a Gen 2 OFF EICAS message; CRJ-900 Captain inadvertently secured the Number 1 Generator without using a checklist or enlisting the aid of the First Officer who was conversing with the cabin. ADG deployed and aircraft landed without further incident.

Narrative: Descending through 11;000 feet on approach.... One of the flight attendants called up to the flight deck and the First Officer was talking to her on the intercom. We had not yet run the in-range below the line check for sterile cockpit since we were still above 10;000 feet. At that time the GEN 2 OFF EICAS message annunciated. The QRH procedure for GEN 1(2) OFF calls for the affected generator switch to be selected to OFF/RESET then back on. I was the Pilot Flying and since the First Officer was talking the with the Flight Attendant on the intercom and we were in clear; VMC fight conditions I reached up to reset the Number 2 generator. I inadvertently grabbed the GEN 1 switch instead of the GEN 2 switch. As soon as I lifted the GEN 1 switch out of its on position detent I realized I had inadvertently grabbed the wrong generator switch. I immediately returned the GEN 1 switch back to the on position detent but apparently the GCU had already taken GEN 1 off line. The aircraft sensed it had experienced a total loss of electrical power and auto-deployed the Air Driven Generated (ADG). I had flown ADG deploy test flights in past years so I knew what to expect for the short remainder of the flight. After determining that the aircraft had full electrical power from GEN 1 and the ADG and re-engaging the autopilot which had disconnected with the ADG deploy; I called for the QRH procedure for GEN 2 OFF. The generator would not reset. We ran the remainder of the in-range checklist and continued the brief remainder of the flight and made a normal visual approach and landing without further incident. There is no QRH checklist for ADG deploy so no further action was taken. No emergency was declared and we briefed the flight attendants before landing that other than the obvious loud noise the ADG was producing that it would be a normal approach and landing. I should have waited for the First Officer to finish his conversation with the Flight Attendant and called for the QRH procedure to attempt to reset the GEN 2 failure. My overconfidence in knowing the QRH procedure by memory and flying in clear; VMC conditions led me to inadvertently grab the wrong generator switch and compound a very simple situation increasing the work load for both the first officer and myself. Two sets of eyes looking at the correct generator switch to reset would have prevented this situation from occurring. I will no longer rely on memory and will not act alone in even the simplest of abnormalities in the future. There simply is no excuse for not following established abnormal procedures.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.